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TOWARDS EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN ETHNIC POLITICIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SENEGAL AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines in the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized in heterogeneous societies: how, and in what ways do political institutions matter? How, and what kinds of political institutions constrain or provide incentives for the use of ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool? Many answers to this question focus on the role of formal political institutions (colonial, post-colonial, democratic transition). As in most of the developing countries, however, informal institutions play a crucial role in African politics. To the extent that the rules of the political game governing representation and access to government resources are determined by informal institutions (e.g., institutions of social integration), these rules should be central to any explanations of ethnic politicization or the lack thereof.

Drawing on and extending existing theories and analytical frameworks on formal institutions, the dissertation considers the interactive effects of informal political institutions on the forms and outcomes of ethnic mobilization in sub-Saharan Africa. The dissertation finds that informal institutions (e.g., the Sufi Orders in Senegal and voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire) and informal institutional rules (e.g., ethnic transcendence and ethnic balancing) can directly affect the politicization of ethnicity. Change in these informal institutional rules may lead to shifts in the political salience of ethnic identity—from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national discourse— altering incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The salience of ethnicity in politics has resurfaced as an issue of major concern, particularly for heterogeneous societies. While war between states seems to be on the decline, ethnic conflict within them is on the rise. Some early works on the social conflict and regime breakdown in Africa suggest that ethnicity acted as the centrifugal force behind such outcomes. In fact, most of the civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa have been attributed in one form or another to ethnicity. Many view ethnicity as a good predictor of the likelihood that a country will experience ethnic conflict in the future.[1]

Citing cases such as Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, scholars assert that in heterogeneous societies, ethnicity will shape the main political cleavages, define political participation, become the axes of political competition, encourage ethnic voting and ethnic campaigning, and ultimately lead to ethnically related conflicts, civil war, political instability and even regime breakdown.[2] Since control of the state and its resources are the focal points of competition, ethnicity increases the zero-sum nature of political engagement and leads to violent confrontation

[1] See Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier (2000). These scholars use a measure of ethnic plurality to determine which countries are most at risk of civil conflict. Easterly and Levine argue that higher levels of ethnic diversity encourage instability. Collier, however, posits that at higher levels of ethnic plurality, the likelihood of civil unrest decreases higher levels of ethnic plurality. According to Collier, the countries that are most at risk of civil conflict are those with medium levels of ethnic heterogeneity. A number of ethnic factionalization scores/ indexes have been developed for the explicit purpose of calculating the risk of civil conflict. These include the Atlas Narodov Mira (ELF) index and the Minority at Risk (MAR) dataset.

[2] A number of scholars view ethnicity as a good predictor of support for different political parties (Norris & Mattes 2003; Posner 2005; Laitin 1986).

among groups as each ethnic cleavage seeks to dominate by neutralizing or eliminating rival groups.[3]

Challenged by the failure to empirically account for the many heterogeneous countries in which ethnic cleavages do not feature prominently in the political arenas and have not experienced social conflict, civil wars or regime breakdown,[4] scholars have sought to refine this argument. The more refined version of the argument is that while important, ethnicity in and of itself does not cause conflict. Acknowledging that "[e]ven in the most severely divided society, ties of blood does not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood," scholars such as V.P. Gagnon (1995) and Daniel Posner (2005) posit that theoretically, the conventional causal mechanism is wrong: the root cause of social conflicts and the disintegration of the state is not ethnicity *per se*, but rather the politicization[5] thereof. When ethnicity becomes the chief mobilizational tool, the axes of political competition and dominates the political discourse, political instability, disintegration of the state, or full blown collapse and civil war inevitably ensue. The practice of ethnic politics sharpens divisions, exacerbates existing tensions and creates a cycle of violence that often undermines political stability and encourages ethnic conflict.

But under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized in multi-ethnic societies? What are the dominant constraints on such practices? When and why do political elites take advantage of their country's ethnic multidimensionality? Under what circumstances does ethnic politicization become an attractive political option for elites, and what factors check the use of ethnicity as a political tool? By answering these

[3] See Laitin (1986); Horowitz (1985); Chabal (1993).
[4] For example Senegal, Tanzania, Cameroon, Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin.
[5] See Posner(2005); Gagnon (1995)

questions this dissertation offers an account of the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to be politicized in ethnically diverse societies, highlights some incentive structures that systematically influence ethnic politics, and helps to explain the cross-country variation in ethnic politicization that we observe throughout Africa.

This dissertation builds on some of the general assumptions in the vast literature on political life regarding various developing countries, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa. Following the trend established by Laitin (1986) and Posner (2005), this dissertation considers the impact of colonialism on ethnic politicization. Key to their analyses is the notion that the salience of ethnicity is significantly determined by the colonial institutions that developed in particular countries. The underlying assumption is that institutions provide the context in which political actors define their strategies and pursue their interests.

A country's institutional setting helps to define the constellations of incentives and constraints faced by political actors and individuals. More specifically, the colonial administrative, labor and land policies shaped individual preferences and interests. The repertoire of interests in turn influences an individual's political choices and behavior. For these scholars, the likelihood that individuals will invest in their ethnic identity and that political elites will view ethnicity as a meaningful mobilizational tool may be discerned from colonial institutions since it is these institutions that have played the central role in shaping the politics in former colonial societies. Under the right conditions, these incentive structures contribute to the peaceful integration of ethnic groups into national politics

Like these scholars, I argue that there is a definite link between colonial institutions and ethnic politicization. The dissertation shows, however, that the debate should be taken beyond the conventional French versus British dichotomy as the institutional legacies of colonialism produced divergent administrative and political institutions not only among countries with different colonial rulers, but also those with the same colonial rulers. This is significant in meeting the empirical challenge of providing an explanation for divergent outcomes among countries with similar colonial rulers. By moving beyond the broad differences among the various colonial institutions direct rule versus indirect rule- this dissertation indicates that while historical legacies may seem (and are often presumed to be) similar in terms of the importation of administrative structures, political organization, political ideologies and labor policies, how these factors were instituted on the ground varied significantly, even among countries with the same colonial ruler.

These differences in the administrative structures, political organization and labor policies, I argue, have significant consequences for the incentives and/or disincentives and consequently, the likelihood of ethnicity being politicized. In fact, my empirical data from the field research in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire indicate that differences in the colonial administrative, land and labor policies led to differences in the types of and the manner in which informal institutions emerged, evolved and operated. These institutions have, in turn, shaped the expectations and behavior of the people in each country. They have defined the incentives for individuals to invest in their ethnic identity and for political elites to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.

Another important departure from the general literature is that rather than focus on the historical development of formal state institutions such as different electoral rules at the national level, this dissertation focuses more on societal-level institutions, particularly informal institutions— "institutions of social integration"—that developed as intermediaries between the colonial state and local society. By focusing on the societal counterparts to the state colonial legacies, this dissertation helps to identify and outline the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become politicized more specifically. It directly bridges the gap in the existing literature in explaining why, despite formal institutional changes, particularly from single to multi-party rule, some countries have not experienced ethnic politicization. The answer, I argue, lies with the informal institutional rules established by the informal institutions such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal, voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire and hometown associations in countries like Nigeria and Ghana.

These institutions developed as a result of colonialism. As intermediaries between the colonial state and the society and later the post-independence state and the society, Sufi Orders and voluntary associations established the rules of the political game as far as whether, and the extent to which, ethnicity became politically salient. By setting forth rules (albeit informal ones) about ethnic transcendence or (as in the case of Côte d'Ivoire) relatively balanced ethnic representation and access to public groups, informal institutions such as the Sufi Order and voluntary associations determine the salience of ethnic identity and therefore, the incentives for political elites to view and use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool. What is more, this dissertation indicates that in the case of Senegal formal institutional change does not necessarily destroy informal

institutions. This, I submit, suggests the need to look beyond formal institutional change to account for shifts in the salience of ethnicity and the use of ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.

This dissertation proposes an analytical framework that addresses the criticism that institutional legacies of colonialism "cannot account for variation among or within territories colonized by the same European power."[6] By uncovering the role of informal institutions such as the Sufi Order and the Voluntary Associations in the respective countries, we begin to shed light on the important question of why ethnicity is more politically salient in Côte d'Ivoire than in Senegal. Uncovering the rules of the game governing political participation, access to government resources, land rights and citizenship also indicates the need to look beyond formal institutions as key explanatory factors for ethnic politicization and conflicts in sub-Saharan African.

This finding has implications for our understanding of when, and what kinds of institutions matter. It shows that political outcomes in Africa are largely conditioned by societal-level factors, that informal institutions play a more significant role in African politics than many previous accounts have suggested, and that existing accounts that focus exclusively on the role of formal institutions at the national-level, tell only part of the story. Another implication is that the argument makes it possible to generalize about the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized.

This dissertation argues that it is these societal level informal colonial institutional legacies that are the key determinants of whether ethnicity becomes politicized. The main argument is that ethnic affiliation becomes the axis of political competition not because of change in formal institutional rule as Posner (2005) asserts,

[6] Boone (2003:16).

but rather because of shifts in the informal institutional rules, particularly those regulating the rules of engagement in the realm of political representation, access to public resources, land rights and citizenship rights. Much of the variation we observe in the politicization of ethnicity across sub-Saharan Africa may be attributed to this factor.

Like much of the work that tries to explain ethnic politics, ethnic conflict or ethnic politicization, the literature on Africa focuses on formal institutions and other state-level variables to explain political outcomes within and across African countries. Scholars have focused on the effects of colonial legacies, particularly the effects of the importation of administrative ideologies and structures from colonial metropoles; the role of religion, religious differences and divides, or changes in formal institutional rules, particularly the shift from single-party to multi-party rule and democratization. These variables have been advanced to explain cross-country differences in ethnic conflict, ethnic politics or the politicization of ethnicity. While this dissertation also focuses on cross-country variation in the politicization of ethnicity, it identifies a different casual relationship. I argue that variations in ethnic politicization are determined by shifts in the informal institutional rules; variations in ethnic politicization and the salience of ethnicity are products of political bargaining and redistributive functions that occurs within African societies between the state, political leaders, informal institutional networks, and ethnic groups.

Informal Institutional Change and Ethnic Politicization in sub-Saharan Africa

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, there are significant variations in the salience of ethnic identities as well as informal institutional networks and rules that help to

regulate against politicization. These informal institutional configurations, and by extension, their rules, help to explain why the use of ethnicity as a mobilizational tool have varied so much. While it is fairly well established in the state/society relations literature that informal institutions such as hometown associations, voluntary associations and Sufi Orders play a crucial role in African politics, there has been little or no attempt to examine their effect on ethnic politicization. Changes in informal institutional rules tend to be overlooked as a source of the differences in ethnic politicization or ethnic conflict throughout Africa. Rather, as mentioned above, much of the scholarship on ethnic politics in sub-Saharan Africa has emphasized the importation of foreign administrative structures and ideologies from colonial powers or change in formal institutional rules as key determinants of variation in instances of ethnic politicization in Africa south of the Sahara.

This dissertation offers an alternative approach. It focuses on the role and impact of informal institutions on ethnic politicization using the comparative case-study approach. Analyses of colonial conquest, administration, the post-colonial and post-independence period, and the politics of regime consolidation since the 1950s reveal considerable variations in the capacity of, and the manner in which, informal institutional configurations manage ethnic differences and constrain the politicization of ethnic identity. This has led to calls for research that focus closely on informal institutions.[7]

In an attempt to bridge this important gap in the literature and increase understanding of the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized more generally. The main argument of the dissertation is that informal institutions play a

[7] See Helmke and Levitsky (2006).

much more significant role in African politics than is generally acknowledged. How power and politics are negotiated and distributed among various ethnic groups and how these imbalances are institutionalized in sub-Saharan Africa are largely determined by societal-level informal institutions such as Sufi Orders in Senegal and voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire . These institutions, more so than formal institutions, shape expectations, define the incentive structure and influence the strategic choices that individuals, ethnic groups and political elites make. Consequently, shifts in the informal institutional rules may significantly change public expectations and shift the incentive structure — so much so that ethnic identity becomes an attractive mobilizational tool for political elites— for political elites to make ethnic appeals.

This dissertation builds on the insights on the political importance of informal institutions from the scholarship on democratic governance and state-society relations in Africa by extending the discussion of their implications beyond concerns for democratic consolidation, to the impact that change in these institutional rules may have on ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict. Given the prevalence of informal institutional networks operating as intermediaries between the state and society, particularly as conduits for the redistribution of governmental benefits throughout Africa, there is much to be said for examining the question of the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become politicized by focusing not so much on formal institutional rules, but more so, on the rules (albeit informal ones) that really matter.

North argues that while the general assumption is that life is ordered by formal rules, actions are in fact guided more by informal constraints, such as "codes of conduct, norms of behavior and conventions" (North 1990:36). Arguing that formal and

informal institutions should be regarded as opposite ends of a continuum, and that the latter are at least as important as the former, North defines institutions as: "the rules of the game in a society, or more formally… the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."[8] Despite this wider, more encompassing definition and assertions that informal institutions may be the more important of the two, the use of institutions as independent variables in the comparative politics literature focus almost exclusively on formal institutions, especially those that relate to electoral systems and democratization. This dissertation is premised on the idea that such analyses could help to explain why the salience of ethnic identity and instances of ethnic politicization vary so much across the African continent.

The research findings are striking. Changes in informal institutional rules governing political representation, power-sharing, and resource distribution, have significant implications for the incentive structure[9] and consequently, for ethnic politicization. This dissertation shows for example, how in the case of Senegal, institutional configurations such as Sufi brotherhoods help to transcend historic ethnic and religious communities, thereby providing an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the idea of national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that blocks the use of political appeals to cultural differences as a mobilizational tool. And, with the patronage ties of the respective brotherhoods forming the social base of the political parties and the Sufi brotherhoods dictating the terms of social and political interactions, the Sufi Orders indicate that institutions of social integration may indeed constrain ethnic politicization.

[8] North (1990:3).
[9] In terms of elite strategic choices and people's incentives to respond to ethnic politics.

The approach produces an account of colonial legacies, and post-colonial institutional changes much like those of scholars such as Atul Kohli (2004) and Posner (2005), with the notable exception that rather than focusing on formal institutions at the state level, this dissertation considers the counterparts at the societal level- colonial legacies, and change in informal institutional rules. To the extent that political representation and access to government resources are determined by informal institutional rules those rules will be central to any explanation of ethnic politicization or the lack thereof. Change in informal institutional rules may lead to a shift in the political salience of ethnic identity—from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national discourse—and the incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity a primary mobilizational tool.

Faced with change in the Ivorian land policy from "the land belongs to he who cultivates it" to needing proof not only of one's natural birth registration, but also proof that both parents are also natural born citizens, a northern Ivoirian Muslim would begin to compare her (and by extension her group's) relative access to political presentation and access to government resources with those of other ethnic groups (Baoulé, Bété, Krou, and Christians). Finding evidence of political inequality against northern Ivoirian Muslims in general, she may become more likely to respond to appeals by political elites who seek to highlight the grievances of her ethnic group. She may also align herself with political party that, while not making explicit appeals to ethnic differences or related grievances, directly opposes the new changes to the informal institutional rules.

This dissertation also shows that while formal institutional rules governing political competition in Senegal changed (particularly from single to multiparty rule) in 1981, the general expectations of the public and the incentive structures have remained relatively unaltered. This, I argue, is largely due to the fact that there have been few changes to the structure or importance of the informal institutional configurations of the Sufi Order. Consequently there have been few changes to the institutionalized rules governing political representation and access to government resources or the likelihood of political elites making appeals to ethnic identity.

The implication here is that as long as the pan-ethnic, inclusive and transcendent institutional configurations of the Sufi Orders continue to determine the rules of the political game, the likelihood of Senegalese political elites using ethnicity as a mobilizational tool also remains low. Conversely, where the actual rules being followed are established by informal rather than formal rules, changes to the former (particularly those governing political representation, resource distribution, land tenure and citizenship) may significantly alter the salience of ethnicity and public expectations of relatively balanced ethnic representation and access to public goods, as well as affect the overall incentives for political elites to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.

The assertion that change in informal institutional rules offers a stronger explanatory power for the variation in ethnic politicization across sub-Saharan Africa than accounts that focus on formal institution is built on well-established empirical accounts depicting the extent to which uncodified rules shape the behavior and expectations of the people in African societies. The state-society relations literatures offer rich analyses of how factors at the societal level (such as the redistributive

networks of the Sufi Orders in Senegal) influence political outcomes. These analyses indicate that in general, the actual rules of the game (that is, the institutionalized, societally embedded rules) to which the public and political elites adhere and develop expectations are not those that are formally established. Rather, they are long established, deeply rooted, societally embedded rules that remain uncodified. In her depiction of the importance of informal institutional rules in society Catherine Boone (2003) wrote:

> There is often acute disjuncture between the formal rules that define institutional structure and functions, and the real politics of how government agencies work. [Individuals] who advocate reforms that will "get institutions right" ignore this at their own risk…Informal power relations, communal divisions or solidarities and underlying economic arrangements can constitute real parameters of institutional change and choice. [10]

As the chapters that follow will indicate, changes in informal institutions regulating political representation, access to state resources, land tenure and citizenship rights may lead to significant increases in political inequality, ethnic and regional disparities and ethnic based grievances, which in turn shifted the salience of ethnic identity-from dormant and contained to dominating the national political discourse-and the incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool. Catherine Boone aptly reminds us that "[t]heorists and practitioners need analytical frameworks for describing differences in …African contexts and for hypothesizing about the sources and effects thereof" (Boone 1990:7). The proceeding chapter constructs an analytical framework and proposes a theoretical account of the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become politicized. It is objective of this dissertation to offer a better understanding and an alternative account of the cross-

[10] See Boone (2003:4-5).

country variations in ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict in Africa. The dissertation meets this objective by identifying and assessing: (a) the actual rules of the game pertaining, in particular, to the distribution of resources and land and citizens' rights, that shape people's behavior and expectations (that is, how they developed and their importance relative to political stability and social cohesion within a particular country); and (b) how these informal rules and change therein, affect the incentive structure—whether ethnic identity is likely to: (i) remains socially but not politically salient; (ii) become or remain politically salient but dormant or contained; or (ii) become the primary mobilizational tool for political competition.

Like formal institutions, informal institutions provide common knowledge about the incentives faced by everyone in a society. Consequently, change in informal institutional rules governing access to state resources or land tenure policies can affect whether, and the extent to which ethnic identity becomes politically salient or the primary means of political mobilization. Posner asserts that prior to delving into the issue of why political actors embrace or seek to mobilize on the basis of ethnic affiliations, one must "first account for why some identities are understood to be meaningful candidates for mobilization and others are not."[11] Posner is right. Chapter Four focuses entirely on this issue.

The chapter uses process tracing and indicates that ethnic identities may be traced to specific colonial institutions, particularly those related to administration. The chapter also shows that colonialism resulted in the rise of informal institutional configurations that often operated as conduits of the state. Rules (albeit informal ones) developed to govern issues such as political representation, power-sharing

[11] See Posner (2005: 6).

arrangements, access to state resources, land tenure and citizenship rights. These rules have persisted since 1960 in the case of Senegal and until recently (in the post- 1993 era)[12] in the case of Côte d'Ivoire.

Chapter Five further details the persistence of these institutions throughout the post-independence era and considers how the nature and functions of these informal institutions help to accentuate or attenuate ethnic differences. The chapter directly addresses the claim that religion, in particular a Muslim/Christian divide, effectively accounts for instances of ethnic politicization or non-politicization. The chapter shows that while religion is indeed important in shaping behavior and influencing the capacity for collective action, it does not determine political actions. It argues that the likelihood that ethnicity will become politicized is dependent not so much on religious differences, but rather, on whether, and to what extent the informal institutional networks and informally institutionalized rules accentuate or attenuate ethnic differences. Islam is able to mitigate ethnic politicization in Senegal, not because of the religious doctrine or theological foundations, but because of the extent to which the religious structures gave birth to informal institutions that: (a) attenuate ethnic differences; and (b) serve as an effective counterweight to the state, in terms of goods provisions.

Chapter Five also shows that the real problem in Côte d'Ivoire is not religion *per se*. Rather, unlike Senegal, the informal institutions that developed in Côte d'Ivoire during the late-colonial and post-independence periods provided governmental resources primarily on the basis of ethnic and ethno-regional differences. The result is

[12] Following the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, political competition in the country took on a decidedly ethnic tone. By 1995, the dominant issue of Ivorian politics was ethnic affiliation. The situation resulted in a coup d'etat in December 1999 and the onset of a civil war which has left the country dived into two distinct administrative units—the government controls the South and the rebels control the region north of Bauké.

that unlike Senegal, these informal institutional configurations of voluntary associations accentuated ethnic differences and made ethnicity politically salient. To be clear, the argument here is not that high salience levels will result in ethnic politicization. Rather, the argument is that ethnicity is more likely to become politicized in those countries where ethnicity is more salient than in societies where it is not. Thus, while higher levels of political salience in Côte d'Ivoire meant that there was a larger possibility of ethnicity being politicized than in Senegal, it is possible for political salience of ethnicity to remain low and dormant over long periods of time.

Chapter Six directly addresses the question of how institutional change can result in ethnic politicization. This chapter challenges the general assumptions in the comparative politics literature that ethnic politicization results from, and therefore, may be explained by shifts in the electoral system or the shift from single to multiparty rule. The chapter offers a comparative analysis that traces the shift in incentives and the politicization process in Côte d'Ivoire from 1960-1993 and 1993-2007.

The case explorations indicate that ethnic affiliation became the axes of political competition in Côte d'Ivoire when it did, not because of democratization or regime change, but because of changes to long established and institutionalized rules governing political representation, power-sharing, resource distribution and land tenure and citizenship rights. These changes significantly altered the political representation, as far as relatively balanced ethnic representation, land tenure and citizenship rights, leading to claims and counter-claims of ethnic biases and preference, mobilization and counter-mobilization and ethnic outbidding. The chapter also provides an explanation for how and why institutional change occurs. In particular, the dissertation addresses a central

question that is often left unaddressed in works on institutionalism- how can individuals initiate change in a context that is determining their behavior? In other words, how can actors change the very institutions in which they are embedded?

The countries studied in this dissertation were selected because of the variation in ethnic politicization. Given their disparate experience with ethnic politicization,[13] the Senegal-Côte d'Ivoire dyad presents an opportunity for understanding the conditions under which political elites politicize ethnic differences and the factors that prevent them from doing so. Despite an ethnically diverse population, ethnic differences have not been a major feature of Senegal's political discourse. Rather, as indicated in the last elections in 2000, political competition in Senegal is staged at the level of the nation-state.

Conversely, since 1993 political competition in Côte d'Ivoire has been based largely on ethnic identity as Ivoirian political elites have increasingly used the ethnic card to secure their hold on power. President Bédié for example, in an effort to secure his electoral victory in the 1995 presidential elections, introduced the concept of *Ivoirité* (or Ivoirian pride),[14]which excluded principal political opponents such as Alassane Ouattara from the political decision making process. Like Bédié, Guei and Gbagbo have continued to interject the notion of pure versus circumstantial Ivoirians into the Ivoirian political discourse. Subsequently, not only has *Ivoirité* come to dominate Ivoirian

[13] Despite its ethnic diversity Senegal (North of the Gambia) has had little experience with ethnic politicization. Côte d'Ivoire has been experiencing ethnic strife and politicization since the mid-1990s.
[14] The concept of Ivoirité has been around for some time, primarily since the 1960. It was reportedly coined by Houphouët-Boigny as a means of promoting Ivoirian pride and nationalism. Since the mid-1990s, however (particularly after the death of Houphouét-Boigny), the concept took on a different, more acerbic meaning and was used as the criteria for distinguishing between a "true" Ivorian citizen and distinguish between "true" Ivoirian citizens and others. Given its implications on political representation, citizenship and land tenure rights, the question of Ivoirité has dominated much of the national debate in the post-1993 era.

political arena, overshadowing the politics of the nation-state, it has been the primary source of the recent civil war in the country.

The variation in the political salience of ethnicity between the countries begs for explanations as to why ethnic politicization occurs in some ethnically diverse societies but not others. Why have Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire had such different experiences regarding ethnic politicization despite the many structural and historical similarities? Under what conditions are ethnic conflicts constructed? This question lies at the heart of contemporary theoretical and policy debates about ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.

The plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in three parts. Part I, comprised of chapters two and three, offers a detailed discussion of the literature related to ethnicity, ethnic conflict and democratization. It also describes the research design and methodology. Part II, comprising chapters four and five, describes and explains why, given the colonial legacies and institutional continuity in the post-independence era, ethnicity became politically salient and, therefore, more likely to become politicized in some countries but not others.

Having established the nature of the Senegalese and Ivoirian political landscape, Part III addresses the central question of the dissertation: under what conditions are political elites likely to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool? Chapter Six offers an in-country comparative analysis over time that directly addresses this question. The chapter focuses on the leadership of Ivoirian leaders, Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993)

and Bédié (1993- 1998). The chapter offers a comparative analysis of the proportional representation of the various ethnic groups in the top government positions, the legislature and top-level economic organizations under the two leaders Here, the chapter shows that shifts in the incentive and the politicization process in Côte d'Ivoire are directly related to the changes in the informal institutional rules governing political representation, access to state resources, land tenure and citizenship rights. The chapter also shows that focus on formal institutions, particularly shifts from single-party to multiparty rule, does not adequately account for ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire. The implication, which is further explored in Chapters Seven and Eight, is that much of the variation in the use of ethnicity as a mobilization tool that we observe across sub-Saharan Africa may be explained by change in informal institutional rules.

Part III therefore tests the explanatory power of the argument of the dissertation by going beyond the cases of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. Chapter Eight considers the cases of Casamance[15] and Cameroon. Chapter Nine offers a conclusion of the findings of the research project and implications for future studies. The empirical material presented in this dissertation shows that there is a need to consider not just state- level variables but also counterparts at the societal-level. This is particularly true of African societies and developing countries more generally, where the rules of the game that guide political behavior are often not formally established but rather, people's expectations and incentives are largely influenced by informal institutional rules.

[15]The Casamance is located in the southern regions of Senegal. The territory is literally separated from the rest of Senegal by another country—the Gambia. While part of Senegal, for the purposes of this dissertation Casamance is treated as a single case. Besides being geographically separated from Senegal north of the Gambia, the region has had spells of ethnic related violence and experienced outright ethnic conflict since the early 1980s. Treating the Casamance as a single case should provide insights into the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized. As a regional case, the Casamance is also a good test-case for the argument the dissertation advances.

Defining the Concepts

The politicization of ethnicity occurs when ethnic differences (identities, language, origin, and religion), tensions or conflicts are brought into the political arena, thereby creating a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity. Ethnicity becomes the central focus of political debates and the primary subject of "political discourse." Political policies, platforms and campaigns are no longer staged at the level of the nation-state, but based more on ethnic pluralism. Scholars such as Boubacar N'Diaye claim that by injecting the poisonous concept of *Ivoirité* into the Ivoirian political discourse, Bedié awakened the demons of xenophobia, regionalism, tribalism and religion intolerance, which played a significant role in the demise of democracy in Côte d'Ivoire (2001:106).

The salience of ethnicity refers to the extent to which political competition is affected by ethnically related differences (language, religion or origin). That is, the extent to which party alignment, political cleavages, political campaigns and the political policies are influenced by ethnic differences. And, political elites refer those who regularly and substantively affect national political outcomes. They include high-ranking government officials, legislatures, opposition party leaders and active officials. Nancy Bermeo (1992) points out that the stability of a political system depends greatly on the actions and decisions of political elites in power or who hold top-level positions. Non-elites include all of the actors involved in establishing the functioning of informal institutions.

CHAPTER TWO

Ethnicity, Ethnic Politics and Ethnic Conflict

Introduction

This dissertation is interested in variations in ethnic politicization and seeks to account for when and why ethnic affiliations become the axis of political competition and conflict. This chapter focuses on how earlier analysts have accounted for or explained such variations: How have these differences been explained? Why does ethnicity become politicized in some contexts and countries but not others? From existing studies it is possible to distill explanations for politicization from three major areas: ethnicity and democratization, ethnicity and ethnic conflict and the role of political elites.

Ethnicity and Democratization

The reigning presumption within the democratization literature is that ethnic diversity is a major source of conflict and is directly related to political instability and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Perhaps the most influential claim and the main message of Donald L. Horowitz's book on ethnic conflict, is that "ethnically plural societies face a host of pathologies that render them especially prone to conflict and democratic instability."[16] Presumably, ethnic divisions threaten the survival of democratic

[16] See Horowitz (1985).

institutions. They encourage clientilism[17] and neo-patrimonialism, which have adverse effects on the judiciary, the election process and political parties. For instance, Kanchan Chandra (2005) argues that ethnic outbidding[18] is one of the chief mechanisms linking ethnic divisions to political instability in the region. Ethnic divisions inevitably give rise to one or more ethnic parties which, in turn, infect the rest of the party system and create a "spiral of extreme ethnic bids that destroy competitive politics altogether."[19]

Similarly, Horowitz (1985) explains that when elections are held in ethnically heterogeneous societies, the numerically larger group tends to win. To maintain a hold on power, the winners extract state resources for their own ethnic group to the exclusion of other groups and facing prospects of permanent exclusion, the loser will have no reason to continue the electoral game and will be more likely to seek non-democratic means of gaining political power. While this does not automatically lead to political instability, it makes the chances of successful democratization efforts and democratic survival slim.

While ample evidence is provided by cases such Rwanda, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, the claim that ethnic composition has an inherent impact on the odds of political stability has not gone unchallenged. Youssouf Diallo (2005), for instance,

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[17] There different variations of clientilism,but they all involve a mutually beneficial exchange between a patron and clients. The central idea that political power would come from direct, personal exchanges. According to Lindberg, "patron-client relations are primarily about providing material resources in exchange for personal loyalty" (Lindberg 2003: 123-4).

[18] Outbidding occurs when two or more parties compete for the same ethnic group by using increasingly extreme ethnic appeals. Essentially, moderate parties are vulnerable to accusations that they have sacrificed the group's interests if they fail to pursue maximal policies on divisive inter-ethnic issues, like distribution of patronage resources, jobs, national language policies, and so forth. As parties compete for an ethnic group, they take increasingly extreme positions in order to present themselves as the true defenders of the group's interests. This undermines moderation and increases inter-group tensions. See Horowitz (1985:356-357).

[19] See Chandra. (2005:235).

asserts that ethnic diversity is not necessarily a source of instability.[20] Similarly, Gagnon states that "ethnicity …in and of itself does not determine policies."[21] What matters is whether ethnicity becomes politicized. In essence, it is not ethnic diversity *per se*, but rather the politicization of it that matters for political outcomes."[22] Politicization exacerbates existing ethnic tensions, sharpens divisions, creates a cycle of violence among various ethnic communities, and ultimately undermines political stability. But, under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized?

Institutional theories suggest that the institutional configuration of democracy matters. Institutionalists argue that not only do institutions shape leadership and popular choices, but also, democracy is more likely to survive if political institutions are crafted in such a way as to avoid the obvious pitfalls of competitive, electoral politics. Di Palma (1990) points to an important interplay of institutions and agency in his work on democratic survival and stability. Others, such as Arend Lijphart, have examined the political management of cultural cleavages through institutional engineering (1977) and the effect of institutional design on the quality and success of policy outcomes (1999).

In his examination of the relationship between institutions and ethnic politics in Africa, Posner (2005) found that institutional design affects the selection of cleavages for the purpose of political mobilization.[23] Still others have engaged in more narrow debates about the impact of parliamentary and presidentialism on ethnic cleavage (Linz 1978, 1990, Valenzuela 1992, Shurgart and Carey 1992, Stepan and Skach 1993, Mainwaring 1993, Kenney 2004)

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[20] See Diallo (2005:10-12).
[21]Gagnon (1995:166).
[22] See Posner (2005); Gagnon (1995).
[23] See Posner (2005).

Lijphart's theory of consociations or consensus democracy is particularly relevant here. This theory suggests that by facilitating cooperation and compromise among political leaders and maximizing the winners, consociational systems allow separate groups to co-exist peacefully despite deep ethnic divisions. Consociational theories also suggest that proportional, rather than majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to facilitate accommodation between diverse ethnic groups, making them more likely to remain stable. Majoritarian systems tend to exclude smaller parties from securing a place in the legislature, thereby perpetuating the logic of ethnic exclusion and paving the grounds for ethnic conflicts. Majoritarian systems are also believed to encourage political polarization. The connection between polarization and the breakdown of democracy is made most explicit in the article: "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies" by Giancomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori (1983).[24] These authors argue that countries with deep social cleavages are more prone to political instability or democratic breakdown than those with low or cross-cutting cleavages.

One of the primary assumptions in the literature on polarization is that ordinary citizens are responsible for democratic breakdowns, as individuals are more attracted to extremist movements than to moderate and democratic ones.[25] In his seminal essay on the breakdown of democratic regimes, Linz wrote: The fall of the …system is usually the result of a shift in loyalty by citizens of weak commitment, by the apolitical, as a result of a crisis of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness. If these citizens have not

[24] Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1983:337).
[25] See Lipset (1969).

shifted their allegiance, the previous rules would have been able to resist change."[26]

Challenging this view however, Bermeo asserts that, "[i]f we look beyond the relatively well-known cases of Italy and Germany to the whole set of ill-fated interwar democracies…[w]e learn that popular support for unambiguous anti-democratic parties varied greatly within the democracies that collapsed, and that citizenry played a much more peripheral role in the dismantling of democracy than the Fascist cases would lead us to believe."[27] The blame, Bermeo insists, lay, if not wholly, then at least partially with political elites. According to Bermeo, with few exceptions, the interwar regimes broke down either because political elites deliberately chose to disassemble them, or because political elites inadvertently took actions that led to the regime's demise.

That an important relationship between elite choice and political outcomes exists has long been established.[28] In a study of the Wiemar Republic almost three decades ago, Linz (1978) made the case that the decisions of the political leadership are especially critical for political stability and/or demise. According to Linz, while the naming of Hitler as the chancellor had something to do with the ordinary citizens, the fact that 76 percent supported the Weimar coalition at the outset of the republic in 1919 leader suggests that the Nazis lacked sufficient electoral support to assume power on their own. Had it not been for the decisions of small reactionary elite who mistakenly saw the Nazis as a positive counterweight to the Left, democracy may have survived in Germany beyond 1932. Linz (1978, 1994), and later Huntington (1991) and Bunce (2002) conclude that at the basic level, democracy cannot survive unless elites or state leaders see it as the only game in town.

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[26] Linz (1978:44).
[27] Bermeo (2003).
[28] See Linz (1978), Stepan and Skach (1992), Huntington (1991), Bermeo (1992).

A number of studies have focused on the level or strength of elite commitment to democracy in newly democratizing countries. The idea is generally that instances of strong elite commitment to democracy are good indicators of success at democratization. The stronger the elite commitment to democracy, the more likely democratic stability will be achieved.[29] While it is intuitively logical that the stronger elite commitment to democracy the better the chances of sustaining democratic stability, as Rustow (1976) and Nancy Bermeo (1992) point out, this is not necessarily the case. Both scholars argue that democracy may be pursued, in spite of a lack of, or in the presence of, weak commitment to democracy. According to Bermeo, "elites may come to tolerate and advocate liberal democracy, not because they come to see intrinsic value, but because they come to believe that the alternatives are even less desirable."[30]

Similarly, Dankwart Rustow states that, democracies can be built by people who are not truly democrats. Circumstances may force, trick, lure or cajole non-democrats into democratic behavior. Circumstances can force political elites to change their beliefs about the merits of non-democratic forms of rule and support democracy as a lesser evil.[31] According to Di Palma, a skillful craftsman can persuade entrenched regimes that their ultimate security lies with democracy by allaying the fears of competing groups, putting together pacts, or adopting a variety of strategies to promote democracy. Furthermore, a strong hegemon can play an important role in persuading reluctant dictators to follow the democratic path.[32]

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[29] There are number of studies that are based on barometric measures of elite commitment to democracy throughout Africa which is often used to determine, explain or indicate potential for democratic stability. See for example, *Afro Barometer:* http://www.afrobarometer.org/abseries.htm,. Also, see Hennie Kotze and Carly Steyn (2004)

[30] See Bermeo (1992).

[31] Rustow (1976) cited in Bermeo (1992).

[32] See Di Palma (1990).

Notably, none of these arguments undermines Linz's statement that elites must, at the very least, see democracy as the best alternative. They do however raise important questions about the role of elites in the breakdown or persistence of democracy in particular countries. Within the sub-Saharan context, the pertinent question becomes what roles do elites play in determining political stability and political outcome? More specifically, what factors influence and/or constrain the choices that elites make?

An influential argument advanced by Karl and Schmitter (1991) is that historically-created structures have confining conditions that can "restrict (or in some cases enhance) the choices or range of options available to decision-makers…and can even pre-dispose them to choose a specific option."[33] This perspective has led to an impressively large literature on colonial legacy; its effects on political stability, democratic transitions and survival, especially in relation to elite choices.

Postulating that the institutional legacy available to successor regimes will favor the process in some countries more than others, Weiner (1987) points out that the British colonial model of democracy has been more successful than other colonial models in sustaining democratic institutions in newly independent countries. According to Joireman (2001), this is so because British rule is more open to political participation or self-administration than French rule. Presumably, once the institutional framework for democracy is established, it helps to create conditions for its own persistence.

While scholars such as Steven Fish and Robin Brooks (2004) dispute the claim that colonial heritage has an effect on democracy's prospects,[34] Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle (1994) argue that the degree of competition and political

[33] Karl and Schmitter (1991: 274).
[34] See Fish & Brooks (2004).

participation allowed in pre-transition systems can in fact affect post-transition experiences. Marc Howard makes a similar claim for post-communist countries.[35] According to George Philip: "[t]he fact that regular and contested elections have changed the formal rules of the game has not always prevented pre-democratic means of organizing power from putting on "alternate shows in town…[p]re-democratic modes of political behavior can survive democratization."[36]

While the literature in general points to a number of variables[37] that might help to explain cross-country and cross-regional variations in political outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa, systematic comparison of all sub-Saharan countries across a number of criteria, prior to and since transition, as suggested by theories of political and democratic stability is entirely beyond the scope of this project. Rather, the study will focus exclusively on ethnicity. Specifically, under what conditions is ethnicity likely to be politicized?

The State of the Literature on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

The salience of ethnicity in politics is largely attributed to primordial (Horowitz, 1985; Conner, 1972) and biological (Van den Bergh, 1981) differences. The assumption is that the basis of electoral choices is symbolic or emotive. Horowitz (1985) argues for instance, that ethnic groups have particularly strong emotional and symbolic appeals that inspire their political actions. According to Easterly and Levine (1997), "higher levels of ethnic diversity encourage poor policies, poor education, political instability, inadequate infrastructure, and other factors associated with slow growth" (1997, p.

[35] See Marc Howard (2003).
[36] George Philip (2003: 14).
[37] For example economic development and performance. See Przeworski et al (2000).

1205). Conversely, Sambanis (2001) points out that, primordial identities such as religion, ethnicity and language are present even when a group is not politically active. Since ethnicity is not static, as not only can ethnic identities change over time, but also, individuals tend to have multiple identities:[38] under what conditions does a particular ethnic identity become more politically salient than others?

Operating on the assumption that ethnic groups and identities do not become politically salient unless triggered, Robert Bates (1974) developed and advanced a "materialist" approach to the question. According to Bates, the answer lies with the usefulness of ethnic divisions for extraction of resources. As he explains it, ethnic differences create ready-made axes of political competition. "[I]n competition for power and benefits of modernity and the prestige it confers, politicians will stimulate the formation of competitively aligned ethnic groups." Bates wrote:

> Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members for the components of modernity. Insofar as they provide these benefits to their members, they are able to gain their support and achieve their loyalty. [39]

The idea depicted here is that in a *quid pro quo* relationship between voters and political elites, loyalty and electoral support along ethnic lines are traded for the promise of material gains.

Both Posner (2005) and Chandra (2005) espouse this view. Posner (2005) asserts that ethnicity is crucial for the distribution of patronage as ethnic affiliation provides credible information about what groups stand to benefit, if a given party or

[38] For example; Black, English speaking, Christian and Jamaican.
[39] See Bates (1974:471).

candidate wins the election.[40] Chandra (2005) makes a similar claim with regard to ethnic cues acting as information shortcuts about who will benefit from a given politician's policies. According to Chandra, the perception among most multi-ethnic sub-Saharan African societies is that having a political representative from one's own ethnic group will yield greater benefits in terms of public goods and other material gains. As such, Chandra posits, voters in ethnically diverse societies tend to favor politicians of the same ethnicity.

A somewhat implicit presumption is that ethnicity is politically salient because it is a viable mobilization tool. As readymade axes of political competition, ethnic groups can be effectively mobilized to support a particular party or individual candidate on the promise of providing material benefits. This assumption is very popular among contemporary works. The problem with this perspective however, is that it bears distinct elements of determinism. The assumption that voters will only trust their co-ethnic groups to deliver material benefits creates a sense of inevitability that is highly misleading.

Political analyses indicate that there are countries, such as Senegal and Benin, in which ethnicity is not a prominent feature in the political arena and access to political and economic benefits does not depend on ethnicity, despite the presence of highly mobilizable ethnic cleavages (Galvan 2001; N'Diaye 2001). In his analysis of public goods provision in Tanzania and Kenya, Edward Miguel (2004) observed that while ethnically heterogeneous areas in Kenya provided fewer public goods to their inhabitants than homogenous areas, this is not true of neighboring Tanzania. Similarly, Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes (2003) find that while ethnicity is an important

[40] Posner (2005:, 104).

predictor of party support in countries such as Zambia and Malawi, no such effect was found in Mali or Tanzania.[41] Moreover, Rene Lamarchand (1972) pointed out more than three decades ago, that there is no reason to expect that political use of ethnicity and patronage have to go hand in hand. Conversely, patronage networks can be created along economic positions or interests rather than ethnic affiliations. Posner notes for instance that even in multiethnic societies patronage might run along class lines rather than ethnic affiliations.[42] According to Lemachand, patronage ties can also create competing loyalties, which could undermine ethnic identities.[43] Englebert (2000: 67) supports this argument and points out, "African politicians usually do not simply favor their own ethnic group but build networks of support and alliances across ethnic, regional …or other cleavages," which is often the case when they want to win elections.

Although these authors indicate that ethnic difference does not necessarily become the political axis in all cases, and that mobilization can occur along lines besides ethnic affiliation in ethnically diverse societies, little has been done to explain the disparity across cases. Also, while most scholars seem to agree that political elites play a critical role in whether or not ethnicity becomes politically salient, the question of the conditions under which political elites choose to politicize ethnicity and conversely, the factors that constrain such tendencies is never quite addressed. Given that political elites[44] are the primary decision makers and policy engineers, the issue seems to be as much about elite behavior as it is about the role ethnicity in sub-Saharan

[41] Case study analyses consistent with these findings include: Deborah Kaspin (1995) for Malawi, Dennis Dresang (1974) for Zambia, Daniel Posner (2003, 2005), for Tanzania see Goran Hyden (1992).
[42] Posner (2005), points to cases such as the Tanzania where it is impossible for any politician to make a career by appealing to ethnic identities.
[43] Lemarchand (1972).
[44] By which I mean high-ranking state officials, opposition and party leaders, and members of parliament.

Africa. Indeed, as Gagnon (1995) states, although "ethnic[ity] is founded upon historical and cultural realities; [ethnic] identities do not become politically salient unless they are triggered, often by elites who seek to use these identities in order to gain political power." [45]

Conclusion

Two key points emerge from the above discussion of the literature: (a) institutions matter; and (b) political elites play a crucial role in the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. Incentives generated by institutional rules influence the decisions and choices that political elites will make in terms of using ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool. Much of the scholarship is, however, focused on formal (often state-level) institutions. Little consideration is given to informal societal-level institutions such as religious brotherhoods, home-town associations and voluntary associations, particularly as their interaction with the forms and outcomes of ethnic mobilization. This gap has significant implications for our understanding of the conditions under which ethnicity become politicized and institutional analyses on sub-Saharan Africa.

Indeed, scholars such as Joel Migdal (1988) , Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle (1994) among others, point out that as in many parts of the developing world, the real rules governing the political rules of the game in sub-Saharan Africa are often not those that are formally established and/or codified. Rather, they are governed

[45] Gagnon (1995:12).

by unwritten, informal institutional rules.[46] Research focusing on formal institutions may miss many of the underlying incentives and constraints on political behavior.

Rather than focus primarily on the role of formal institutions such as electoral rules and colonial administrative institutions and policies, therefore, the dissertation has sought to incorporate informal institutions into existing institutional analytical frameworks. This accomplishes two things. First, it broadens the theories and tenets generated by institutionalism. Second, it identities key factors in the story of ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict that have remained largely unexplored and unaddressed in extant literature.

While this dissertation considers the role and importance of colonial institutional legacies, therefore, it focuses less on the relationship between formal colonial political institutions and more closely on the emergence and persistence of societal-level informal institutions out of the colonial experience and interaction between these informal institution and forms of ethnic mobilization. In doing so, the dissertation finds that shifts in informal institutional rules may change the political salience of ethnic identity (for example, from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national discourse), thereby altering incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool. Arguably, this is a significant contribution to recent theoretical advances within institutionalism. The implications of these findings extend far beyond institutional analyses on sub-Saharan Africa; they are applicable to studies on the developing world more generally.

[46] This is often true of political rules regarding the salience and use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

Introduction

While the theoretical literature on ethnic conflict and ethnic politics suggests that ethnic politicization is the norm in sub-Saharan African countries, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Instances of ethnic politicization are more varied than generally depicted in the current scholarship, particularly ethnic politics in Africa. One of the main reasons for this overgeneralization is that scholars typically investigate cases where an outcome is known to have occurred. Another reason is that these studies tend to focus on a particular country. Although Collier et al. (2004: 87) note that such research strategies provide "a better opportunity to gain detailed knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation," they also help to paint a picture that is often misleading and unrepresentative.

Indeed, while recent work on the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Côte d'Ivoire reinforces the notion of widespread ethnic politicization throughout sub-Saharan Africa, a survey of the continent indicates that there are many countries where ethnic identity is not politicized or politically salient. In countries such as Senegal, Tanzania, Benin, Mali and Cameroon for example, ethnicity is not a prominent feature in the political arena. Indeed, despite the presence of highly mobilizable ethnic cleavages in these countries, access to political and economic benefits is not determined by ethnic affiliation (Galvan 2001, N'Diaye 2001). In his analysis of public goods provision in Tanzania and Kenya, Miguel (2004) observed that while ethnically heterogeneous areas in Kenya provided

fewer public goods to their inhabitants than homogenous areas, this is not true of neighboring Tanzania. Similarly, while Norris and Mattes (2003) found that ethnicity is an important predictor of party support in countries such as Zambia and Malawi, they found no such effect in Mali or Tanzania.[47]

One of the most glaring realities of politics in Senegal observed during my visit at the height of the presidential electoral campaign in 2007 was the relatively low levels of political salience of ethnic identity. Campaign appeals almost never evoke any real sense of ethnic or party loyalty. My interviews with political party representatives and other Senegalese clearly revealed a lack of tension or conflict among the various ethnic groups. While there are important splits on many fundamental issues, such as religion and language, disagreements have rarely resulted in ethnic violence in Senegal.

The various ethnic groups in Senegal thoroughly coexist and interact. My overwhelming impression was that while on a day-to-day basis ethnic stereotyping was widespread, and, in fact, a large proportion the conversations among Senegalese reference qualities and defects attributed to individuals on the basis of his or her ethnic origin, such practices were not readily observable at the official level. Rather, at the official level, ethnic identity is rarely considered for official appointments, job placements and/or promotions. Ministers, civil servants and clerks are appointed without regard to their ethnic affiliation. Since 1960 for example, elected members of government have been ethnically diverse. My interviews with political party representatives and other Senegalese also revealed a lack of ethnic based constituents. The lack of any formal party base or official constituents was particularly striking.

[47] Case study analyses consistent with these findings include: Deborah Kaspin (1995) for Malawi, Dennis Dresang (1974) for Zambia, Daniel Posner (2003, 2005), for Tanzania see Goran Hyden (1992).

Individual parties distributed political flyers pin-pointing their respective political agendas and platforms, however, campaign appeals almost never evoked any real sense of ethnic or party loyalty. In fact, I left Senegal with the distinct impression that ethnicity played a minor role (if any at all) in Senegalese politics.

My more extensive field research in Senegal from July 2007—January 2008 provided other important insights. First, the assumption that patronage and the political use of ethnicity go hand in hand is significantly flawed. Patronage networks can, in fact, be created along economic lines and might run along class lines rather than ethnic identity. [48] Also, patronage ties can create competing loyalties which could undermine rather than accentuate ethnic identities.[49]

An important implication of these empirical observations concerns methodology, in particular, the conventional treatment of cases such as Senegal and Tanzania as deviant cases, outliers and anomalies. Empirical evidence of non-politicization in sub-Saharan African countries other than Senegal and Tanzania raises question about the oft-cited methodological justifications[50] for their exclusion from conventional comparative analyses. Evidence of variation in ethnic politicization among sub-Saharan African countries suggests that a significant question needs to be addressed: What accounts for the variation in the political salience of ethnicity and ethnic politicization in sub-Saharan Africa? Why does ethnic politicization occur in some ethnically diverse societies but not others?

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[48] It is fair to point out here that Rene Lemarchand (1972) made this point more than three decades ago-one of the few scholars to take this position at that time. In his recent works Posner has demonstrated that even in multiethnic societies, patronage ties may run along class lines and other non-ethnic cleavages.[48]

[49] See Lemarchand (1972).

[50] One of the chief cautions against methodological pitfalls is claiming too much from the study of deviant cases. Deviant cases are generally less helpful in advancing theory, particularly as their deviance may result from the combined effects of many weak variables or variables relevant only for the outlying case itself.

To address these questions, I used a comparative study of two countries similar in several important ways but vary in ethnic politicization. Following Robert Putman's maxim that "the prudent social scientist, like the wise investor, must rely on diversification to magnify the strengths, and to offset the weaknesses, of any single instrument" (Putnam,1993:12), I drew from multiple data sources including interviews (elite and non-elite), newspaper publications detailing with legislative and presidential electoral campaigns (1965- 2008), archival and official legislative documents, survey data on public perceptions of the role of political elites and ethnic politics, government census (particularly data on ethnic compositions and standards of living) and; recorded and transcribed political speeches by political leaders and/or party officials.

The following pages outline the primary research strategies that I used for data collection and analysis in this dissertation. I also discuss some of the methodological issues and obstacles encountered while conducting the field research.

The Dependent Variable: Measures and Indicators

The dependent variable in this study is ethnic politicization. The politicization of ethnicity occurs when ethnic affiliation becomes one of the main the axes of political competition and conflict. In other words, ethnicity becomes politicized when tensions or conflicts created by differences in identities, language, origin, and religion are brought then into the political arena, thereby creating a domestic political context where ethnicity is the most (if not the only) politically relevant factor. Ethnicity becomes the central focus of political debates and the primary subject of political discourse. Political

policies, platforms and campaigns are no longer staged at the level of the nation-state, but based more on ethnic politics.

Since one of the objectives of this dissertation is to gauge the effects of institutions and changes in institutional rules on the politicization of ethnicity, it is imperative that any impact on the salience of ethnic identity (i.e., increase or decrease) is taken into account. This is not to say that political salience is being used as a proxy for ethnic politicization. While there is evidence of this practice in the current scholarship on ethnic politics and ethnic conflict, empirical evidence indicates that this is not necessarily the case. For example, while political support has been largely based on ethnic affiliation in Côte d'Ivoire, the political salience of ethnic identity remained at relatively low-levels for a relatively long period of time-from 1960-1993.

The assumption here is that shift in the salience of ethnic identity alters the likelihood that political actors will use ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool. If increase in the salience of ethnicity occurs we would expect political elites to make ethnic appeals so as to maximize their voter appeal. There is little consensus as to when ethnic divisions are politically salient. According to Horowitz, "where parties divide exclusively along left-right lines or along non-ideological lines determine by patronage patterns, that is an excellent identification that ethnic divisions are not salient" (Horowitz, 1985:303). The empirical evidence indicates that this is not necessarily so. For instance in Côte d'Ivoire, parties organised along the left-right spectrum so as to maximize their voter appeal, with ethnicity being a salient political issue.

For the purposes of this research project therefore, the salience of ethnicity in electoral politics is measured in several ways, including the existence of ethnic parties, political discourse and ethnic voting. Horowitz suggests that ethnically based parties are those that "derive their support from an identifiable ethnic group (or groups) and serve the interests of that group."[51] As such, this study considers whether political parties rely disproportionately on electoral support from a particular ethnic group. Additionally, I examined political campaign literature including newspaper reports on political rallies, party manifestos, electoral posters, flyers, party memos, agendas, directives, party rhetoric and speeches, for evidence of public appeals to ethnic identity. I focused on both the legislative and the presidential electoral cycles from 1960-2008.

I also examined analyses of campaign messages in the local media, which provided a window into the messages that parties provide to voters. As Chandra (2005) notes for instance, discourse analysis of campaign, rather than the content of their manifesto in election campaigns, may lead to the inclusion of parties that (based on their party manifesto and interview responses) may otherwise be excluded from this category. If parties were deriving their support from a specific ethnic group, this should be reflected in the political discourse. If however, a party is making implicit ethnic appeals, this should be indicated by the nature of its support base.[52]

[51] Horowitz (1985:291).
[52] Chandra (2005)

Case Selection Criteria

The African continent represents a vast area of the globe and consists of fifty-four countries. [53] These countries are remarkably diverse on a number of indicators including language, culture, economic development, political institutions, political economy, and history (ancient and modern). To minimize the number of cases I follow the most common trend of focusing on a particular region[54] and eliminating countries of vastly different histories. Specifically, I have chosen countries that: are ethnically diverse, were governed by the same colonial ruler, similar electoral systems, have experienced transitions from single-party to multi-party rule in the last 30 years, have a similar ethno-regional divide, have about the same standard of living and have had different experiences with ethnic politicization. Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire fit these criteria (see Table I).

Among the possible cases,[55] the Senegal-Côte d'Ivoire dyad presents an interesting opportunity to conduct a comparative study explaining the cross-country variation in the politicization of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa. Both countries are former colonies of France. Both countries have been independent since 1960, and although (unlike Côte d'Ivoire) Senegal experienced multiparty rule prior to 1990, the two countries adopted the semi-presidential system of government (modeled after the French) at independence. Both countries also became single-party post-colonial governments soon after declaring independence in 1960 and both rely on a primary agricultural export economy.

[53] Africa is about three times the size of continental United States of America.
[54] This is one of the most frequently used categorizations upon which analyses and discussions are based. Scholars tend to focus on or develop their expertise on regional politics: West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa.
[55] All sub-Saharan African countries, that is.

Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire also shared a number of social, historical, political and demographic features. Both countries, for instance, ranked in the low-to-medium categories on human development indicators during the 1990s early 2000s.[56] The cases are even more similar on other, more significant social indicators of development. The life expectancy at birth is 56.6 years in Senegal and 55.5 years in Côte d'Ivoire. The population in each country grew at a rate of 2.5 percent in Côte d'Ivoire and 2.5 percent in Senegal between 1990 and 2004. Urbanization grew at a rate of 5 percent and 3 percent respectively over the same period and the rate of adult literacy, which has a bearing on political participation and efficacy, is 51 percent in Côte d'Ivoire and 57.9 percent in Senegal.[57]

TABLE I
Summary of the Similarities of West African nations Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

	Senegal	**Côte d'Ivoire**
Colonial History	Ruled by the French	Ruled by the French
Recent Political History	Established single-party government immediately after independence	Established single-party government immediately after independence
Electoral System	Semi-Presidential: French model	Semi-Presidential: French model
Democratic Transitions	1982-2000	1990- 1999
Location	West Africa	West Africa
Ethnic Diversity	Yes	Yes
Economy	GNP/capita: $520 (1998)	GNP/capita: $700 (1998)
Life Expectancy	56.6 years (1990)	55.45 years (1990)
Ethnic Politicization	No	Yes

Sources: *Europa World Yearbook, CIA World Factbook* and *World Health Statistics*

The two countries exhibit several overt characteristics some of which are divergent, but do not impact the study (see Table II). First, each country has a relatively

[56] World Bank reports (2005).
[57] See CIA Factbook (2008)

large Muslim population. While Senegal has a more significant Muslim/Christian ratio than Côte d'Ivoire, in both cases the Muslim population tends to be regionally separated from the Christian population. In fact, the cases share an important ethno-regional characteristic—each country has a relatively large Muslim/north, Christian/south divide. The countries also differ in overall size and population.

TABLE II
Summary of characteristics of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

	Senegal	**Côte d'Ivoire**
Population	Population of 12 million	Population of 17 million
Size	322,460 square kilometers[58]	196,190 square kilometers [59]
Ethnic Composition	12 ethnic groups (generally classified into 5 principal groups)	60 ethnic groups (generally classified into 5 principal groups)
Religion	94 percent Muslim; 5 percent Christian ; under 1 percent animist	40 percent Muslim; 30 percent Christian; 30 percent animist
Ethno-religious divide	Muslim/North; Christian south	Muslim/north ; Christian/south

Sources: *Institut Nationale de la Statistique du Sénégal, CIA Factbook, Sénégal, Les Ethnie et La Nation* and *Europa World Yearbook*

Second, Côte d'Ivoire has a significantly larger number of ethnic groups than Senegal but when classified, each country has an approximate 5 principal divisions (see Table III). The largest ethnic group in Côte d'Ivoire is the Akan ethnic group, which constitutes 42.1 percent of the total population. The second largest group is the Gur, which makes up 17.6 percent of the population while the northern Mandé are 16.5 percent and the southern Mandé are about 10 percent of the country' total population. The others (about 5 million or 2.8 percent of the total population) are non-Ivoirian

[58] Comparatively, Côte d'Ivoire is nearly the same size as New Mexico.
[59] Comparatively, Senegal is slightly smaller than South Dakota.

Africans; a third of these are immigrants from Burkina Faso, and the rest from Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Senegal, Liberia and Mauritania.[60] In Senegal, the largest group, the Wolof, make up 43 percent of the population. The Peul and Tukuleur constitute 23 percent, the Serer 14 percent, the Diola 5.5 percent and the Manding under 5 percent[61].

TABLE III
Ethnic Groups in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

Country/ Ethnic Group	Number (X 1000)	Percentage
Senegal	12, 000	
Wolof	5,196	43.3
Sereer	1,764	14.7
Peul	2,856	23.8
Manding	600	5
Diola	660	5.5
Other	924	7.7
Côte d'Ivoire		
Akan	17,000	42.1
Gur	7,157	17.6
N. Mandé	2,992	16.5
S. Mandé	2,805	10
Krou	1,870	11
Other	510	3

Sources: *Institute Nationale de la Statistique du Sénégal, CIA Factbook,* Côte d'Ivoire

The cases of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

The sharp changes in ethnic politicization over time in Côte d'Ivoire made it a particularly valuable case for this study. Prior to the 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire was renowned for its economic prosperity and political stability. Scholars and analysts frequently referred to Côte d'Ivoire as the "beacon of political stability and economic

[60] Institut Nationale de la Statistique, Abidjan, 1998.
[61] The Senegalese National Institute of Statistics, Dakar.

prosperity" in Africa; it was one of the few sub-Saharan African countries that had seemingly successfully avoided succumbing to the trap of ethnic politics (Le Vine, 2004). How can a country that many proclaimed a model of political stability and development in sub-Saharan Africa suddenly become enthralled in ethnic politics?

In the context of a single case analysis, Côte d'Ivoire greatly informs the question of how ethnicity becomes politicized in heterogeneous countries over time. However, the recent outbreaks of civil war and political instability in Côte d'Ivoire also allows for an empirical analysis of the whether there is indeed a strong relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict in the West Africa as many scholars purport. While instances of ethnic politicization in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau suggest that the answer is a firm yes, a closer survey of the region reveals that contrary to the dominant view in recent political science discourse, the political salience of ethnic identity has remained relatively low in a number of West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cameroon and Burkina Faso.

The variation in the political salience of ethnicity among the countries begs for explanation. Why does ethnic politicization occur in some ethnically diverse societies but not in others? Why have Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire had such different experiences regarding the ethnic politicization despite having so many structural and historical similarities? Suggestions from the existing literature on ethnicity, ethnic politics and ethnic conflict include factors such as colonial experience as an independent variable. The common assumption is that countries with the same colonial rulers also have similar institutional legacies and therefore, should have similar post-colonial trajectories. As former colonies of France with differing experiences with ethnic

politicization, the cases of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire suggest that the issue is not that simple.

A comparative analysis of these two countries makes it possible to move the colonial legacy argument beyond the British/ French or direct/indirect rule dichotomy that characterizes much of the historical institutionalist approach to the question. This in turn allows us to more precisely isolate the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become politicized. The dissertation shows, for example, that the historical and political processes of state building experienced on the ground in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire were vastly different despite having the same colonial ruler. These differences profoundly shaped the types societal institutions that developed in each country. The rules established by these societal institutions have had a profound effect on the salience of ethnic identity in each country.

A comparative analysis of these societal institutions (institutions of social integration) also allows us to assess existing theoretical arguments in the scholarship. Besides the colonial legacy argument, I specifically address the prominent claim that ethnic politicization results from shifts in formal institutions, particularly from single-party to multiparty rule. Using process tracing and comparative case study analyses, I examined the effects of the formal institutional change on ethnic politicization in each country and checked the findings against the predicted outcomes advanced in literature. The study indicates that shifts in formal institutional rules such as the transition from single-party to multiparty rule, do not necessarily result in ethnic politicization. Exclusive focus on formal institutions as explanatory variables, therefore, can be misleading.

Applied to cases such as Senegal and Cameroon, for example, the formal institutional argument would lead one to expect the transition to multiparty rule to result in ethnic politicization in these countries. To date, ethnic identity has not become a prominent feature, or the dominant axis of political competition, in either country. What these studies missed is that, in many cases, the institutional rules of the political game that drive public expectations, political calculations and the incentive to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool, are the informal rather than the formal institutional rules.

To the extent that the rules of the political game governing representation and access to government resources are determined by informal institutional rules, these rules are central to any explanation of ethnic politicization or the lack thereof. Change in these informal institutional rules may lead to shifts in the political salience of ethnic identity-from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national discourse-altering incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool.

Also, while the timing of the politicization of ethnicity Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s at first seemed to reinforce the argument that there is a strong relationship between the shifts in formal institutions (from single-party to multiparty rule) and ethnic politicization, a closer examination reveals that ethnic politicization was due more to changes in the informal rules (including ethnic balancing and the agrarian policy that "the land belongs to whomever cultivates it") governing access to political goods, representation and land and citizenship rights.

In sum, the cases in this dissertation have helped to generate an alternative explanation and argument for why ethnicity becomes politicized in some countries but

not others. Besides pointing to flaws with the dominant approaches, the cases point to alternative factors that explain how, and what kinds of institutional rules affect actors' incentives to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.

Importance of the research Question

The question of the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized in multi-ethnic societies is significant for a number of reasons. First, there is a need to address the dominant assumption in current political science discourse that individuals will mobilize along ethnic lines wherever such identities exist. The cases of Senegal, Cameroon, Tanzania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin offer empirical evidence that this assumption is fundamentally wrong. While ethnic identity does feature prominently in the politics of some sub-Saharan African countries, it does not feature prominently in all of them. Other than highlighting the important point that there is in fact variation in ethnic politicization in sub-Saharan Africa, research on why ethnicity becomes politicized in some countries but not in others can do a lot to expand our understanding of, and abilities to explain what triggers ethnic politicization, the conditions under which ethnic politicization becomes an attractive political option for elites and the factors that constrain the use of ethnicity as a political tool. Specifically, understanding the impact of political institutions (both formal and informal) on ethnic politicization in will be central to comprehending sub-Saharan Africa's (and other regions') prospects for political stability and development.

By uncovering the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become politicized in multi-ethnic societies, the dissertation stands to make a significant contribution to the scholarship on ethnic politics and ethnic conflict. The research may also have practical implications for heterogeneous countries more generally. Political analyses indicate that if not checked, conflicts can be contagious and can quickly spread throughout a region or, as in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, across regions; however, policy prescriptions for how to address the problem can hardly be effective unless scholars have a thorough grasp of the conditions that are conducive to the politicization of ethnicity by elites and/or the factors that constrain such practices.

Research Design

This dissertation is conducted largely as a qualitative study with particular attention to comparative case study analyses and process tracing. To examine the question: under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized in heterogeneous countries, I use a comparative study of two countries—Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire—alike in several important ways but different in the political salience of ethnic identity and ethnic politicization. Building on earlier scholarship by Laitin (1986), Posner (2005) and others, that institutional rules do matter for the study of ethnic politics, I intend to examine whether, and to what extent, informal institutional rules matters for ethnic politicization.

First, while the dominant trend in the political science scholarship is to focus almost exclusively on formal state-level institutions like Kohli (2004), I considered the

role and impact of societal-level institutions such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal and voluntary association in Côte d'Ivoire on the political salience of ethnic identity and ethnic politicization. To uncover the development of these institutions of social integration, I delved into the colonial history of each country. I examined the interactive effects between the Sufi Orders (in the case of Senegal) and voluntary associations (in the case of Côte d'Ivoire) and the forms and outcomes of ethnic mobilization. Specifically, I considered how the rules established by these societal-level institutions shaped the political salience, and use of, ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool in each country.

Next, I examined the argument that ethnic politicization may be explained by shifts in formal institutional rules, in particular, shifts from single-party to multi-party rule. I identified ethnically diverse countries in West Africa that have undergone transitions and assessed whether the transitions have indeed resulted the increased political salience of ethnic identity or ethnic politicization. My first point is that contrary to the dominant perspective in the recent politics science discourse, shifts in former institutional rules do not necessarily result in ethnic politicization. I hypothesize that non-politicization may be explained by the persistence of the institutions of social integration such as the Sufi Orders and by extension, their rules of ethnic transcendence. Despite changes to the formal institutional rules governing electoral competition, the political salience of ethnicity remained relatively low because the influence of the institutions of social integration persist, as do their rules of ethnic transcendence.

To test this hypothesis, I examine, whether ethnic politicization was preceded by significant changes to the informal institutional rule in Côte d'Ivoire. Drawing on

Langer (2005), I checked for evidence of sharp changes to the practice of ethnic balancing among political representatives. [62] I also examine the agrarian policy of "the land belongs to whoever cultivates it." The findings suggest that changes to informal institutional rules may have stronger explanatory power than shirts to formal institutional rules.

Another key requirement of this research project that made a qualitative approach desirable was the need to conduct field research. While quantitative approaches can be useful in providing information on research questions on ethnicity and ethnic politics, these data are most helpful when used to complement in-depth case studies. For example, while Minority at Risk (MAR) data set classifies electoral activities on the basis of ethnic group identification, and classification of groups as electorally active or inactive supposedly is based on information that records electoral activity of the most widely supported organizations or political parties representing groups interests within the state, not all such organizations are recorded. Also, some information about electoral activity is coded as missing, which raises concerns about the frequency of over-reporting and/or under-reporting. These are significant concerns because electoral activity as an indicator may constitute serious impediment to making reliable causal inferences.

The Afrobarometer also conducts survey research. However, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire in particular, such research data are unavailable. In some cases, the country was not among those selected for survey research due to political instability and safety concerns. About the only way to generate data therefore, was to conduct field research that allowed for the collection of documentary evidence, discourse analyses and direct

[62] Here I use a

observations. In-depth, open-ended interviews about the role of ethnicity in political affairs generally produce much more nuanced and full understanding than some quantitative analyses can produce. Direct observations of political rallies and candidate speeches greatly informed the analyses in this study.

Another advantage to using a qualitative research design is that it allows for refinement of the data collection methods, indicators and analyses during field research. For instance, I was able to refine interview questions and data gathered in Côte d'Ivoire on the basis of the information and data generated in Senegal, the initial research site. Because of this flexibility, the data gathered are richer and emphasize many of the same independent variables. These have allowed for more systematic comparative analyses.

Case studies

Given the underlying objective of advancing understanding of, and more precisely identifying the conditions most conducive to the use ethnic appeals, the need to conduct case study research as a core aspect of this dissertation is distinct. The case study approach has long been utilized as a primary research tool by anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. Robert Yin defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 1984:23). Specifying context, particularly within a comparative framework, requires detailed and in-depth analyses. Thus, where context matters case studies more so than the largely variable-concerned quantitative approaches, are a more suitable method.

Qualitative research is not without limitations and/or problems. A chief concern for research that based on small-n studies and that is not based on random samples and statistical control is generalization. In general, the more cases a theoretical approach can explain the stronger its explanatory power. Some generalization of the finding of this research project is possible however. For example, we can generalize that informal institutions play a critical role in ethnic politicization. Furthermore, insights derived from the in-depth case studies contributed to a better understanding of the conditions under which ethnicity become politicized in sub-Saharan Africa.

Indeed, the case study approach provided a mode of inquiry for in-depth examination of events that enabled me to tap diverse data sources and employ multiple methods of data collection. The data collected for this dissertation span time,[63]space and individuals. To ensure overall reliability and confidence in the findings and analysis of the dissertation, I also analyzed multiple data sources including newspaper publications detailing electoral campaigns (1960s- 2008), archival and official legislative documents and survey data on public perceptions of the role of political elites and ethnic politics.

Data and methodological triangulation also ensured that the analysis in the dissertation accurately depicts or reflects the realities on the ground in the countries examined. I was also able to refine some of the interview questions and the data I gathered in Côte d'Ivoire on the basis of the document analyses and interview accounts I received at the initial research site—Senegal. I focused a lot more on gathering information on the role of religion in Côte d'Ivoire than I previously intended. Also, I uncovered vast and rich formation on the historical development and political

[63] In fact, the dissertation covers three different time frames: the late-colonial to early post-colonial periods (1930s to 1960), the post-independence era (1960-1990) and the democratic transition period (1990s - present).

importance of voluntary associations as redistributive intermediaries during the field research in Côte d'Ivoire. Upon my return to Senegal, I expanded the research on the historical development and the redistributive role of the Sufi Orders.

Data and Sources

Like most qualitative studies, this dissertation relies on data generated from interviews, survey data, observations and documents (including archival and official documents and newspapers). Data for the dissertation were gathered in the course of eleven months of field research in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire (July 2007-June 2008). Research was conducted for the most part, in the largest urban centers in each country- Dakar in the case of Senegal, and Abidjan in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. These cities represent the commercial and administrative centers of each country. Political elites tend to reside or at least hold offices in these major cities, and are arguably more accessible for interviews. These cities are also homes to the largest universities and access to public records and documents. While some may view conducting research in Côte d'Ivoire as problematic given the state current civil war there, the conflict is largely confined to the northern regions of the country and posed few problems for data gathering. Abidjan is located in the southern region of the country and miles from the foci of the military action.

The study relies on data from a wide host of primary and secondary sources. During the initial portions of each field work session, I focused mostly on documentary and archival sources. Other than my interviews, much of the primary sources came from

archival research conducted at the National Archives of the Republic of Senegal, in Dakar, and the Legislative Archives and the Documentation Center of the Chamber of Commerce in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. I relied on newspaper articles that offered coverage of legislative and presidential elections (1965-2008); government census (particularly data on ethnic compositions and standards of living) and; recorded and transcribed speeches by political leaders and/or party officials. I also obtained some of the documentary pieces on political speeches and rallies in rural parts of the country from the film archives of the national television stations (the RTI in Côte d'Ivoire and the RSTI in Senegal).

During the last three months of field work in each country, I focused primarily on conducting interviews. All interviews were semi-structured. This allowed for changes in the ordering of questions to reflect the flow of conversation and the introduction of new issues. Also, the questions were mostly open-ended, which generated a wealth of information and anecdotal stories that I probably would not have been privy had the interviews been structured differently.

I conducted a total of 92 interviews during the field research—47 in Dakar, Senegal and 45 in Côte d'Ivoire. The study population included political party leaders and /or top officials, professors at the local university and colleges, journalists of some of the major newspapers and other media sources, and students attending the major university and colleges. In addition to elite interviews, I conducted interviews with non-elite citizens about the factors that inform their choice of political leader, the role of ethnicity in their choice of political leaders and the role of religion.

Originally, the goal was to interview (random) non-elite citizens in ethnically diverse cities. However, because of the recent political instabilities in Côte d'Ivoire[64]it was best to limit the study population to university and college students. Doing so reduced the safety risks. Also, as I anticipated, the university students were more forthcoming and open about their views than the average citizen. Côte d'Ivoire has three autonomous universities, two of which are located in Abidjan: the University of Cocody and the University of Abobo-Adjame. An advanced Teacher Training College is also located in Abidjan. The study includes expert interviews with university professors, journalists and newspaper editors and lawyers.

To identify key themes for data coding, I analyzed the full transcript of each interview and made continuous comparison. This ensured equivalence in issue coverage and the approach to questioning.

The dissertation is also based on an assessment of existing secondary sources of empirical data and literature on Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. Sources for this study include studies on colonialism, colonial administration, electoral politics, democratization and political transitions. I consulted studies by historians, sociologists, economists and political scientists throughout the course of the research project. Two secondary sources that included sections on the early history of the Côte d'Ivoire are Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff's *French West Africa* and Robert W. July's (1974) *A History of the African People*. In the case of Senegal, I consulted Martin

[64] At the time of the field research here, the northern regions were still under the control of rebels. Although I was able to secure passage to this region, I was forced to go through a security check-point complete with armed members of the Forces Rebels (Rebel Forces). While I was able to meet with members of members of the UN Peacekeeping Core in Baouké, warnings against asking politically charged questions were heeded. Some of the more important observations from this visit nonetheless informed the research.

Klein's (1968) *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal; Cruise* O'Brien's (1971) *Mourides of Senegal* and Lucy Behrman's (1975) outstanding *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal.*

TABLE IV
Interview Groups in the two study cites

Dakar	Abidjan
Interview Groups 1. Members of the Senegalese legislature, political party leaders and /or top ranking officials. 2. Professionals: university and college professors at the University of Cheik Anta Diop and the Institute for Teachers; journalists of major newspaper/media organizations and lawyers. 3. Students (University and college Students).	Interview Groups 1. Members of the Ivoirian Legislature, government officials and political party leaders and/or top ranking officials. 2. Professionals: journalists of major newspaper/media organizations; University and college Professors at University of Abidjan, Cocody, University of Abidjan Bouaké and University of Abobo, Ajame, and the national Institute for Teachers. 3. Students: University Students

Recent literature on Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire is copious and varied. Aristide R. Zolberg's *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* is the best known and most detailed source on recent Ivoirian politics. Other analytical studies of Ivoirian politics, both pre-colonial and postcolonial, include Christian Potholm's (1970) chapter in *Four African Political Systems*— "The Ivoirian Political System"; Paul David's (1986) *La Côte d'Ivoire* ; and Martin Staniland's (1969) "Single-Party Regimes and Political Change: The P.D.C.I. and Ivory Coast Politics." Other articles on contemporary Ivoirian politics include Richard Crook's (1997) article "Winning coalitions and ethno-

regionalist politics: The failure of the opposition in the 1990 and 1995 elections in Cote d'Ivoire" in *African Affairs* and Catherine Boone's (2003) *Political Topographies of the African State*.

Literature that deals extensively with the nature and extent of Houphouët-Boigny's political leadership include Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg's (1982) *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. Another article of note, which deals in great depth with the Ivoirian political transition, is Tessilimi Bakary's "Elite Transformation and Political Succession." Perhaps one of the best sources for a critical assessment of Houphouët-Boigny is Laurent Gbagbo, a government opponent, whose book, *Côte d'Ivoire: Economie et société à la veille de l'Indépendance (1940-1960),* examines the events and conditions that brought Houphouët-Boigny to power.

Some of the most valuable analyses of local politics and political issues were written by government agencies, government-funded research institutes, and non-government-funded research institutes (NGOs) and monitoring agencies operating in each of the countries studied. These include research centers at the Université de Cheikh Anta Diop and Université d'Abidjan (Faculté des Sciences Economiques), the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Center of Research and Action for Peace (CERAP).

I also consulted the works of multilateral institutions and think tanks associated with democratization in Senegal and the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. These include International Crisis Group, the World Bank, Institute for Security Studies, CERAP, African Assembly the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Office (UNOCI). Other sources include scholarly analyses, electoral

posters, and public rhetoric by high-ranking state officials, survey data, unpublished works, conference research papers and online journal articles.

National newspapers provided critical accounts and pieces of information to this research. In the case of Senegal, *Le Soleil* is the main daily newspaper and is state-owned. *Le Soleil* is also accessible online in English as well as in French. Other independently owned Senegalese newspaper sources included: Afrol Senegal news archive, *African Confidential, Senegal Post, Sud Quotidien, Walfadjrii, and PANA (*Pan African News Agency). All of these were accessible via the internet.

Côte d'Ivoire also has a number of newspaper sources, about half of which are state-owned and half privately owned. They include: Fraternité Matin (state-owned daily), Notre Voie (daily, owned by the FPI , Le Patriote (opposition daily), Soir Info (private daily), Le Jour (private daily), 24 Heures (private daily), Le Front (private daily) and L'Inter (private daily national). In Senegal, much of the older editions were found in the national archives. In Côte d'Ivoire, le CERAP was a fortuitous find. The library hosted at this location carried national daily newspapers dating back to the early 1960s. Many of the copies that were no longer available for public viewing at the university or the legislative achieves were well preserved and accessible at CERAP.

For the most part, I focused on the coverage of the legislative and presidential electoral campaigns since the early 1960s. Like the interview data, I then identified key themes for data coding. The data were then incorporated into the analysis of the study.

Measurement and Other Methods Issues

There are many methodological challenges to collecting and measurement of the sort of empirical data considered in this research project. Collecting data across countries with different data gathering and administrative norms can prove problematic, especially data comparability across time and across countries. It helps that the chosen cases have a lot in common. This makes it easier to decide which factors to hold constant, for example colonialism, and to design more targeted interview questions that may better isolate the specific factors that explain extant differences. Also, since I conducted research in Senegal first, I used the data generated in this case to inform and guide data collection in Côte d'Ivoire. A return to the initial research cite in Dakar allowed me to make some adjustments in data gathering based on information generated in Côte d'Ivoire.

Collecting data on informal institutions proved particularly problematic. There is little consensus as to what constitutes an informal institution. Some researchers (Ostrom 1990, Pretty and Ward, 2001) define informal institutions as community-based, local, and social or grass-roots institutions, such as micro-credit schemes and groups formed for the purpose of managing common pool resources. In this view, informal institutions differ from formal institutions in that the latter are imposed from above by the state, whereas the former are developed from the bottom up by the community. North (1990) defines institutions as: "the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, [they] are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." He also defines informal institutions are "rules and procedures that are created,

communicated, and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels."[65] Drawing on analogy of rules in sports, North notes that written rules of a sport are analogous to formal institutions, whereas unwritten codes of conduct, such as an acceptance that it is unacceptable to kick an opponent in the head, are analogous to informal institutions.

Despite the fact that North (1990) drew distinctions between formal and informal institutions, and even argues that informal institutions may be the more important of the two, the empirical proxies used in the comparative politics literature focus almost exclusively on formal institutions, especially, those which relate to electoral systems. This may simply reflect the fact that formal institutions may be easier to measure than informal institutions. However, just because they may be difficult to measure, does not mean that they are unimportant. According to North (1990: 36) "it is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that societies devise than to describe and be precise about the informal ways by which human beings have structured human interaction. But, although they defy, for the most part, neat specification and it is extremely difficult to develop unambiguous tests of their significant, they are important."

My strategy for dealing with this problem was to document the verbal descriptions and articulations of normative beliefs about ethnic-balancing, ethnic coalitions and ethnic transcendence and land tenure. Interviews and observations, and everyday conversations, highlighted the rules. For example, many interview participants spoke of the ethnic balancing between the various ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire as something that was understood as a normal aspect of post-independence political life. As one respondent explained, "we remained a country at peace for so long because

[65] See North (1990:89)

everyone had a share in the goods that Côte d'Ivoire had to offer; even the immigrants. No one felt threatened and well all existed peacefully...that is until recently."[66] He was relaying the rule governing political participation and access to public goods and emphasizing the boundaries regarding ethnic considerations in Ivoirian politics.

Quantitative data on the practice of ethnic balancing of political representation, notwithstanding the formal adoption of the winner-takes-all electoral rule, also helped to verify existence and salience of such rules. Also, to analyse these unwritten and informal institutions, I assessed the actual rules of the political game. If these rules drive expectations and shape political behaviour by creating and influencing the incentives, I consider them informal institutions. This approach differs from some of the existing approaches that consider informal institutions in terms such as social capital. Pretty and Ward (2001:211) for instance, view informal rules as social capital, which they define as "relations of trust, reciprocity, and exchanges; common rules, norms and sanctions; connectedness and networks and groups." Rather, I attempted to ensure comparability by using a working definition and measurements that could be valid across cases, space and time.

Also, on the issue data reliability, I analyzed accounts, reports, assessments and descriptions of the variables and relationship considered in one or both of the case, gathered data from a host of different sources and verified. Confidence in descriptions or related accounts is achieved when those stories or descriptions are recounted by other observers or other analysts. One of the ways I sought to get around the challenges of collecting reliable data on respondents' ethnic affiliations and attitudes about ethnicity

[66] Interview, Abidjan, March 2008.

and politics was to phrase questions requiring ethnic affiliations in as uncharged a manner as possible. For example, rather than asking a direct question of what ethnicity does one belong, which carries with it the assumption that this is how individuals identify or see themselves, questions instead were posed as follows: "I have spoken with many (Senegalese and Ivoirians) and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, gender, race or ethnic group, and others describe themselves in economic terms such as a farmer, a merchant, a lawyer or a doctor. Besides being (Senegalese or Ivoirian) which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?" Part of my strategy for dealing with issues concerning the fact that person asking the questions is female and a foreigner, was having a local (university student- male and older) accompany me to the interviews. I was able to gain a lot of cooperation because of this set-up.

Part II

Introduction to Part II

Accounting for variations in ethnic politicization in sub-Saharan Africa

This study develops and constructs an argument to account for when and why ethnic identity becomes politicized within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. The explanation offered here builds on observations that political behavior is strongly influenced by incentives, which are themselves created via institutions. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, it has been shown in the literature that in many instances, the rules that determine the boundaries of political incentives are not necessarily those that are formally established. These institutions will influence whether or not ethnic identity becomes politically salient. I argue that where the rules to which society adhere are the informal rules; these are the rules that will significantly affect whether ethnicity gets treated as a mobilizational tool. Thus, where institutional rules foster ethnic transcendence, ethnicity is less likely to become politicized.

This section develops as follows: Chapter Four demonstrates that while both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are former colonies of France and were a part of the same administrative unit—the French West Africa—colonial policies and administration on the ground differed considerably. The colonial experience in turn affected the kind of societal level institutional configurations (e.g., voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire, hometown associations in Nigeria and the Sufi Orders in the case of Senegal) that emerged in each country. For example, ethnicity became politically salient in Côte

d'Ivoire and Nigeria, but not in Senegal. While countries may indeed have had the same colonial rulers and therefore, similar colonial experiences, the institutionalization and microscopic experiences may vary considerably and consequently, the political or structural impacts and general trajectory of two countries with similar colonial legacies vary significantly. I argue that these differences help to explain the variations in the nature and capacity of the informal institutions that emerged in each country, which—given their differential effect on the salience and use of ethnic identity in the postcolonial era—may help to account for the variation in ethnic politicization we observe across sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter Five outlines the manner in which these redistributive institutions work, particularly in the post-independence period. In Senegal resources were distributed on a pan-ethnic basis while in Côte d'Ivoire, resources were distributed largely on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Framed within the context of the theoretical debate about the relationship between religion and ethnic politicization, this chapter indicates that while important, religion *per se* does not influence ethnic politicization. The chapter shows that the persistence of the Sufi Orders and voluntary associations, even after independence, significantly influenced the political salience and use of ethnic identity in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of the former, ethnicity continued to lack political salience, while in the case of the latter ethnic identity continued to be politically salient, albeit at very low levels.

More importantly, this chapter shows that while ethnicity was more salient in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, ethnicity remained largely non-politicized in both countries for very long periods. One explanation (which is explored in more details in Chapter

Six) is that in both cases, informal institutions governed the political use of ethnic identity. In the case of Senegal, the Sufi Orders established the rule of ethnic transcendence. As redistributive intermediaries between the state and society, religious Marabouts were able to attenuate ethnic identity and establish a rule (albeit an informal rule) of ethnic transcendence in Senegalese politics over time. While the voluntary associations accentuated the salience of ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire, informal rules such as ethnic balancing and the agrarian policy of "the land belongs to he who cultivates it" proved to be significant constraints against the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool –at least until 1993. Changes to these rules in the post-1993 era, has significantly undermined and eroded the rule of having relatively balanced political representation and land and citizenship rights. Consequently, ethnic identity has dominated the national political debate and become one of the primary axes of political competition.

CHAPTER FOUR

Colonial Legacies and Ethnic Politicization: Insights from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

Introduction

This dissertation seeks to account for the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to be politicized in ethnically diverse societies. It builds its explanation around accounts of the benefits and non-benefits that political elites receive from making political appeals on the basis of ethnic differences. Since both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are former colonies of France, the chapter focuses on the colonial legacies of each country, particularly in terms of administrative structures, political institutions and social and economic policies. As Stephen Gellar pointed out in 1976, when analyzing non-western societies under the aegis of colonialism, special attention should be given to the significance of the colonial context itself (Gellar, 1976:6). This chapter does this by delving into Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal's colonial history to identify the colonial-era policies, rules, and regulations influenced how Senegalese and Ivoirians think about their nation's ethnic landscape.

Tracing the origins of contemporary ethnic identities to the institutions of colonial rule is not novel. In fact, the notion that the importance of ethnicity was created or heightened under colonial rule is largely accepted by scholars. The emergence of Hindu, Muslim and Sikh identities is largely associated with British census-taking in India, while the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi are the product of Belgian

and German colonial practices. [67] In his 1986 book, *Hegemony and Culture*, Laitin explains why, despite both tribe and religion being socially salient cleavages in Yorubaland, tribe is politicized and religion is not. In his 2005 master-piece *Institution and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Posner effectively traces the origins of contemporary Zambian ethnic identities to the institutions of colonial rule. According to Posner (2005), tribe and language came to be viewed as natural, potential building blocks for political coalitions in post-colonial Zambia because these were the distinct dimensions of ethnic identity generated by the colonial rulers. Institutions of the colonial-state generated incentives for people to actively identify themselves in terms of one particular ethnic dimension, depending on their political attractiveness or unattractiveness.

Following such scholars as Laitin (1986), Posner (2005), Migdal (1988) and Mandani (2001), I argue that colonialism plays a significant role in determining whether or not ethnicity becomes politicized. Colonial rule (whether British, French, Portuguese), defined the institutions (such as the Sufi Order in Senegal or voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire, or hometown associations in Nigeria)[68] that emerged and in turn narrowed the set of options open to elites in post-colonial politics. My approach departs from the standard accounts in several ways. The first and most obvious is that my discussion of colonial legacy does not operate within the context of the French/British rule dichotomy. This chapter shows that although the colonial rule established a kind of generalized mode of control in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, policies and institutions were often adjusted to fit the specific goals and interests of the colonial

[67] See Bowen (1996:66); Fearon and Laitin, (2000).
[68] Formal, informal, political, economic and social.

power as well as the realities of the individual countries.[69] Consequently, countries with similar colonial rulers may exhibit differences in the salience of ethnicity depending on the particular institutions policies adopted during colonial rule.[70] For example, while the colonial experience in Senegal led to the relative unimportance of ethnic affiliation as a key social, economic or political marker, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, colonialism led to the emergence of two distinct dimensions of ethnic identity: tribe and religion.

The policies of the colonial state in Côte d'Ivoire generated incentives for the people to actively invest in and cultivate the social distinctions as defined by the state. Conversely, the colonial administrative structures and policies in Senegal created a scheme of social categorization that was based on citizenship rather than ethnic affiliation. As citizens, individuals (limited to those born in one of the *Four*

[69] The French ruled Senegal for much longer than they did in Côte d'Ivoire. This is consequential because sixteenth-century French colonialism in Senegal (particularly the political goals and economic interests) differed from nineteenth-century French policies in other West African countries. Indeed, although the French had contact in other areas of West Africa throughout the seventeenth-century, their focus was mostly on Senegal. One could argue that the French colonial project began in Senegal; more specifically, in St. Louis where the French established trade port in 1659. During the initial phases of the colonial project, the French promoted the policy of assimilation, whereby the colonized countries would be extensions of the metropole or "mere provinces overseas" (Boahen, 1986: 123).The early attempts at assimilation resulted in the establishment of four communes in Senegal, where assimilated Africans could represent the government in France. By the nineteenth-century the original objectives of the French in West Africa changed from establishing settler colonies and the policy of assimilation to economic interests and the extraction of resources. Scholars such as Boahen (1986) attribute the change in colonial policy and approach to the increased competition from other European countries in the *Scramble for Africa* and the Atlantic Slave Trade. As the competition for colonies increased, the French became less interested in establishing settler colonies and became driven by commercial interests. The consequence was that in countries such as Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, the colonial administration, policies and political, social and economic institutions differed significantly, despite having the same colonizer.

[70] Atul Kohli (2004) allows for this in his account of the British colonial legacies in India and Nigeria. Examining why some developing countries have been more successful at facilitating industrialization than others Kohli finds that the impact of colonialism is significant. According to Kohli, colonialism, especially in the fist half of the 20th century, defined the state institutions (e.g., the civil service, central government and bureaucracy and tax collection) that emerged in developing countries and in turn molded their economies in the second half of the 20th century. To account for the variation in the level of development between Nigeria and India, Kohli finds that patterns of colonial state formation and administration may differ significantly, even for countries with the same colonizers.

Communes[71]), regardless of ethnic affiliation or race, were allowed to actively participate in the political system, were given access to a system of French laws, codes, and courts for both civil and criminal affairs, and were protected against colonial administrative abuse. Since citizenship (and not ethnic affiliations) brought higher status and privileges to Africans who possessed it, the incentives for Senegalese were not so much to build political identities around tribal membership and language group, but rather to be considered citizens.

Also, as the case explorations below indicate, one of the consequences of differing colonial policies in the two countries concerns the institutions, particularly the social institutions, that emerged in each country. I show that unlike in Côte d'Ivoire, colonial rule in Senegal resulted in the emergence of informal institutional configurations such the Islamic Sufi Brotherhoods. The destruction of pre-colonial political institutions brought on by the French conquest resulted in the rise in the influence of Islamic religious brotherhoods nationwide. Both the French state and the society became reliant on these Islamic Brotherhoods as redistributive intermediaries: in exchange for state goods, religious Marabouts encouraged individuals to produce export products and pay taxes. In turn, the Marabouts redistributed the goods extracted from the state to society. Being pan-ethnic, inclusive and universalistic in nature, these religious brotherhoods have provided an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the idea of national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that have effectively blocked the use of political appeal to cultural difference as a potentially profitable or attractive mobilization strategy choice for political elites.

[71] The French established four Senegalese provinces as legal departments of France. In 1848 the colonial policy extended the rights of full French citizenship to individuals born in any of the four regions of Dakar, Gorée, Saint- Louis and Rufisque regardless of race or ethnic affiliation.

The colonial policy of co-opting these religious orders in order to advance French peanut production-based export economy in Senegal also affected the development of political parties and the party structure. Party leaders and political elites became dependent on religious Marabouts to garner political support among the public. This generated disincentives for party leaders and political elites to use ethnic identity as a mobilization tool. The argument may be summarized as follows: colonialism → direct rule → sufism (and the four communes) → ethnicity "expunged" from commonsensical assumptions about politics →party System → post-colonial non-politicization.

Colonial Legacies

Scholars attribute the political and developmental problems in Africa to a number of factors. Chief among these are corruption and colonial legacies. While there are in fact debates about the extent to which colonial legacy helps to explain many of African political and developmental problems, there is a general consensus that, whether indirectly or directly, colonialism has had a significant impact on Africa's post-colonial development. In his 1986 book, *Hegemony and Culture,* Laitin examines the question of the impact of colonialism on ethic politicization in West Africa. More specifically, Laitin sought to explain the non-politicization of religion in Yorubaland in Nigeria. Both tribe and religion are socially salient cleavages in Yorubaland, but tribe is politicized and religion is not. According to Laitin, the key independent variable explaining this outcome is the ideological hegemony instituted by the colonial state.

British colonialism in Yorubaland adopted a system of indirect rule which created a common-sensical world in which tribe was real and religion was not. Consequently, long after the departure of the British, the Yoruba organized their politics on the basis of tribe rather than religion. In essence, the simply bivariate correlation unearthed by the book is: Colonial Hegemony → Post-colonial Politicization of a Cleavage.

In his 2005 masterpiece, *Institution and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Posner showed how, in the case of Zambia, tribes from communities with fluid boundaries and varying degrees of internal cohesion became more territory bound and standardized in their social and political organization under British colonial rule. British colonial administration imposed a more rigid form of expressly tribal organization that allowed village, lineage and clan loyalties to become important parallel bases of Zambian social and political organization. [72] According to Posner, the standardization and tribalization of rural administration [in Zambia] was a momentous first step in the construction of the tribal dimension of Zambia's post-colonial ethnic cleavage structure. It was by organizing local administrative activities around tribal units that incentives could emerge for Africans to invest in their tribal identities rather than simply accept or allow them to wither away.[73] As Posner points out however:

> Tribal and linguistic identities came to be internalized by Zambians not simply because they were employed as units of administrative categorization by the colonial government. These identities "took" because a wide range of formal institutions-including land tenure regulations, labor policies, civil service hiring practices, local government structures, and even the organization of the judicial system-created incentives for Africans to invest in their identification as tribes-people and language-speakers.[74]

[72] Posner (2005: 30)
[73] Ibid
[74] Posner (2005:25)

Migdal (1988) also notes that by making crucial economic and political resources available to some but not to others in the local colonial societies through specific policy decisions, colonial rulers greatly influenced ethnic politicization in African societies. Colonial policies permitted or encouraged the creation of a firm base of social control for particular indigenous leaders and their social organizations. For example, colonizing rulers could give preferential access to resources to many local indigenous leaders, each of whom could establish social control in only a circumscribed part of the society. For the indigenous society, differences in privileged access to resources proffered by the colonial power had prolonged effects. They determined who could offer components as people sought to reconstitute viable strategies of survival-organizations broad and strong enough to be incipient states or scattered local organizations that could never hope to achieve countrywide control.[75]

Although there are many cases of ethnic conflict whose origins can be traced to colonial rule, political analyses indicate that not all countries with a legacy of institutionalized ethnic preference have experienced ethnic politicization.[76] This suggests that while institutions can lead to the emergence of ethnic politicization, sustained relevance may depend on post-independence institutions (formal and informal institutions). Such a conclusion would not be entirely off-mark. It would nonetheless ignore an essential point: while countries may indeed have had the same colonizers, the colonial policies and administration may have differed significantly. Consequently, the political or structural impacts of colonialism and the general trajectory of countries with the same colonizer may also vary significantly.

[75] Migdal (1988: 105).
[76] For instance, Tanzania.

Yet, much of the discussions on the effects of colonialism operate within the broader frame work of the British/French, direct rule/indirect rule dichotomy. For the most part, studies have focused on the impact either of British colonialism (more specifically, indirect rule), or the impact of French colonialism (particularly, direct rule) on ethnic politicization. More recently, there have been questions as to whether differences in colonial rulers matter significantly in explaining patterns of ethnic politicization in post-colonial Africa. A number of scholars have made the case that indeed, instances of ethnic politicization in post-colonial African societies are greatly affected by whether the colonial rulers were British or French, Portuguese or Belgian. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) assert that this is particularly true as each colonial power had a specific administrative model–the French generally used direct rule and the British used indirect Rule. According to Mahmood Mamdani (2001):

> [i]t is Belgian reform of the colonial state in Rwanda], the decade from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s that constructed Hutu as *indigenous* Bantu and Tutsi as *alien* Hamites. It is also Belgian colonialism that made for a political history in Rwanda different from that in standard indirect rule colonies, like Uganda and Congo, in tropical Africa."[77]

A number of Africanists make the claim that instances of post-colonial ethnic politicization are more common in former French colonies than among former British colonies. The key explanation, according to these scholars, is that direct and indirect rule institutionalized very different states and thereby differentially affected postcolonial political development. The French imposed a uniform centralized French administration in their colonies, whereas the British opted for indirect rule and made use

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[77] Mamdani (2001:15).

of local authorities. Some scholars posit that the utilization of local chiefs and leaders under the system of indirect rule by the British to some extent assuaged local authorities.[78] Since individuals tend to be ruled by members of their own ethnic group, their political demands are unlikely to be about ethnic identity. Because of the history of self-rule, ethnic violence is unlikely to develop in countries with a legacy of in-direct rule. Countries with a legacy of direct rule face longer transition periods at independence and are more likely to experience cultural conflict.[79]

A study by Blanton, Mason and Athow (2001), which examined whether colonial heritage might matter for predicting conflict risk in Africa, found however that there are substantially different systems of ethnic stratification in former British and French colonies. The "indirect, descentralized rule of the British fostered an unranked system of ethnic stratification, while the French style approximated a ranked system" (Blanton, Mason and Athow, 2001: 473). Since unranked systems foster competition between ethnic groups which can readily spiral into conflict, former British colonies have experienced more ethnic conflict than former French colonies (Mahmood, 2001).

A number of scholars have taken a quantitative approach to the question of the effect of colonial legacy on political development and ethnic politicization by comparing the instances of political stability and ethnic conflicts in former British and French colonies.[80] The conclusion from these studies is that there are no substantive differences in the instances of ethnic politicization between former British and former French colonies. In other words, ethnic politicization is no more likely to occur in former French colonies that in former British colonies. While the utilization of local

[78] See Hechter (1995; 2000); Boone (2003).
[79] Ibid.
[80] For recent quantitative studies see: Lange &Dawson (2009: 785-817).

chiefs and leaders under the system of indirect rule by the British to some extent allowed for the an easier task of self-rule at independence and the system of direct rule by the French meant that a longer transition period was needed for French colonies after independence, there are no significant differences among former British, French colonies or Portuguese cases.

Laitin's 1986 work reinforces the assertions that differences in colonial rulers do not matter significantly in explaining patterns of ethnic politicization in post-colonial West Africa. Testing his hypothesis developed from Yorubaland (a former British colony) in the case of Benin (a former French colony), Laitin argues that Benin "demonstrates the power…of the model of hegemony" (1986:165). Consequently, the pattern of politicization in post-colonial politics can indeed be explained by the pattern of politicization adopted by colonial rule. Laitin has come under heavy criticism for exporting a model developed from a case study of a former British colony to a former French country without regard for significant differences that would have to be held constant in both countries in order for the findings in the case of Yorubaland to be corroborated. Colonial ruler, duration of colonial rule, history, ethnic demography, economy, political leadership and institutional structure, are some of the factors that needed to have been held constant in order to ascertain whether Benin corroborates the model suggested by the case of Yurobaland.

Yet, as the cases of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire indicate, there are differences in outcomes that need to go beyond the broader framework of the British/French colonial rule dichotomy. Indeed, far less explored and inadequately explained is what factor or factors accounting for variations in outcomes among countries with the same colonial

ruler. While colonial powers generally employed and applied specific colonial models (direct rule or indirect rule for instance) to their colonies, could it be the case that administratively, countries were governed differently, hence different colonial legacies?

In other words, while ruled by the same colonial power, are there significant differences in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire in the realm of colonial administrative policies, political participation, political institutions/policies and associative socio-economic effects that could account for non-politicization in the case of the former and ethic politicization in the case of the latter? If, there are indeed significant differences, have these key colonial institutions/policies affected how post-colonial societies were formed and the political and social structures the countries adopted upon independence and extended well into the post-independent period? If there are no significant differences in colonial administration, the implication is that the answer(s) lie more closely with the institutions or policies employed during the post-independence era than with colonial legacy. A critical question therefore becomes: to what extent do these institutions adopted in the post-independent era differ between the two countries?

To assess or appreciate fully the impact of colonial legacies on ethnic politicization in their former colonials, this chapter addresses whether, and to what extent the colonial experiences differed in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, particularly in terms of how they affected societal transformation and political and party development. The chapter also examines whether, and to what extent the post-independence political institutions differ from their colonial origins in each country. The cases of colonial Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire constitute the initial sections of this chapter, while the latter sections focus on post-colonial Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire.

French Colonial Rule in West Africa: Background

Direct rule was the preferred model of French colonial rule. Unlike the British system that tended to rely on local political elites or institutions, French colonies were treated as extensions of the *Metropole*; France attempted to replace local leadership with practices from their own country. While it is true that France generally adopted this model of colonial rule, research indicates that administratively, politically, and practically, Africa never functioned as a unified object in French colonialism. Indeed, even at the height of its African empire, France did not govern Africa under a single colonial apparatus. Rather, numerous forms of political control were employed across the continent. The policies used often depended on the goals and interest of the colonial rulers within the particular country. Still, much of the discussions of the differences in French administrative policy implementation is made within the context of sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghrib.

Given that both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire were governed under one administrative body- *Afrique Occidentale Francaise* /French West Africa (AOF)- which was created in 1895- to what extent do the two cases- colonial Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire- differ in terms of the colonial administrative structure, organization, institutions, and policies? Did the French encourage different distributions of administrative policies and social control among the local populations of Senegal than among those in Côte d'Ivoire? Or, were the decisions of French officials similar with different effects on social structure and political rule in each of the countries?

Colonial Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal

Côte d'Ivoire was made a French colony in 1893. Until 1947, efforts were made by the French government to attach parts of Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) and French Sudan (present-day Mali) to Côte d'Ivoire for economic and administrative reasons. For the most part, Côte d'Ivoire was governed under the French policy of association, which stipulated the superiority of the French in the colonies. Under this policy, the Africans in Côte d'Ivoire were allowed to preserve their own customs only insofar as they were compatible with French interests. The Ivoirian African population was considered subjects of the French empire with no political rights, and was controlled by the Code de l'Indigénat or the Colonial penal code.[81] Per the direct rule model, Governors were appointed in Paris and the Ivoirian African population had little room for participation in policy making or administration.

French activities in Senegal date back to the early seventeenth century. The French established trading posts along the Senegal River in1638. In 1659, the trading posts were moved to the more secure location on the island of Saint Louis and in 1677 the French seized) the island of Gorée from the Dutch (a pivotal point on the coast). The French later established a station further inland at Médine in the 1850s. Dakar was captured in 1857 and later replaced Saint Louis as the capital of Senegal in 1902. Senegal remained at the center of France's West African empire until all the separate colonies won independence in 1960.[82]

[81] For an excellent historical account of the French colonial policies in Côte d'Ivoire see David (1986). See also Zolberg (1964).
[82] See Searing (1993).

Administrative structure

France divided its territories into administrative units or districts called *Cercles.* A *Cercle* (district) consisted of several cantons, each of which in turn consisted of several villages, and was headed by a French colonial officer (c*ommandant du cercle).* Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire were both structurally administered on the basis of this colonial administrative principle. In both countries, a commandant du cercle ruled through a hierarchy of local rulers or chefs de subdivision, and was subject to the authority of a District Commander, and the government of the colony above him. It was also typical French colonial policy that individuals born within these Cercles /districts were *subjects* of the French empire and were regulated by the Code de l'Indigénat or the Colonial penal code.[83] While the French applied this colonial policy throughout the entire territory of Côte d'Ivoire, a slightly different approach was taken in Senegal. As one of the first colonies in which the French sought to establish a settler society, the French initiated an exceptional policy in Senegal called the *Four Communes*.

According to this policy, individuals born in the regions of Dakar, Rufisque, Saint Louis, and Gorée, regardless of race or ethnic affiliation, had the status of French "citizens." The *Four Communes* had a measure of self-governance shared by no other colony in Africa.[84]" As *citoyens,* individuals from these Communes were allowed to

[83] The Code de l'indigénat was a policy tool first created by the French government to solve specific problems of administering France's African colonies in the mid to early nineteenth century to control large subject populations, in particular, how to regulate the native peoples without extending the rights of Frenchmen to everyone. Scholars argue that the indigénat had its foundations in the Code Noir which was a decree passed by France's King Louis XIV in 1689. Louis wanted to increase his power in the colonies; in particular the France outré mer island colonies. The Code Noir ordered all Jews out of France's colonies, forbade the exercise of any other religion, other than Roman Catholicism, restricted the activities of free black Africans and defined the conditions of slavery in the French colonial empire. The code has also been described as one of the most extensive official documents on race, slavery, and freedom ever drawn up in Europe.

[84] See Searing (1993).

elect a representative to the French National Assembly and enjoy the same political participation and voting rights as those born in the *Metropole*.

Senegal elected a deputy to the French National Assembly as early as the revolutionary period of 1848, when France began organizing local elections. Although the early deputies were all White or Métis (of mixed race), indigenous black residents of these cities enjoyed equal rights to vote as French citizens. If literate in French and familiar with French customs, individuals from the *Four Communes* could work in the administrative institutions. While this policy was strongly opposed in France as being too liberal, the policy became an important feature of colonial Senegal. In1907, Galandou Diouf was the first black African elected as Legislator Councilor in Rufisque. Blaise Diagne was Senegal's (and Africa's) first black representative directly elected as to the French Assembly in Paris in 1914.

Colonial Administration: the Ivoirian Experience

The colonial conquest of Côte d'Ivoire was notably longer and more arduous than in Senegal. A coastal region that had long established trading relations with foreigners, Senegal offered less violent resistance to French settlement than Côte d'Ivoire, where "permanent European contact took place very late."[85] Until 1900, "the [indigenous] Kings retained all their prerogatives and continued in effect to rule their own country."[86]Ivoirian resistance movements against European conquest were protracted because they were dispersed and often organized along ethnic lines. In the face of the complexity of the ethnic map, the French adopted a policy geared towards

[85] Zolberg (1964: 19).
[86] Amon d'Aby *(*1951) cited in Zolberg (1964: 19).

stifling any form of resistance by applying the old and well-known maxim of divide and rule. The ethnic policy of the colonial administration in Côte d'Ivoire consisted of regrouping, assigning (and confining) ethnic groups to territories with rigid borders.

The basis of establishing these so-called ethnic maps was to better identify and, if necessary, implicate so-called troublesome ethnic groups; thereby diminishing the intensity of local resistance. Such ethnic parceling was widespread in Côte d'Ivoire throughout the entire colonial period and served to accentuate cleavages and other minor differences between various cultural entities. "Chiefs who had fomented revolt were deported; natives were disarmed; others were interned; war fines were imposed on various tribes amounting to more than $700,000 between 1910 and 1912."[87] After 1910 new African auxiliaries were appointed on the basis of their loyalty to France rather than because of any traditional qualifications. It became common practice to appoint members of different ethnic groups as *sub-chefs* to rule over the canton. [88]

French Economic Policy in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal

As France consolidated its holdings in Africa, it took steps to ensure that the territories were profitable and self-supporting. The Minister of Colonies believed that if the colonies were properly developed, there would be less need to depend on foreign countries for raw materials and a new market would be created for French goods. To minimize the administrative costs however, the French quickly initiated a policy that made each colony responsible for securing the resources- money-needed for its administration and defense. The exploitation of natural resources was one means by

[87] Zolberg (1964: 21-22).
[88] Ibid.

which the French sought to ensure profitability. In Senegal, the French embarked on a peanut export economy. In sharp contrast to Côte d'Ivoire, the dominance of peanut export industry in Senegal led to a monoculture economy. Until 1925, Côte d'Ivoire's main contributions to the French economy were timber and palm oil. Cocoa (and later coffee) were added to the list as a result of Govern Angoulvant's efforts. By 1930, Côte d'Ivoire was producing more cocoa than France could absorb.[89]

Exploitation of natural resources requires massive commitments of labor. The French therefore imposed a system of forced labor in both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire under which each male adult was required to work for ten days each year without compensation as part of his obligation to the state.[90] While Senegal was able to meet the labor requirement on French peanut plantations, the population of Côte d'Ivoire was insufficient to meet the labor demand on the numerous plantations that sprung up over time. Because of this labor scarcity, the French actively recruited large numbers of workers from the Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) to work in Côte d'Ivoire. This source of labor was so important to the economic life of Côte d'Ivoire that in 1932 the AOF annexed a large part of Upper Volta to Côte d'Ivoire and administered it as a single colony.

By the nineteenth century, forced migrant labor was the backbone of Ivoirian economy. Also, at the encouragement of the colonial administration, enterprising Africans from regions of Côte d'Ivoire (mostly northern regions bordering Burkina Faso and Mali) unsuitable for commercial agriculture migrated, settled and colonized other parts of the country. An important consequence of this policy was that workers

[89] See Zolberg (1964:23).
[90] The system was subject to extreme misuse and was the most hated aspect of French colonial rule throughout.

imported to these areas often settled there afterwards, obtained land, and became farmers. By the late 1940s, many of the local cities had a majority of immigrants from foreign countries or other regions of Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, in some rural districts there are more foreigners than natives. According to the 1955 census, foreign Africans made up nearly half of the total population of Abidjan. The original inhabitants, the Ebrié, constituted less than seven percent of the city's total population by 1948. In the *cercle* of Bouaflé, which was originally inhabited by the Gouro, two-thirds of the population consisted of Baoulé and Malinké immigrants.[91]

One impact of this policy is continuous tension and conflict between original inhabitants (autochthons) and foreigners (allogènes). According to Raulin, "…since the Bété knows that the population of Gagnoa is made up mostly of non-Bété foreigners, he fears, rightly or wrongly, the rule of the non-Bété and rebels against the Dioula."[92] Similarly, in the Agboville region, there were documented fears that the Abbey natives might eventually be eliminated from their own region's development by the foreign townsmen. During the 1920s and 1930s, the native Dida in Divo were contemptuous of the Baoulé and Dioula immigrant farmers who engaged in work reserved for women in their own society. Except for exacting compensation payment for the use of their lands, the Dida had little to do with the foreigners.

Another serious implication of this migration policy was the significant economic differentiation that developed between regions; particularly between the North and the South. While much of Côte d'Ivoire's economic profitability occurred because of migrant workers from the North, in terms of investments and infrastructure

[91] Recensemet d'Abidjan (1955); also, see Zolberg (1964:41).
[92] Raulin (1957), cited in Zolberg (1964:46).

development, the Southern regions of Côte d'Ivoire benefitted far more than the northern regions over time. Because the differences between regions also corresponded with the ethnic map created by the French, Côte d'Ivoire soon became a country of rich ethic groups and poor ethnic groups. Also, the policy had the effect of drawing sharper distinctions along religious lines while Christianity was localized in the south; Islam was localized in the north. What is more, because of the large influx of migrant Muslim workers from neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, southerners often generalized all northerners into foreigners, Dioulas and Marabouts- distinctions which reinforced tensions between natives and foreigners or geographically contiguous because of ethnic, geographic and economic differences.

The French also used taxation to maximize profits while minimizing its administrative costs in its colonies was taxation. Taxation not only generated revenue but, because taxes were payable in cash only, it also induced large numbers of African men to take up wage employment. In Senegal, this meant that the rural population had little choice but to participate in peanut production. The French however had tremendous difficulty collecting these taxes in the deep hinterlands of Senegal. To promote efficient tax collection, the French forged a working relationship with local Islamic leaders called Marabouts.

A large portion of the rural population had come under the influence of Muslim leaders due to the power/leadership vacuum created by the destruction of the indigenous political institutions by colonial conquest. Rather than eradicate or compete with these Islamic orders, pragmatic French leadership sought to co-opt the Sufi leaders. Marabouts would help to promote peanut production, publicly endorsed the payment of

taxes to the French Administration and actively recruited soldiers in exchange for peaceful existence, continued social and spiritual dominance in the countryside and monetary rewards. By the 1950s the leadership of the main Sufi orders had become pillars of the colonial establishment and were deeply embroiled in politics. These brotherhoods came to dominate the rural political economy in the early 20th century and represent the most legitimate and popular social organizations in the country. Despite their role in facilitating French colonial extractions, the brotherhoods were able to maintain their legitimacy in the post-independence environment. This was due primarily to the redistributive services that the brotherhoods provided with those goods extracted from the colonial state. Because they are "pan-ethnic, inclusive, universalizing and transcendent," [93] the Brotherhoods have served as a kind of bulwark against the tendency of political elites to seek the path of least resistance in political mobilization in playing the ethnic card. [94]

Accounting for the relative salience of ethnic cleavage in Colonial Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

Clearly, from the discussion above, the administration of French policies were hardly uniform across former colonies. Indeed, the argument can be made that (at least partially) the policy of the *Four Communes* established the framework for social distinction in modern Senegal that never existed in Côte d'Ivoire. The policy of the *Four Communes* de-legitimized ethnicity as a pre-requisite for political participation.

[93] See Glavan (2002:11); Behrman (1975) ; Cruise O'Brien (1971) and Leonardo Villalón (2006)
[94] See Villalón (2006).

Consequently, ethnic distinctions became less of an available political mobilization tool for politicians to utilize in the future.

By placing focus less on ethnic affiliation and more on citizenship, social distinctions ran more along the lines of whether one was in fact a *citoyen* or an *indigene*, than ethnic affiliation. In other words, because of the policy of the *Four Communes*, ethnicity was expunged from commonsensical assumptions of Senegalese politics in the colonial period and subsequently in the post-colonial periods. What this means is that the early tensions within Senegalese society were really less about ethnic affiliation than citizenship rights.

With the majority of the rural population considered indigene and lacking the rights to political participation in the manner allowed their sometimes distant cousins or immediate family members born in any of the *Four Communes* concerns regarding ethnic affiliation never really took root. Both Blaise (Senegalese named to the French National Assembly) and Senghor (first President of Senegal) were black Africans; the former a Wolof and the latter a Serer.

Also, the policy of the *Four Communes* meant that Senegal has had longer experiences with political participation than most other African countries, including Côte d'Ivoire. According to Gellar, "the communal tradition in Senegal has had profound influence on the creation of a strong taste for liberty among those living in the Four Communes and the basis for a democratic culture" (Gellar, 2005:63).

Co-opting rather than eliminating Muslim control over the Senegalese country-side also helped to further de-legitimize ethnicity in Senegalese society. First, local problems were more likely to be solved locally (by Marabouts), and therefore less likely

to escalate directly to the state/national level in the Senegalese system than the hierarchical systems imposed in Cote d'Ivoire would allow. Second, the Sufi orders developed into pan-ethnic, inclusive and universal movements across the country, making ethnic affiliation a non-issue in terms of Senegalese social, economic or political realities.

But, to what extent did this framework persist in a post-colonial Senegal? And, to the extent that it did, what sustained it?

Continuity and Change in post-colonial Senegal and Côte D'Ivoire

The following section will account for the perpetuation and reinforcement of post-colonial structures and policies by post-colonial heirs and indicate that the manner in which the post-colonial heirs structure policies and institutions (particularly in terms of making ethnic mobilization profitable) directly affects whether or not ethnicity becomes politicized.

A number of scholars suggest that there is path dependence in much of the politics of post-colonial societies. According to Posner (2005), even as states became free of colonialism, the options or choices open to political actors were somewhat limited. Many of the options open to elites in postcolonial politics were carried over from colonialism. If my argument about the French policy of the *Four Communes* and how the inclusive nature of the religious Marabouts de-ligitmized ethnicity and expunged it from the Senegalese colonial realities is correct, then we should find that appeals to ethnicity by post-colonial political elites in Senegal are low or non-existent or highly ineffective. Conversely, if my argument about the incentives that the colonial

administrative, ethnic and economic policies generated for investing in one's tribal and religious identities during the colonial era is correct, then we should find evidence of strong continuation of these policies by post-colonial Ivoirian political elites.

Towards an explanation for the salience (or lack thereof) of ethnic cleavage in post-colonial Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire: a case of path-dependence?

Senegal

A direct result of the *Scramble for Africa* and territorial conquest was the breakdown of the traditional familial or tribal structures in Senegal. French conquest caused the breakdown of the old political and social order and created a virtual authority vacuum. Individuals became drawn to the Islamic Sufi orders for social, economic and political leadership. These Brotherhoods came to dominate rural political economy in the early 20th century and represent the most legitimate and popular social organizations in the country. Cruise O'Brien (1971, 1975) and Villalón (2006) have written extensively on this issue. Rather than eradicate or compete with them, pragmatic French leadership in the form of governor Faidherbe co-opted Sufi leaders: the Marabouts retained social and spiritual dominance in the countryside and helped promote peanut production[95] in exchange for peaceful existence (Klein, 1968). Marabouts publicly endorsed the payment of taxes to the French administration and actively recruited soldiers.[96] The French, in turn, rewarded important and cooperative Marabouts with gifts, political donations, and money. In fact, as Behrman points out,

[95] See Klein M. (1998) on the importance of the Peanut Production under colonial rule in Senegal.
[96] A large population of West Africans was recruited to fight alongside the French during World War I.

"[i]t became a matter of habit for families of the great Marab[o]us to expect money from the government" (Behrman, 1975: 52).

By some accounts, French colonialists were in perpetual fear of jihad-type resistance against them and decided that it was wiser to control and accept the Brotherhoods rather than to ban them. As such, in 1906, the French West African colonial administration set up a corps of civil servants specializing in Muslim affairs. The aim was to closely monitor the activities of Muslim leaders in the colonies.[97] A more plausible explanation for why the French opted against instituting bans against the Brotherhoods is that the Marabouts were very important to the peanut production and exports trade that constituted the foundation of Senegal's colonial export economy.

The rapid adoption of the Islamic Sufism offered by the religious orders over time allowed the Sufi orders a considerable amount of autonomy over a huge percentage of the Senegalese population. While it is not entirely clear whether the percentage of the population adhering to the Sufi orders increased over time in response to the increased legitimacy and influence of the Marabouts or vice versa, one thing is certain: the ability to attract followers from all the major ethnic groups allowed Sufi leaders to acquire that much more social legitimacy and social command. Data from Senegalese national population census indicate that the number of Muslims in Senegal went from approximately 1,026,000 in 1907 to 2,789,320 in 1963.[98]

The 1960 and subsequent national census, indicate that progressively, more and more Senegalese (including those areas such as the Casamance where Christian Missionaries had the most impact) self-identified as Muslim. It has been more than 30

[97] See Behrman, (1975, p.36).
[98] Statistical Institute of Senegal,

years since the 90 percent mark of Senegalese who identify as Muslim has been surpassed.[99]

Local newspaper reports dating back to some of the earliest electoral campaigns in Senegal depict a symbiotic relationship between political elites and Sufi leaders that mirror those held between the colonial rulers and Marabouts. Some of Senegal's earliest prominent political elites such as Blaise Diagne, (Senegal's first black representative to be named to the French parliament during the late 1920s to the early 1930s), had the support of one of the most important religious leaders of the time. One of the main reasons that Senghor, a Christian, won against Lamine Gueye, a Muslim, for the coveted position as President of Senegal was that unlike Gueye, Senghor had the support of the most important religious Marabouts of the period.[100] The Lamine Gueye/Senghor race to the presidency by way of courtship of the chief Marabouts of the time has become a classic example of the influence that the Sufi orders have in the country. The proverbial message to other up-and-coming political elites: ignore the Marabouts at your electoral peril.

Political parties have no real social base.[101] Rather, the political parties, and indeed, the entire regime structure are, "deeply socially embedded."[102] Interviews with representatives of the numerous political parties in Senegal revealed that none of the parties consider themselves having a loyal base. Even the Trade Union based political

[99] See national census data, Statistics Institute of Senegal. See also Behrman (1975).
[100] This is consequential because as a Muslim, one would assume that Gueye would have garnered more support from the Marabouts than Senghor- the Christian. There is no consensus among scholars and analysts on why the Marabouts supported Senghor. Some argue that that by backing an ethnic minority and a religious miniority, the Marabouts were trying to solidify their message of ethnic and religious transcendence and tolerance. Others argue that the Marabouts supported Senghor to the exclusion of Gueye because of his promises for increased financial support to the Orders.
[101] The political parties are not well-developed as in other countries as they are almost entirely reliant on the religious orders to garner political support from the public.
[102] See Galvan (2002).

party leader [103]admitted to not having worker base during my interviews. Rather, that party receives majority support from University and Teacher College students and with the support of very important religious Marabouts, some members of the Mouride Brotherhood members.[104] Campaign appeals almost never evoke any real sense of party loyalty. While each party distributes political flyers pin-pointing their respective political platforms and agenda, upon close analysis, there are very few differences in terms of political perspective. Most championed a democratic cause, however, democracy not in the Anglo-American political model, but more akin to the European social democracy model.

One implication of this lack of a social base, as Galvan similarly found during his field research in Senegal, is that the Senegalese political parties became embedded in the Sufi brotherhoods.[105] With more than ninety percent of the population being Muslim (many of whom belong to one of the four major Brotherhoods in the country), the influence of religious Marabouts throughout the country is tremendous. And, since the religious orders tend to be all encompassing of the various ethnic groups, pan-ethnic, inclusive and universal and political elites are forced to appeal to the public via these religious orders. Accordingly, ethnic differences the importance of ethnic affiliation became further diminished in the political calculations of Senegalese political elites.

The media coverage of the electoral campaign paints a telling picture. Political elites, regardless of prominence or religious affiliations, all seek electoral votes by courting the most important Marabouts and even paying homage to smaller more local

[103] Pati de l'Independence et de Travailler.
[104] Interview, October 2007, Dakar.
[105] See Galvan for similar argument

ones as well. A particularly striking and (repetitive) newspaper image over the decades is that of a prominent Christian candidate, adorned in Muslim garb and Islamic religious symbols, while visiting prominent local religious Marabouts as part of their political campaign. Interestingly, when asked about the significance of this practice, few of these political elites admitted to it being a political strategy. More often than not, the response was that this was merely ceremonial, and hardly strategic. As one political elite declared however, "whether ceremonial or strategic or both, the only way to get the vote of the people is if we can convince Marabouts to instruct their followers to vote for us. Wearing the Muslim garb shows that we have tremendous respect for these Marabouts." [106]

The tremendous influence over the decisions of large portion of the country's population generated strong incentives for religious Marabouts to demand benefits from dependent political elites on the one hand and allegiance from disciples on the other hand. As well-organized institutions with an extraordinarily high degree of popular legitimacy based both on an ideological religious foundation and their responsiveness to popular concerns, the orders have been able to provide the Senegalese society with a degree of strength in interactions with the state which is virtually unparalleled elsewhere in Africa (Villalón, 2006:199).

Given the relationship between the religious leaders and the political party leader, a clear incentive for the disciples is to comply with the instructions of their Marabouts. They recognize that besides their religious leadership, Marabouts serve as conduits for redistribution of governmental benefits. Marabouts also realized that if they

[106] Interview, November 2007, Dakar, Senegal.

were to maintain their following and their more than favorable position as mediators they have to facilitate and contribute to the circulation of resources.

Though difficult to corroborate, the media have made numerous assertions that political elites pay out huge sums of money and other resources in order to gain the support of the major Marabouts. This is an important tactic by political elites to gain electoral support from the disciples. Interviews with various party representatives suggest that visits and gifts for Marabouts are more than ceremonial. Several interview respondents disclosed outright that this is a political strategy of the party leaders to garner the votes of the masses. Those who admit outright to this political strategy are quick to point out that other political parties have engaged in similar behavior. According to one respondent "if you want to know who is going to win an election in Senegal , all you have to do is figure out who is paying out the most money and other resources, and who is making the biggest donations to the religious leaders." [107]

Newspaper articles are full of accounts depicting the persistent influence of religious Marabouts beyond the colonial era. Much of the television news reports following the 2007 Presidential elections re-counted the courting relationship between religious Marabout and political elites. One of the first pieces of official business that Abdoulaye Wade performed as President of Senegal in 2000 (after defeating a forty year rule by Abdou Diouf) was visiting the very powerful and influential Marabout in the holy city of Touba. The media coverage of this event was extensive. Pictures of Wade kneeling before the Marabout and kissing his ring were plastered on the front pages of every newspaper as well as on the evening news reports. When tension later arose between President Wade and leader of the National Assembly (Mackie Sall),

[107] Interview, August 2007, December 2007, Dakar, Senegal.

Wade made official request from the Mouride Marabout to pray for Mackie Sall (a thinly veiled message or appeal to the religious leader to negatively influence public opinion against Mackie Sall.) Before long, natives were calling for the resignation of Mackie Sall. Within days of the death of the old Marabout (who favored Wade), the new Mouride Marabout leader, perhaps fearful of the escalation of the political tension between the President and Leader of the National Assembly, issued a "ndiggle" or order for both parties to cease and desist the fight immediately. The Marabout outlined the constitutional right of the leader of the National Assembly to serve his term and ordered no further public discussion on the topic. Within two days of this ndiggle there were no more newspaper or media reports concerning political tensions between the President and Mackie Sall.

Given the influence of the Marabouts during colonial rule, it is hardly surprising that the post-independence political elites sought to continue the cooption of Sufi brotherhoods. For one thing, as the post-colonial administration swapped out French officials for Senegalese officials in the administrative positions, the latter found it easier to continue in the path set by the former. Also, having acquired massive wealth, established redistributive networks whereby the society could access particular public goods and their large scale religious influence, Marabouts held the distinctive advantageous position of fending off potential challengers they deemed threatening to their persistence. Consequently, political elites found it more than useful during the early party developmental stages to solicit the support of the people by vigorously courting heads of the Sufi Brotherhoods.

As informal institutional configurations that help to transcend historic ethnic and religious communities, Sufi Brotherhoods provide an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the idea of national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that block the use of political appeal to cultural difference as a mobilization tool. But how did Sufi brotherhoods come to hold such powerful sway over the Senegalese population? Addressing this question requires a journey through the colonial and post-colonial past.

A country's social life can offer key insights into the salience of ethnicity in a society. As in most countries, the Senegalese social life is distinguished between formal official practices and ordinary everyday informal practices. In everyday social interactions, ethnic origins are of great importance. In ordinary conversations, personal introductions are often apostrophized by "Je suis Wolof," "lui, il est Serer," "c'est un Fulani," "elle est Pulaar," and "ils sont Diola."[108] Also, a large proportion of the quips in the conversations between Senegalese turn on the qualities and defects attributed to each person by reason of his/her ethnic origin. For example, it is not uncommon to hear the following quip in the streets of Dakar: "Mon Cher, tu es vraiment une personne stupide. Ça c'est parce que tu es Diola. Vraiment! Si, tu était Serer comme mon frère Senghor, tu peux jamais parler comme ça."[109] During my field research in Dakar, I once overheard a young man talk his way out of a certain fine from a police officer by bombarding him with insults. Someone later explained to me that as ethnic cousins, had

[108] Personal observation during field research in Senegal 2007-2008.
[109] Field research, Dakar, Senegal 2007. It should be noted that such exchanges are generally friendly banter between related ethnic groups or ethnic groups that have historically established a joking relationship. In this case, this exchange was between the Sereer and the Diola. Joking relationships between these two ethnic groups are well known, studied and documented.

the young man not offered up the worst insults he could muster, he would surely have been fined (maybe twice as much) by the police officer. [110]

At the official level however, ethnic groups are not taken into consideration for job placement or official appointments or promotions. Ministers, civil servants and clerks are appointed without regard to their ethnic origins. An audit of elected members of parliament from 1960- 2007 by ethnicity depicts a diverse and eclectic group. It is not by accident that Senghor was elected the first President of Senegal, despite belonging to one of the smallest ethnic groups in the country, a Sereer and a Christian.

In an interview about the history of ethnic relations in Senegal, a prominent retired professor at the University of Cheike Anta Diop told me the story of how, as a young man, he left his hometown of Kaolack to attend school in St. Louis and was befriended and invited home for lunch by a local of the city. His friend appropriately introduced him to his grandmother, who, upon enquiry, learned that the young man, whom her grandson had brought home from school, was from the hinterland. The grandmother's response, (which the retired professor swore never to forget) was, "ah, c'est une indigène." Of little importance to this grandmother was the fact that this friend that her grandson had brought home was also a Tukulor. Tellingly, the fact that he was not from one of the *Four Communes* carried more weight than the fact that they all belonged to the same ethnic group.

On another occasion, I was invited to have lunch with a group of professors at the University of Chieke Anta Diop, and was introduced to each of the seven men (ages ranging from the early 30s to the late 60s) by the names, ethnic affiliation, area of expertise and region of origin respectively. Interestingly, with the exception of Diola,

[110] Personal observations during field research, Dakar, 2007-2008.

each of the country's ethnic groups was represented at the table. Being, by this time, fully acclimated to the non-stop teasing rivalries about the merits of the various ethnic groups that are typical at such social gatherings, I fully expected the discussion to follow this trend. Surprisingly, what started out as (what I thought to be) a standard, ethnic teasing rivalry, soon turned into a teasing rivalry of *citoyen* versus *indigene.* It was clear that those who fell into the former category, regardless of ethnic affiliation, felt somewhat superior to those who fell into the latter category. "We [who are from Dakar, Saint Louis, Rufisque, Gorèe]," one of the professors explained to me, "are more civilized than they are [those from the other regions of Senegal]. When they were manning the farms, we were helping to decide governance in France." [111]

That this social framework continues to operate on these levels is also illustrated by the fact that, taxi drivers from areas outside of original *Four Communes* are generally referred to as an indigene. I once asked how one can tell the difference, since almost everyone spoke Wolof and/or French and the response was: "You can most certainly tell by the accent, which differs by region.[112]"

Clearly, since the framework for social distinction created by the French policy of establishing the *Four Communes*, that diminished importance of ethnicity as a social identifying factor and consequently as a useful political bargaining tool, persisted from the colonial era to post-colonial Senegal, colonialism has indeed played a huge role in non-politicization in Senegal. The early experiences of non-ethnic based political participation may have set the stage for future concepts of inclusion in the sense that it

[111] Field research, Dakar, July 2007.
[112] Field research, Dakar, 2007.

removed ethnic affiliation from the table as a potentially profitable or attractive strategy for political elites.

Côte d'Ivoire

Unlike the case of Senegal, the French played a more active role in Christianizing Ivoirian locals; particularly those in the Southern regions of the country. Since colonial settlements rarely extended beyond the coastal areas, Christian influence was almost entirely limited to the south. This did little to stem the flow of Islamic influence throughout the rest of the country, especially in the northern parts of the country. By the 1900, Côte d'Ivoire was clearly delineated into a Muslim-north/ Christian-south society and the government favoring the south soon became apparent. While traditionally several regions were economically self-sufficient, significant economic differentiation occurred between regions (particularly the north and the south) under colonial rule. The South benefitted disproportionately in terms of direct investments and infrastructural developments and quickly became, in general, richer than the North. Whereas the northern regions experienced little improvement in road construction or other modes of transportation and access to schools and running water, great improvements along these lines were made in the Southern regions. Of course, geographic location/characteristics factors into this equation, as the northern and more Sahelian regions are far less conducive to agricultural development than richly fertile forest regions of the South. Nonetheless, even in terms of per capita income (1958),

income in the southeast for a family of eight stood at 100,000 Franc de la Communauté Financière d'Afrique (CFA)[113] per annum and 15,000 CFA in the North.[114]

There is plenty of evidence indicating the continuation of the colonial differential treatment between the Muslim north and the Christian south in post-colonial Côte d'Ivoire. In the 1970s there were many direct demands by northerners for former president Houphouët-Boigny to improve public services, increase public investments and promote economic development in the north by ethnic groups from the region. Houphouët-Boigny responded to these demands by scheduling presidential tours of the region in 1974.

Immediately after this tour, Houphouët-Boigny reportedly allotted large sums of money to address the many problem of the region. An increasing amount of public investment towards the promotion of economic development was received in the north throughout the 1970s (see Table V). For example, public investment per capita of the northern region increased from 18,400 CFA francs in 1974 to 29,400 CFA francs in 1977 and greatly exceeded that received in most other regions (with the notable exception of the Southwest and Abidjan Region). Resenting this re-allocation of funds to the north, many southerners voiced their opposition to the increased investments in the northern regions. Some felt that by improving the region, many migrant workers would no longer have the incentives to work on the palm or cocoa plantations. Others believed that since a large portion of the country's income is derived from the plantation economy of the south, this is where the majority of the investments should be made.[115] northerners on the other hand felt that while the investments were a start in the right

[113] Franc of the African Financial Community.
[114] Equivalent to US $1000.00.
[115] Field Research interview, Abidjan, Jan.-June 2008.

direction, the government was not doing nearly enough for the region. After all, many point out, the migrants workers from the north are the backbone of the Ivoirian economy.

TABLE V
Public investment per capita by region, 1971-77 (CFAF thousands)

Region	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975[a]	1976[a]	1977[a]	1971-77	1973 Pop.
North	1.3	10.8	21.3	18.4	27.0	28.8	29.4	137.0	554.6
East	5.3	0.4	0.4	1.1	1.5	1.1	1.5	11.3	266.5
South	6.5	7.7	6.3	8.2	12.3	13.2	13.6	67.9	1,193.6
West	0.3	3.4	2.3	3.7	4.6	2.8	3.1	20.2	701.9
Center West	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.7	2.5	3.2	0.6	7.6	712.0
Center	10.8	11.5	9.2	11.0	13.5	10.4	4.3	70.7	1,490.4
S.West	49.4	17.9	13.5	33.3	60.3	75.0	102.6	351.9	156.0
Abidjan	11.7	14.5	23.0	31.1	41.4	33.0	22.4	177.0	840.0
Non-allocated	2.3	2.8	3.0	4.2	6.2	6.8	6.9	32.2	NA[c]
Total	9.6	11.0	12.4	16.1	22.9	22.1	19.8	113.8	5,910.0

Source: Den Tuinder (1978: 151)
a. Projected
B. in thousands. The 1973 population was used for all years. Thus, figures for the later years are biased upward in comparison with earlier years.
c. Not applicable

By the end of the 1970s, the performance funds and generous investments in the north desisted. While some Ivoirians and analysts believe that Houphouët-Boigny changed course under the pressure of resentment from the south, many felt that Houphouët-Boigny was hampered by the deteriorating economic environment brought on by the fall in world prices for primary agricultural products. Since sustainability of investment initiative in the north depended largely upon economic growth or positive performance, these were some of the first programs to go on the budgetary chopping-block. Not only did Côte d'Ivoire revert to having severe regional socio-economic disparities between the north and the south, the resentment of the northerners against the government and the south were further exacerbated.

The French policy of channeling working migrants from the northern regions of the country (sahelian or desert) and neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso and

Mali, to the southern regions to establish plantations has been identified as the key to the economic success of Côte d'Ivoire for the French. By the 1950s, France was the direct beneficiary of the wealth generated from the export of between 1000 and 500,000 metric tons in cocoa, coffee, timber and banana. [116]To the extent that returns from these economic activities benefitted the country and people of Côte d'Ivoire directly, it was in the form of public investments and in infrastructure. One of the primary goals of the colonial rulers, after all, was that the colonies could sustain themselves. Notably however, the majority of colonial investments in infrastructure were designed primarily to promote trade with the metropole. Indeed, of the millions reportedly spent in foreign investments between the early 1900s and 1960, more than three quarters was spent on those regions of crop production in an effort to improve production levels or allow for better access to market (that is, increase profits). [117]

There was no official change to this colonial migration policy at independence. To the extent that there were any changes, it was in the direction of an extension of the policy, when in a bid to attract more workers; Houhouët-Boigny boldly declared that "the land belongs to he who cultivates it." Côte d'Ivoire experienced a huge influx of foreign workers to the south, primarily from neighboring Burkina Faso (57.5 percent), Mali (20.4 percent) and Guinea (3.4 percent). The majority, however, were born in the country, albeit in the northern regions (they were predominantly Voltaic— mainly Mossi and Sénoufo and northern Mandé —mainly Malinké and Dioula ethnic groups).[118]

[116] See Amara (1990).
[117] See Walter Rodney (1973) for more detailed account/analysis of how Europe expropriated Africa's surplus.
[118] See Zolberg (1964); Langer (2005, 2007).

While this policy has successfully attracted numerous workers from all over the continent, and consequently increased productivity and economic growth, it also amplified the strained relationships between natives and foreigners and/or between geographically contiguous groups that had developed during colonial rule. There are many empirical accounts of the tendencies (particularly of Southerners) to treat northerners not as real Ivoirians (*Ivoiriens douteu*'), but more like foreigners from Burkina Faso, Mali or Guinea (Coulibaly 2002).

Zolberg (1964) offers accounts of how the southerners often generalize and stereotype all northerners as Dioula and /or Marabouts. Because of shared geographic, regional and cultural traits between some internal migrant workers and foreign migrant workers, being northerner or Muslim became synonymous with being a foreigner. Crawford Young (1982) finds that the ethnic and religious background of agricultural migrant workers affected their ability to work with peasant farmers. In essence, whereas the French could arguably have continued through to infinity with such a policy as they never had to fully address the question of citizenship rights; once independent however, the effects of this policy could provide ethnic mobilization opportunities for Ivoirian political elites or opposition parties.

Stewart (2000, 2002), Mustapha (2005) and Langer (2005, 2007) indicate that economic inequalities can indeed affect the political salience of group identity. Their research on Ghana and Nigeria detail how group inequalities (perceived or otherwise) can provide powerful grievances, which in turn provide the bases for ethnic mobilization. Given the regional disparity described above in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, one can assert that the politicization of ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire has its origins in

colonial rule, particularly in terms of the policies that were initiated upon and that have persisted after independence.

We already noted how local towns were essentially ethnic communities under the French policy of organizing the colony along ethnic lines, initially to facilitate conquest, and later, to control migrant workers in the urban areas. This did nothing to help promote tolerance or inter-ethnic cohesion in the society. Rather, French colonial policies promoted fierce competition among the various groups for access to colonialists and resources such as education and public services such as running water. One consequence of this policy (however unintended) was the development of voluntary associations. These groups, by substituting an association for the traditional political community, pledged to bring the issues pertinent to a particular ethnic group, to the local colonial administrators. Leader of these associations were to be the new mediators between the population and the colonial rulers. If, these leaders had the "ear of the colonialist" this could mean access to basic services and/or resources.

The problem however, is that some ethnic groups had more access to the colonial administrators and, therefore, some voluntary associations (given the ethnic base) were better able to lobby for resources/services than others. This is true of the Baoulè ethnic group as they were granted better access to educational opportunities than other ethnic groups such as the Krou, the Bètè or Malinkè. Indeed, the first President of Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny, was a beneficiary of this policy. Like other members of the Baoulè ethnic group, Houphouët-Boigny received a university degree. Houphouët -Boigny received the highest medical degree a non-French person was allowed under colonialism-Indigenous Medicine.

The rise of Voluntary Associations in Côte d'Ivoire

There are many examples from contemporary Côte d'Ivoire that illustrate how voluntary associations continued to play a crucial role in the post-independent era. Zolberg (1964) details the role of ethnic voluntary groups in the development of Ivoirian political parties and offers an interesting account of how these associations helped Houphouët-Boigny become the first president of Côte d'Ivoire. According to Zolberg (1964), the PDCI secured the support of different ethnic communities by providing public offices and redistributing state resources to ethnic elites, who were brought into the PDCI via the voluntary associations. Consequently, the associations became the building blocks of early electoral coalitions. Ethnic groups were largely dependent on the effectiveness of these voluntary associations to "bring home the goods."[119]

Ultimately, the voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire helped to perpetuate internal divisions along ethnic lines. They also helped to create a political ethnic identity consciousness that may not have otherwise developed within the context of the pre-colonial traditional social unit. This was particularly true for those societies in which there was little organization above the village level. In such cases, smaller ethnic groups and associations found it more effective[120] to form larger associations in which coalesced. For example, representatives of the eight groups that make up the Baoulé ethnic group would often coalesce into one large association, the first of which was called the *Union Fraternelle des Originaires de Côte d'Ivoire* (UFOCI). [121] The leaders of the Agni and other Akan groups of the Southeast founded the *Association pour la*

[119] That is, state goods and services.
[120] For instance, better access to state resources and political representation.
[121] See Woods (1992; 1994).

Défense des Intérêts des Autochtones de la Côte d'Ivoire (ADIACI) in 1934. And, in 1944 the Westerners in Abidjan founded the *Union des Originaires des Six Cercles de l'Ouest* (UOSCO), which included the Krou ethnic groups. The Odienné ethnic group formed the *Odienné Idéal* and later incorporated other Malinké Muslims from areas such as Séguéla. Notably, these ethnic groups were generally closely related.[122] Indeed, it was rare for unrelated ethnic groups to be found in the same voluntary associations. Even foreign Africans had their own associations. These included the *Union Fraternelle des Senegalais* and the *Union Voltaique* (Zolberg, 1964). For these societies, therefore, the voluntary associations provided ethnic groups not only the communication links between the towns and the hinterland. They were also the chief mechanisms by which smaller ethnic groups could gain access to public goods and political representation.

As previously noted, the French policy of the *Four Communes* was never extended to Côte d'Ivoire. Rather, the French administrative policy in Côte d'Ivoire was to establish ethnic communities whereby entire neighborhoods, towns, cities, and even regions were divided along ethnic lines. In theory, African subjects in Côte d'Ivoire could become citizens through a procedure analogous to individual naturalization. However, unlike Senegal, the necessary educational facilities for acquiring the proper qualifications for this form of legal assimilation were extremely limited in Côte d'Ivoire.[123] Indeed, former president Houphouë-Boigny was among the many Ivoirians who had to travel to Senegal to fulfill their educational pursuits. In

[122] For example as smaller sub-sects of the larger ethnic groups, similar linguistic group, religion or via region.

[123] The limitations of Ivoirian African participations in the government occurred at national as well as the local level. The only local body in which citizens or subjects were represented was the Administrative Council (a body of advisory powers only), created in 1895. In the 1930s, African Ivoirians (subjects) had three representatives on the Council. They were chosen by a very limited electorate that was concentrated mostly in cities such as Grand Bassam and Abidjan.

1921 for example, only 308 (of a total population of six million) of African Ivoirians were French citizens.[124] Many among these African citizens were Senegalese. Because of the lack of educational facilities in Côte d'Ivoire and subsequently the lack of knowledge and skills among the Ivoirian population, Senegalese administrators were brought in by the French to fill administrative positions during the late-colonial era.

The impact was that neither citizens nor subjects of Côte d'Ivoire had much opportunity to participate in government. Government remained in the hands of the French officials. Even after independence, a large majority of the administrative positions continued to be held by French citizens and other foreign nationals such as the Senegalese.[125] Houphouët-Boigny also maintained the ethnically organized communities as established by the French. This in turn perpetuated the relevance and importance of voluntary associations in Ivoirian post-independence politics. With entire neighborhoods, towns, cities, and regions divided along ethnic lines and the question for Houphouët-Boigny was how to structure and coordinate the Ivoirian political and party system that would incorporate all of the major ethnic groups. Rather than restructuring or reorganizing the population[126], Houphouët-Boigny incorporated the voluntary associations in the political and party system. Indeed, as in the late-colonial era in which leaders of the voluntary associations from all of the major ethnic groups were incorporated into the party structure of the PDCI, in the post-independence era, Houphouoët-Boigny incorporated them not only into the PDCI but also the government. In this way, voluntary associations became institutionalized and regarded

[124] Only citizens were allowed to elect a representative to the *Couseil Superieur des Colonies* (another consultative body), created in Paris in 1883.
[125] See Zolberg (1964).
[126] This was an enormous undertaking that would have undoubtedly resulted in massive opposition among large portions of the population.

as effective redistributive mechanisms that both the state and ethnic groups could utilize.[127] The benefits derived from membership and promise of political support among major ethnic groups created the incentives for sustaining and maintaining voluntary associations. Their persistence in turn helped to reinforce and therefore accentuate, rather than attenuate, the importance of ethnic identity in Ivoirian politics.

Conclusion

The chapter shows that despite having the same colonizers, the colonial administrative, political and economic policies in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire varied significantly. These differences affected the formation of colonial and post-colonial societies as well as helped to determine the types of social institutions that emerged in each country both before and after independence. As the following chapters indicate, the nature and role that these institutions played in the respective countries were consequential for the attenuation and/or accentuation of ethnic identity.

Whereas the French conquest and colonial policies significantly altered the nature and strength of leadership and relations between the state and society in both countries, in the case of Senegal the colonial experience provided much of the space and opportunity for the rise of the Sufi Orders while the colonial experience in Côte d'Ivoire resulted in the rise of voluntary associations. Both the Sufi Orders and voluntary associations became the primary redistributive intermediaries between the society and the state within the respective countries. Compared to voluntary

[127] This is particularly in terms of securing political support among the major ethnic groups and assurance of access to public goods and representation.

associations, which tended to emphasize the ethnic distinctions among Ivoirians however, Sufi Orders were largely pan-ethnic and inclusive. The reliance on Sufi Orders and voluntary associations as redistributive intermediaries in post-independent Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire gave these informal institutions the bases for establishing the rules regarding the salience and/or use(s) of ethnicity as a mobilizational tool. In the case of Senegal, the pan-ethnic and inclusive nature and redistributive role of the Sufi Orders helped to attenuate the political salience of ethnic identity in the Senegalese society. In Côte d'Ivoire, the redistributive role of the voluntary associations accentuated the salience of ethnic identity as both membership and access to resources were based on ethnic affiliation.

Once the institutions of the Sufi Orders and voluntary associations took on the role of intermediaries between the state and society, providing redistributive goods, it became exceedingly difficult to change (in great measure) the general rules regarding the salience of ethnicity to the access of public goods, political representation, over time. In fact, the chapter shows that even after independence, the Sufi Orders and voluntary associations persisted, as did their redistributive role and the influence of their rules regarding ethnic balancing and/or ethnic transcendence, long after colonialism had ended.

The implication here is that if these institutions continued to establish the political rules of the game in terms of the salience of ethnicity and the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool (potential or otherwise) , the chances of ethnic politicization remained low/constant. Conversely, if there are shifts to these institutional rules, the changes of the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool may

rise dramatically. Both hypotheses are explored in the subsequent chapters. The following chapter, for instance, details the extent to which the informal institutions of the Sufi Order and the voluntary associations have influenced the political rules of the game (particularly as they relate to the use or non-use of ethnic identity) in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire since their rise during the colonial era. The chapter finds that much of the difference in the relative salience of ethnic identity between the two countries may be explained by the nature and the redistributive roles of Sufi Order and voluntary associations. The chapter also shows that while ethnicity has largely been more salient in Côte d'Ivoire than in Senegal, informal institutional rules such as relatively balanced ethnic representation and the agrarian policy of "land belongs to whomever cultivates it" kept ethnicity from being politicized in Côte d'Ivoire between 1960 and 1993. The question addressed in Chapter Six, therefore, is: what changed in Ivoirian politics that brought about ethnic conflict and strife that dominated the 1990s and much of the new millennium? Taking on a dominant argument in the study of comparative politics, the chapter suggests that the answer lies less with formal institutional change and more so concerns changes to the informal institutional rules such as relatively balanced ethnic representation and the agrarian policy of "the land belongs to whomever cultivate it." Chapters seven and eight provide empirical support reinforcing this argument.

CHAPTER FIVE

Religion, Politics and Institutions: Towards an Explanation of Ethnic Politicization in West Africa

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the role of religion in the politicization or non-politicization of ethnicity. One the one hand, scholars such as Makhtar Diouf (1986) attribute the non-politicization of social cleavages in Senegal directly to religion. On the other hand, religion has also been identified as a major cause of ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire. Given that both countries have a large Muslim population and a relatively small Christian population; can religion be a central factor in the contrasting outcomes of these two countries?

Some writers point to the relatively larger Christian population in Côte d'Ivoire as a possible explanation for the differences in outcomes between the two countries.[128] This argument stems largely from assertions that Islam and Christianity have opposite effects on ethnic politicization, particularly within the context of African societies. Works on Christian missionary activities and Islamic influences imply that Islam has more of an integrating effect on African societies than Christianity. Christianity tends to accentuate ethnic identities/difference while Islam attenuates ethnic identities/differences.

[128] Côte d'Ivoire is 30 percent Christian; Senegal is 5 percent Christian.

Ali Mazrui (1983) and Makhtar Diouf (1994), [129]credit Islam with playing an integrating role in African societies. Makhtar Diouf, for example, asserts that by attenuating local divisions and creating a more over-arching, less divisive identity, Islam has "de-ethnicized" the Senegalese society (1994:92). According to Diouf, not only has Islam created solidarity among Muslims regardless of their ethnic background, it teaches tolerance and respect for other religious groups. In their studies of ethnic politicization in Africa, Lemarchand (1964) and Vail (1982)[130] find that African countries with a large Christian population are more likely than Islamic African countries to experience ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict because that Christianity has reinforced and accentuated ethnic identities and tribalism throughout African societies. According to these authors, whereas Islam is aimed at unifying cultures, Christian missionaries are instrumental in creating cultural identities through their specification of, and dependence on, traditional culture and local languages for their evangelizing. Such parochial identities are then reinforced and perpetuated through mission education (1989: 12).

While my own research on religious tolerance seems to fit well within this framework, closer analysis of the role of Islam, more specifically the Sufi Brotherhoods in Senegal, suggest that it is not Islam or Christianity *per se*, that prevent or cause the politicization of social cleavages. Indeed, if Islam and Christianity were to be understood in this fundamentally primordial way, how would we explain the bloody wars between Muslim sects or Christian denominations? The Protestant/Catholic

[129] Makhtar Diouf is a prominent Senegalese Scholar and author of "*Les Ethnies et La Nation* (1994).
[130] Vail argues that missionaries were instrumental in creating cultural identities through their specification of "custom" and "tradition" and by writing "tribal" histories (1989). Such parochial identities were then reinforced and perpetuated through mission education (1989:12).

conflict of Northern Ireland is very well known, studied and documented. Also, as late as 1989, Muslims along the Senegalese-Mauritania border clashed in violent conflict over fishing rights.

What is more, if Islam were to be used as a primordial identity for the majority of the people of Senegal, and hence the basis of good relations among the various ethnic groups, it should follow that cleavages will develop between those who share this identity and those who do not. Yet, what is observed empirically is that the five percent Christian population are over-represented at the national level, the state level, as well as in modern sectors of the economy. Senghor, the first President of Senegal, was Christian.

The central argument of the chapter is that while religion is indeed important, as it helps to shape behavior and influences the capacity for collective action, it does not determine political actions. Islam was able to mitigate ethnic politicization in Senegal, not because of the religious doctrine or theological foundations, but because of the extent to which the religious structures encouraged the facilitation of a social institutions (formal or informal), that: (a) attenuate ethnic differences; and (b) serve as an effective counterweight to the state, in terms of goods provisions. As such, like Villalón (2006), I underscore the need to examine the issue, not so much as a bipolar relationship, but more so, within the context of more nuanced understanding of state-society relations. Joel Migdal (1988) provides a useful model of this relationship by characterizing society as a mix of social organizations. He characterizes African societies as strong in relation to the state but diffuse in that social control is spread

through various fairly autonomous social organizations, among which both religious and ethnic affiliations should be considered.[131]

By tracing the history of the interaction between the post-colonial regime in the Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire and local social institutions/ associations, the chapter shows that social structures born out of Islamic religious tradition proved to be effective at mitigating ethnic politicization not simply because they were able to serve as conduits for the redistribution of governmental benefits. These Brotherhoods were successful at mitigating ethnic politicization because they were able to do so in a manner that was non-discriminatory, inclusive and pan-ethnic. As informal institutional configurations that help to transcend historic ethnic and religious communities, Sufi Brotherhoods provide an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the idea of national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that blocks the use of political appeals to cultural difference as a mobilization tool.

Conversely, in Côte d'Ivoire, social institutions that sought (with varying degrees of success) to mediate the processes of state-society relations operated largely on the basis of ethnic and ethno-regional differences. The success of these social organizations at redressing the mismatch that has usually characterized African state-society struggles depended upon a precarious ethnic/ethno-regional balance. Once the perception of particular ethnic groups gaining better access relative to others became more pervasive, individuals became susceptible to ethnic appeals, providing favorable conditions for political elites to politicize ethnicity.

The chapter also depicts how the Ivoirian social institutions/associations became incorporated into, and existed under, the umbrella of the Parti Democratique de la Côte

[131] Migdal (1988).

d'Ivoire (PDCI) as individual elements of an ethnic whole. This created incentives for continued investments in ethic/ethno-religious/ ethno-regional identities. It also created a favorable condition for political elites to make ethnic/ethno-religious/ethno-regional appeals at the advent of an authority vacuum and/or political fallout.[132] Conversely, in Senegal, the political parties have been largely dependent on the Religious Brotherhoods for electoral votes. The patronage ties of the respective Brotherhoods formed the social base of the political parties thereby creating a transcendent social capital that has acted as a kind of bulwark against the tendency of political elites to seek the path of least resistance in political mobilization in playing the ethnic card.[133]

Religious Tolerance and Coexistence: A Survey of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

That there is a high degree of religious tolerance throughout Senegal is easily observed empirically. The Constitution of Senegal specifically defines the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of religion. According to the International Religious Reports, the government of Senegal generally respects religious freedoms in words as well as deeds.[134] A survey of International Religion Reports from 2001 to 2008 indicates very little change in the status of respect for religious freedoms by the government over time. There have been no reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. The government observes Tabaski, Tamkharit, the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, Korite, Easter Monday, Ascension,

[132] Such as among top ranking party members who leave to form their own party due to disagreements over future governance and policies issues.
[133] See Villalón (2006).
[134] See International Religion Reports.

Pentecost, Feast of the Assumption, All Saints' Day, and Christmas as national holidays. [135] In Senegal, even the most devout Muslims have no qualms about sending their children to Catholic institutions. In fact, the majority of students attending Christian schools in Dakar are Muslims.[136]

Both the Sufi Orders in Senegal and Catholics in Senegal strongly embrace values and principles of religious freedom. These attitudes have led to a high degree of religious tolerance throughout the country. Differences in dogma, practices and religion are met with high levels of tolerance and emphasis on unity, respect and deference, rather than condemnation and/or discrimination by the Sufi Orders. Behrman (1970), details for instance, how the doctrines of the respective Religious Orders emerged from, and have followed, a traditional Sufi path of tolerance whereby all religions and believers merit being treated with respect so long as they do not attack Islam.[137] It is not uncommon for Sufi Orders to attend each other's religious activities and celebrations. In fact, the belief that all marabouts are good, regardless of affiliation, is widespread throughout Senegal.

Despite formal disagreement among the religious Brotherhoods over such issues as the official day on which to begin observance of Ramadan for example, there are no disparaging or disapproving statements issued by the Marabouts. Indeed, the general attitude among the public is that such differences are not at all significant as all spiritual roads, regardless of the path taken, lead to the same end.[138] Each Marabout issues its

[135] Field Research Observation, also see the International Religion Report (2008).
[136] See the International Religious Report, 2008.
[137] See Behrnan (1970).
[138] Field Research, Dakar, Senegal 2007.

Ndiggle[139] concerning the observance of Ramadan, which is then passed on to the respective followers during worship and via the media. In their coverage, the media has generally remained neutral. Indeed, newspaper op-ed pieces and radio or television commentaries rarely cast any particular Brotherhood as being right or wrong on these issues.

It is also not uncommon for Sufi and Catholic leaders to attend each other's events and celebrations. Christians are generally invited to the homes of Muslims in observance and celebration of Tabaski[140] and Christians often do the same for Muslims at Christmas.[141] The Pope received warm welcome during his visit to Senegal in 1992, not just from the Christian population but also from many of the Sufi leaders and their congregants, The cordial relationship between the Brotherhoods and the Christian minority is also evident in the practice of having representatives of the Catholic Church share the same place of honor on the dais in official state ceremonies as representatives of the Sufi Brotherhoods. While in general, name choice analysis is not a scientific measure of social tolerance, the relatively high number of non-Serer and non-Diola Senegalese[142] with Muslim firsts name and Christian middle names is significant here. An examination of school attendance in Dakar indicates that the majority of students attending Christian schools are Muslims.[143] Consequently, as prominent lawyer explained:

> I can no more dislike Christianity than I could Islam. I am a practicing Muslim who is baptized in the Catholic Church. As a child, I studied

[139] Direct orders issued by Marabouts to fellow congregants.
[140] Fest of the Sacrifice of the lamb as represented in the Old Testament of the Bible.
[141] Field Research, Dakar, Senegal 2007.
[142] Ethnic groups with larger percentage of Christians than Muslims.
[143] See the International Religious Report , 2008.

> both the Koran and the Bible. I went by my Muslim name on the playground and my Christian name in the classroom. [144]

While some among the Senegalese intellectuals have expressed the view that it is impossible to gain electoral success unless one is a Muslim and Wolof in contemporary Senegal[145], this was not born out in my own research. When asked which they thought was more important, to support politicians that shared their own religious affiliations or to support the politician with the best abilities, even if he/she was from a different group, 90 percent said they thought it was better to support the politician with the best abilities.[146]In response to the question about whether Senegalese tend to support Muslims, one respondent offered the following explanation:

> The reason that some political candidate of minority ethnic groups are not chosen during elections is not because they are not Muslims or Wolof, but because of their inability to speak the lingua franca well, which tends to lead to problems of communication with the majority of the population…If [one] cannot communicate with those who lack education in the official language [French], one's abilities to win over the voters become dramatically reduced. Also, voters could be troubled by the fact that they elected a candidate with whom they would not be able to communicate.[147]

Almost all respondents point to the fact the country's first President, Léopold Senghor, was Christian as adequate disproof of the above assertion. That the first duly elected president was a Christian is significant. Among other things, it strongly suggests that Marabouts had little problem accepting political leadership by the religious minority. As one respondent points out; having Catholic wives who were active in public affairs did not hamper support of by Sufi Orders for the presidential bids of

[144] Interview, Dakar, August 2007.
[145] Interviews, Field Research, Senegal August 2007. Also, see Dia (2000) on the Islamization and Wolofization of Senegalese Politics.
[146] Interview, field Research, Dakar, July 2007-Jan.2008. 42 of the 47 individuals interviewed indicated their preference for competent political leaders versus those sharing their religious beliefs.
[147] Interview, field Research, Dakar, October 2007.

Adbou Diouf and Abdoulayde Wade. In fact, President Wade's decision to appoint a second Catholic to his Cabinet in June 2007 after complaints about the lack of Christian appointments was met with approval by the Sufi Orders. In general, expanding the cabinet to 38 members is viewed as a relatively small compromise for continued tolerance and adequate representation of all Senegalese.[148]

When asked whether they thought that non-Muslim politicians had difficulty gaining country-wide electoral support because of their religion, only 10 percent agreed.[149] The non-Muslim political party leaders themselves fully disagreed. A prominent Senegalese Christian politician in Dakar pointed out that he is loved and respected by people all over the country, Christians and non-Christians alike. He stated:

> In fact, I receive more electoral support from Muslims than among the Christian population…people like me or dislike me, not because of my religion, but because of my political views and ideas. We are a very tolerant and respectful people.[150]

A Catholic Diola party leader from the southern Casamance region similarly stated that while he in fact enjoys overwhelming support among the Christians in Casamance, this had less to do with his religion and more so, the legacy of his work in the region as Mayor. According to this party leader:

> In the [2007] election, we carried areas in the country that were predominantly Muslim while we lost in regions with larger Christian communities. This tells you that it is not about religion… [T]he people don't care if you are a Christian or a Musliman, they care that you are a good person and that you intend to work hard to help their community and the country.[151]

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[148] Le Soliel (June 2007).
[149] These included 2 Professors, 2 Journalists, 8 University Students (the majority of whom self-identified as Diolas). Diolas are predominantly Christians and often express the view that they are discriminated against because of the conflict situation in the Casamance.
[150] Interview with leader of the BDS, Dakar, Senegal, December 2007.
[151] Interview with leader of Rassemblement Pour le Socialisme et la Democracy Tukku Defaraat Senegal (RSD/TDS), December 2007. This is relatively small party. The party headquarters are located in Dakar , Senegal. Regional offices may also be found in areas such as St. Louis and Zinguinchor in the Casamance.

In sharp contrast to Senegal, a high degree of religious intolerance is evident throughout Côte d'Ivoire. As in Senegal, there is no official state religion in Côte d'Ivoire. In fact, the Ivoirian Constitution, much like Senegal's, declares freedom of religion and religious practices for everyone. In practice however, Islam has largely been depicted as a religion of foreigners, non-citizens or circumstantial Ivoirians. Conversely, Christianity (for the historical and ethnic and ethno-regional reasons explored in the previous chapter), has been palpably favored by the Ivoirian government. Despite the Ivoirian government's claims to provide religious freedoms, there have been serious infringements. The Ivoirian Muslim community has complained of being repressed and discriminated against for many years. Muslims in general largely believe that their religion has made them targets of discrimination by the government with regard to both employment and access to governmental resources. [152] Many believe that it is not by coincidence that all of the heads of state and many senior government officials since independence have been Christians.[153]

While like Senegal, a majority of Ivoirians (80 percent)[154] thought that it is better to support the politician with the best abilities, a majority of Muslim respondents felt that this rule has not been not strictly adhered to in Ivoirian society. Muslims in general feel discriminated against. Many call for more Muslims in high government positions "and not just token positions to placate us Muslims, but individuals who can effectively represent our interests."[155] The Christian respondents argue that it makes perfect sense that Christians have a stronger showing at the highest levels of

[152] Interview, field Research, Dakar, July 2007-Jan.2008.
[153] Field Research, Abidjan, 2008.
[154] Field Research Abidjan, Jan-June 2008.
[155] Field Research, Abidjan, 2008.

government and in the private sector, as more often than not, Christians out- perform Muslims academically and are more competitive in the job market. Christian schools are better educational institutions that Quranic institutions. [156]

Whereas the Senegalese government recognizes both Christian and Muslim holidays, up to 1993, most official holidays in Côte d'Ivoire have been Christian. The main Muslim holidays were public only for Muslims: the Civil Service and public schools remained open on those days.[157] Also, while Quranic schools are required (since 1965) to teach French, Arabic is not taught in public schools. In fact, when the curriculum for public education was discussed in the 1960s, Houphouët-Boigny refused to include Arabic in the list of foreign languages offered at the primary and secondary school levels.[158] When the proposition was repeated by *Conseil National Islamique* in the mid-1990s, it provoked a general outcry on grounds that the Muslim federation was trying to Islamize Côte d'Ivoire.[159] Simone Gbagbo, wife to current President Gbagbo, has been heavily criticized by Muslims for her blatant anti-Muslim statements and rhetoric.[160]

One of the most frequently cited examples of religious bias on the part of the Ivoirian government is the construction of a US $300 million basilica in Yamoussoukro by Houphouët-Boigny.[161] While the government helped in the building of several mosques throughout the decades, the completion of such Christian monuments as the Marian sanctuary, the Saint Paul Cathedral (both in Abidjan) and the Yamoussoukro

[156] Field Research, Abidjan, 2008.
[157] Miran, M. (2006 :.7).
[158] Ibid. p.6
[159] Ibid. p.7.
[160] Fraternite Matin, Le Patriote (, Jan. 2003, May 2008). See also, Akindes (2008).
[161] Field Research, Abidjan 2008.

basilica highlight a serious disproportion in financial investments between the country's main religions.[162] Muslim leaders also point to the creation of two new bishoprics in the almost entirely Islamized towns of Bondoukou and Odienné, respectively in 1988 and 1995, as a sure sign of an attempt by the Ivoirian government to promote Christianity from above. These activities prompted influential Islamist reformist El Hadj`Aboubacar Fofana to ask in 1990: "Is the State still secular or it is choosing a religion?"[163]

The Ivoirian government has a long history of monitoring Muslim religious groups for what it deems "subversive or dangerous" political activity.[164] There are numerous reports of raids by the Government of areas owned by Muslims. In 1999 gendarmerie searched the mosques and the homes of Muslim Imams and in 2000 Muslim leaders and their followers were reportedly killed by the authorities during demonstrations.[165] Muslim Human Rights watchdogs have issued statements that the government of President Gbagbo has been targeting Muslims harshly since taking over the reign of the country in 2002. According to the Human Rights group, Muslims in the Côte d'Ivoire have been subjected to arrests, killings, and the destruction of their mosques by death squads. These squads are set up by the president to intimidate the Muslims, particularly those living in the capital city of Abidjan.[166]

The bias has negatively affected the relationships between Muslims and Christians. [167] Anti-Muslim statements, characterizations and quips are not uncommon in the streets of Abidjan and in the media. A survey of the local newspapers dating

[162] Miran (2006:5).
[163] Cited in Miran, (2006:5.).
[164] Field Research, Abidjan, 2008.
[165] Fraternite Matin (October, 2000).
[166] See Human Rights reports 2002-2007.
[167] There is common disdain for Friday afternoon worship by Ivoirian Christians in Abidjan. Prayers, usually broadcast over loud speakers are considered "loud, disrupting babble." Muslims are often referred to by Ivoirian Christians as "them," "those people," suggesting otherness, outsiders or foreigners.

back to the 1970s suggests that coverage of Muslims is three times more likely to be negative coverage of Christians. [168] Similarly, a survey of editorial cartoons indicates that depictions of Muslims tend to reflect negative stereotypes more often than do depictions of Christians. [169]

The introduction of Ivoirité by Bédié in 1994 has further compounded the Muslims/Christian tensions. The policy has had the profound effect of interjecting religion into the national political contest. Akindès (2003) noted for instance, that the identity discourse propelled by *Ivoirité* has "sown the seeds of mutual paranoia" in Côte d'Ivoire since 1994. Communities began to view each other on the basis of identities fixed to a dichotomy where all northerners and Muslims were the out-group. Ivoirité also promulgated a new electoral code that essentially created two types of citizen: pure Ivoirians and circumstantial Ivoirians.

While it cannot be stated with 100 percent certainty that the introduction of *Ivoirité* resulted in the creation of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) in 1994, and certainly the founders of the political party themselves were not from the northern regions of the country, nor were they Muslims, there is something telling in the fact that northerners and/or Muslims comprise the support base for the party. However, it was undoubtedly Bédié's declaration that the RDR was nothing but a northern regionalist party with a sinister Muslim agenda, his dismissal of Ouattara loyalists in the civil service, the party and the government media, including Ali Coulibaly (head of Ivoirian

[168] During the field research I surveyed some of major local newspapers such as Fraternité Matin, Le Patriote from 1970-2008, specifically looking at how Muslims and Christians are generally portrayed in the media. The assumption is that the representation of Muslims and Christians in the media, especially over prolonged periods, it informs those views and the general sentiment in the country. Media depictions may unveil what individuals may not want to admit to in face-to-face interviews. Individuals may also not be aware of their own personal prejudices.
[169] Fraternité Matin and Le Patriote.

TV1), Koné Moussa (editor of *Ivoir Soir)* and Yacouba Kébé, the managing director of *Fraternité Matin* that drove thousands of Ivoirians to support the RDR (Crook, 1997:13).

The disqualification of Ouattara from running for President in 1995 on the basis of allegation that both of his parents were not Ivoirians also led to wide scale shift in the support of northerners and Muslims from the PDCI to the RDR. Many believed that Ouattara was being disenfranchised because he was a northerner and Muslim.[170] It is not surprising, therefore, that northerners and Muslims ultimately formed the base of the RDR. Thus, although Crook (1997) rightly points out that RDR founder Djény Kobina was from the south-east near the border with Ghana and self-identified was a Nzimba, and three of the other eight founding deputies were from the southern and central towns of San Pedro, Sassandra and Bouake´ (Crook, 1997), loyalty to Ouattara on the ground has been mostly among northern Muslims.[171] Ouattara further galvanized the northern/Muslim votes by declaring at a political rally in France, that his presidency was being denied simply because he was from the North and because he was a Muslim.[172] The fact that a number of Muslims northerners lost their jobs under President Bédié's leadership fueled the fire even further, by seemingly reaffirming a north-south, Muslim-Christian divide.

RDR party officials deny allegations that Ouattara has made appeals on the basis of religious affiliations. In fact, the Secretary General points out that the members of the

[170] Northerners constituting nearly 60 percent of the Ivoirian population and Muslims totaled over 30 percent. As such, a large percentage of Ivoirians felt that it was not just Ouattara who was being disenfranchised, but they themselves as well. .
[171] Electoral data from the 1995 elections indicate that the RDR won in Muslim majority regions.
[172] Fraternité Matin (1994)

RDR are diverse, ethnically and religiously.[173] The manifesto and party documents support the Secretary General's claims. There are no explicit references to ethnic, religious or even regional concerns. The official party documents focus on economic issues, in particular, rationalism similar to the type of policies Houphouët-Boigny had implemented. As Chandra (1994) points out, however, it is often the case that ethnic appeals are not overt or explicit. Party manifestos can refrain from making explicit appeals to ethnicity, yet the party officials themselves do not. Ouattara's statements in France accusing Bédié of undermining his chances at the presidency simply because he is from the North and Muslim, is a case in point.[174] It is the belief among top Ivoirian officials that this was Ouattara's official *war cry* for his fellow northerners and Muslims to mobilize behind his cause- a bid on the presidency.[175]

That ethnicity and religion are closely related- if one is a Baoulé or a Bété, he/she almost certainly a Christian, and if one is a Senufo he/she is almost certainly a Muslim- further complicated the problem. What may seem purely religious on the surface may indeed be undergirded by ethnicity. As many Muslims as non-Muslims (particularly the Christian Bété) were upset about the lack of representation at the top level government appointments and outraged at the dominance of the Baoulé.[176] Indeed, the 1980s was characterized by political upheavals with opposition parties and leaders calling for an end to "Baoulé nepotism," especially in recruitment to public jobs. Le Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), and its leader Laurent Gbabo, were the main

[173] Interview with Secretary General of RDR, Feb.2008.
[174] There were a lot of newspaper coverage of this event in Fraternité Matin and other local newspapers.
[175] Interview, Abidjan, March 2008.
[176] Field Research, Abidjan, 2008.

oppositions to Houphouët-Boigny's leadership to the PDCI and Houphouët-Boigny during this time period.

The FPI fiercely opposed and coined the phrase, the *Baoulization de la Côte d'Ivoire*.[177] The FPI's main message in 1990 was to stress that the PDCI was a partial regime which had systematically favored the interests of particular Ivoirian ethnic groups-Baoulé. This tactic gained support among the Akyé and "lower-ranking" Akan ethnic groups as well- especially after Houphouët-Boigny named Bédié as his successor. Indeed, a prominent Ivoirian writer noted that rightly or wrongly, after 33 years of power by a Baoulé president and the passage of this leadership role to Bédié, someone of the same, ethnic affiliation, the majority of the Ivoirian ethnic groups forged opposition to the Baoulé ethnic group.[178]

The general impression of Houphouët-Boigny naming a fellow Baoulé as his successor is that he was seeking to promote the dominance of the Baoulé people.[179] A number of newspaper articles stated as much. According to the author, with the many instances of mismanagement of the country's finances at the hands of Bédié, a point well known and acknowledged by Houphouët-Boigny himself, the only reason that Houphouët-Boigny chose Bédié was because he is a fellow Baoulé. By Houphouët-Boigny's owns words, Bédié was not honest, and lacked honor.[180] The backlash against Bédié increased after he published a book in 1995 promoting the idea that the rulers de la Côte d'Ivoire should come from among the "superior" Akan ethnic group.[181]

[177] Field Research, Abidjan, 2008. See also, Fraternité Matin.
[178] Ekanza (2003).
[179] Field Research, Abidjan, 2008
[180] La Voie, Oct. 2005.
[181] See Bédié (1995).

The RDR also vehemently accused the PDCI of being nothing more than a cover for unfair domination by the President's ethnic group the Baoulé. RDR party leader denied Gbagbo's accusations however, that the ethnic groups from the North were favored by the PDCI. Ouattara and the RDR decried Bédié's purge of the party's supporters from high-level positions[182] within the government as systematic discrimination against the ethnic groups of the North. The RDR therefore accused the FPI of trying to promote the interests of the Bété by evoking fear of foreigners, a concept which, for the Bété, meant all non-Bété ethnic groups who moved to the West to establish, or work on, plantations. The PDCI's response was to characterize both the FPI and RDR as ethno-regional parties—"the party of the Bété" and the "party of northerners and Muslim," respectively and cast itself as the only true "National Party" de la Côte d' Ivoire.

Decades of uncontrolled migration into the center and south-west areas of the country had the effect of fostering grievances among the Bété, Baoulé and those ethnic groups from the North. The migration of the people from the Baoulé region, the north and the Sahelian states, (mainly Burkina Faso) to the regions long settled by the Bété and the Krou ethnic groups, created bitter conflict between the indigenous population and "foreigners" over land and employment. According to Raulin (1957), "…since the Bété knows that the population of Gagnoa is made up mostly of non- Bété foreigners, he fears, rightly or wrongly, the rule of non-Bété and he rebels against the Dioula" and the Baoulé.[183] The colonial policies, perpetuated by Houphouët-Boigny, were perceived as benefiting the large cocoa plantation owners and foreigners over the

[182] There is some uncertainty as to whether these Ouattara sympathizers were fired by Bédié or had quit.
[183] Raulin 1957 (cited in Zolberg, 1964:46).

indigenes, and therefore helped to define the boundaries of the Bété identity in terms of opposition to the PDCI. Similarly, the treatment of northern Ivoirians as foreigners or "circumstantial Ivoirians" by Southern ethnic groups helped to define the boundaries of the Northern/Muslim/Dioula identity in terms of opposition to the PDCI and the FPI. The end result in both instances was the creation of "centers for mobilized ethno-regional hostility" (Crook, 1997: 222).

Towards an explanation of ethnic and religious tolerance in West Africa: role of Sufi Brotherhoods and Voluntary Associations in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire.

The following section explains how the Sufi-Brotherhoods and voluntary associations affected the set of options open to political elites in post-colonial Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of Senegal, the pan-ethnic nature of Sufi Brotherhoods and their efforts at the re-distribution of government resources along non-ethnic lines de-legitimized ethnic differences and expunged ethnic/cultural difference from the post-colonial politics and political discourse. Consequently, appeals to ethnic differences became a highly unlikely political mobilization tool for Senegalese political elites. Conversely, in Côte d'Ivoire, ethnic affiliation was a prerequisite for access to state resources. This accentuated ethnic differences and ultimately legitimized ethnicity as a pre-requisite for political participation, thereby making ethnic distinctions a useful mobilization tool.

The rise of Maraboutic Authority in Senegal

As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most striking developments that took place after the French conquest of Senegal was the remarkably rapid spread of Islam and the rise of new Muslim religious leaders who became the predominant indigenous authorities throughout the country. Although Islam existed prior to the arrival of the French (owing to the Islamization of the region in general), it was not until the nineteenth century that the Brotherhoods became extremely important. The *Scramble for Africa* and territorial conquest demolished the traditional indigenous social structures and political institutions and caused a breakdown of the old political and social order, which then created a virtual authority vacuum. The Islamic Sufi orders filled this authority gap. According to Galvan (2002): "by the mid-1880s, Muslim spiritual authority was well on its way to replacing the temporal authority of traditional African rulers and elites whose power had been smashed during the course of the French conquest."[184]

The rapid adoption of the Islamic Sufi Orders over time enhanced the appeal of the Marabouts, allowing them considerable autonomy over a huge percentage of the Senegalese population. Data from the national population census indicate that the number of Muslims in Senegal went from approximately 8.4 percent of the total population in 1907 to 82 percent of the total population in 1963.[185] Since the French successfully defeated local opposition to colonial rule however, why didn't the colonial administration promote Christianity as a counterforce to Islamic influence and seek to eradicate the Sufi Orders?

[184] Galvan, (2002: 16-17).
[185] Statistics Institute of Senegal.

By some accounts, French colonialists were in perpetual fear of jihad type resistance by the Muslim leaders[186] and decided against trying to eradicate or compete with them. Rather, French leadership in the form of governor Faidherbe assumed a more pragmatic approach that involved co-opting and controlling the Sufi-leaders: Marabouts could retain social and spiritual dominance in the countryside, so long as they would help in the promotion of peanut production, endorse the payment of taxes to the French administrator and actively recruite soldiers. Cooperative Marabouts would, in turn, be rewarded with monetary gifts, political donations and access to land.[187] According to Behrman by the 1950s" [i]t became a matter of habit for families of the great Marab[o]us to expect money from the government." Since much of this production was to take place in the rural regions of the country, which comprised more than 97 percent and 85 percent of the total population between 1885 and 1945 respectively, the French found it in their best interest to co-opt the leading Marabouts. Gellar states:

> To the extent that he Marabouts preached submission and obedience to the French authority while exhorting their followers to pay their taxes on time, settle new lands, and grow peanuts as a cash crop, the French were willing to grant the leaders of Senegal's major Muslim brotherhoods a good deal of autonomy and freedom of movement. [188]

Disciples recognized that besides their religious leadership, Marabouts served as conduits for redistribution of state benefits. The arrangement with the Colonial authorities allowed Marabouts to accumulate wealth. Because of their involvement as peanut producers and the contributions of their followers, the leading Marabouts were able to accumulate much wealth which enabled them to support large entourages and to

[186] An explanation offered by Behrman, (1970).
[187] See Behrman (1970).
[188] See Gellar (1995).

fulfill many of the redistributive functions previously performed by traditional rulers (Gellar, 1995:46). Entire communities, townships and many individuals rely directly upon Marabouts for their daily existence. Marabouts help to construct houses, community health care centers, roads and running water among other resources.

The ability of the Marabouts to provide economic security and protection provided a clear incentive for disciples to comply with the instructions of their Marabouts and helped significantly to reinforce the Marabouts' authority over their followers. Many in Senegal attribute their success in life as professors, journalists, businessmen, to the assistance provided to them by Marabouts. Even the taxi and car rapide[189] drivers owe their livelihood to the Marabouts. When asked what specific attributes are considered in electoral choices, one student stated: "I vote the way my Khalif tells me to vote… my allegiance is to my Marabout...It is because of him that I am attending university and will have a good life once I am done."[190] Although among the minority to directly admit the level of Maraboutic influence in their political decision making, this respondent highlights a reality in Senegal to which many will not publically admit. Another stated:

> If you need assistance to go to the doctor in Senegal, you do not go to see your local government representative; you go to your Marabout. If you want to move from the country to Dakar, you go through your local Marabout to make the connections for housing and work, not the Mayor. Marabouts take care of us, not government…[i]t does not matter where you are from or what ethnic group you belong to, if you need help…you go to your Marabout. [191]

[189] Similar to bush taxies, mini-buses that are use for short distance transportation in large cities like Dakar.
[190] Field Research, St. Louis, Senegal, December 2007.
[191] Field Research, St. Louis, Dakar, Zinguinchor, Nov.-Dec. 2007.

Indeed, Maraboutic influence also rose to high levels in Senegal because of the "pan-ethnic, inclusive, universalistic, and transcendent"[192] nature of the Brotherhoods. Despite the fact that there are various Brotherhoods, with different practices and dogma, there has been no real ethnic divide among the Brotherhoods. Rather, each of the Orders has proven to be "ethnically transcendent."[193] Some scholars suggest that Sufi leaders were able to shore up their membership because they were universalistic. The ability to attract followers from all of the major ethnic groups allowed the Sufi leaders more social command and legitimacy. The reverse may however be the case: as the percentage of the population adhering to the Sufi Orders increased, the more inclusive, universalistic and pan-ethnic they became; ergo, the more influence the Marabouts gained with the indigenous population. Whatever the direction of the causal arrow, it became clear by the 1950s that the leaders of the main Sufi orders had become pillars of the colonial establishment and were deeply embroiled in post-independence politics.

As the influence of the Brotherhoods grew stronger and influence over the decisions expanded to more than 90 percent of the country's population, the Sufi orders came to enjoy a particularly favorable socio-political position. Marabouts had clear incentives to demand benefits from the colonial administrator and later the state, on the one hand, and the clout to claim the allegiance of the disciples on the other hand. Without direct access to the local population, political parties, and indeed, the entire post-colonial regime structure are deeply socially embedded.

It was evident during the 2007 presidential elections for example, that while somewhat elitist, Senegalese political parties have no "real" social base of which to

[192] Galvan (2002:11-12).
[193] Ibid.

speak. Campaign appeals almost never evoked any real sense of party loyalty. Rather, as the Secretary General of the Parti de l'Independence et de Travaillé explained, like every other party in Senegal… [they] get votes by going through the Marabouts."[194] This may help to explain why, as depicted in almost all newspaper coverage of Senegalese elections since independence, electoral candidates, (Christian and non-Christian alike), make a point of meeting with the most powerful Marabouts in the country as noted earlier.

Voluntary Associations in Côte d'Ivoire

We already noted how local towns in Côte d'Ivoire were essentially ethnic communities under the French policy of organizing the colony along ethnic lines, initially to facilitate conquest, and later, to control migrant workers in the urban areas. This did nothing to help promote tolerance or inter-ethnic cohesion in the country. If anything, it promoted fierce competition among the various groups for access to the colonial administration (and later the state) and resources such as health services, educational facilities/institutions and, public services such as running water. One consequence of this policy was the development of ethnically based voluntary associations.

While many of these associations claimed to seek the protection of the interests of Ivoirian in general, they almost always represented the interest of one or a few closely related ethnic groups. Their objective was to promote the progress of their particular territory. As such, these associations pledged to bring the issues pertinent to a particular ethnic group to the local colonial administration. The Association de Defense

[194] Field research in Dakar, Senegal, December 2007.

des Intérêts des Autochtones (ADIACI) is perhaps one of the most active associations that emerged to represent the interest of the Agni ethnic group during the 1920s and 1930s (Chauveau and Dozon, 1987: 259). The Mutualité Bété was also established in Abidjan by migrants from the centre-west during the 1920s and 1930s. The objective of the Mutualité Bété was to promote development in their home region. According to Cohen (1974):

> These groups brought together the most influential people born in the region in order to combine their collective resources and access to public authorities to improve the locality." Having the ear of the state administrators often meant better access to basic services or resources for them.[195]

In their competition for scarce resources ethnically based associations posed a significant problem. They accentuated ethnic, ethno-regional and ethno-religious differences, which created conditions favorable for political elites to politicize ethnicity. Stated differently, rather than encouraging Ivoirian national unity, these associations provided an institutionalized basis for the idea of citizenship to be centered on ethnic, ethno-regional, ethno-religious differences. They did little to discourage or block the use of political appeals to cultural differences as potentially profitable or an attractive mobilization strategy choice for political elites. Instead, the issue of ethnicity became directly tied to a struggle for power and economic goods, within and outside the state, which created incentives for ethnic factions within the post-colonial regime to use them as political capital in their competition for power and access to limited economic resources.

Unlike the Sufi Brotherhoods, the Ivoirian voluntary associations became incorporated into the emerging political party structure prior to independence.

[195] See Cohen (197:163-4).

Knowing that the Baoulé could not stand alone in the leadership of the country, Houphouët-Boigny used his mastery of ethnic calculus to create "a dream of territorial unity" (Zolberg, 1964, p.74). Incorporation of the association into the PDCI meant broad support from the major ethnic groups in the country. According to Zolberg, the most important factor to the political success of Houphouët-Boigny and the Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) was his "ability to take advantage of personal position, political opportunities, and widespread grievances, to create a sort of federation of ethnic groups" (Zolberg, 1964:74). One of the founders of the Treichville branch of the PDCI offered this explanation of the process:

> During the elections of [1945 and 1946] we had found that the voluntary associations that existed in the city functioned efficiently for electoral purpose as well. In preparation for the battle we would be waging, we thought that it was necessary to create highly solitary units, equivalent to the communist cells in France. Ethnic organization was the most natural and the most practical for this purpose. Regardless of where they lived and worked in the city, people of the same tribe came together for social purpose. So, we transformed the ethnic associations into party subcommittees. Where they did not exit, we helped the tribes to organize original ones. Only in this way could we communicate with the members, collect dues, and pass down party directives in the various local languages [196]

It was through this personalized strategy of ethnic co-optation that Houphouët-Boigny won the political support of the North. On his visit to Korhogo in 1965 Houphouët-Boigny announced that his government would aggressively push to promote the economic development of the poorer northern regions.[197] More important, he stated that regions which established their own home-town associations would fare better, given the fact that his leitmotif was aide-ton l'état t'aidera (Fraternité Matin, 1970:4). With the trip to Korhogo the President inaugurated an annual event: he would elect a

[196] See Zolberg (1964:116)
[197] Ibid.

major town in a particular region of the country to celebrate Independence Day. These visits created an incentive for urban elites to create home-town associations to compete for the visit and the public resources which usually followed once a town had been selected (Keller, 1983: 260).

Incorporation into the PDCI meant that associations could not establish clearly defined and functionally specific bodies in the Côte d'Ivoire. This did not mean however that access to state resources on the basis of ethnic or cultural differences ceased. Indeed, with more direct access to these governmental benefits, these associations proliferated over time; albeit more in the form of a network of auxiliary associations. According to Zolberg, many bureaucrats and party officials viewed the formation of local and regional associations as a means of building up a clientele base for themselves (Zolberg, 1964.). The motivation was to link their rise in the post-colonial state apparatus with their own ethnic group, as a means of protection. The refusal and subsequent "cut-off" of the Agni ethnic group from governmental resources because of refusal to be incorporated into the PDCI party structure, was particularly instructive to many.

According to Bates, the perception by modern political elites was "that they must organize collective support to advance their position in the competition for the benefits of modernity" (1983: 159).The nomination by the President of an individual to a leadership in the government or within a parastatal was not seen solely in individual terms. The general perception is that such accolades are rewards to the individual and by extension his ethnic group. What this means is that an individual's success in Côte

d'Ivoire is seen as the success of an entire ethnic group. One's failure is interpreted in a similar manner.

While Houphouët-Boigny was masterful at striking the right ethnic balance the balance was fragile and there was a perpetual threat that a potential political fall-out or death could result in politicians appealing to ethnic or cultural differences. Since the general perception among the Ivoirian elite was that the most effective way to obtain resources from the state and secure their own political positions was by organizing home-town associations, which by their very nature were ethnic, ethno-regional and ethno-religious, there was very little below the surface national unity.

Since Zolberg's (1964) ground-breaking study on single-party dominance in Africa, a number of scholars have examined the relationship between leadership within voluntary associations and dominant political parties in West Africa. One prominent finding in the case of Côte d'Ivoire is that Houphouët-Boigny would often appoint individuals that came to the his attention because of their leadership role within an ethnic and/or a socio-professional association. In fact, one of the main ways of making it into the national elite was to gain control of an association and declare its support for the President and the PDCI.[198] An analysis of the careers of several members of the political bureau of the party as well as of top state officials reveals just such a pattern. Each one of them had been either director or assistant director of an associational group. Some notable examples are Mme Jeanne Gervais, Philippe Yace and Mathieu Ekra. Ekra, in particular, played a central role in the association for the development of his native village of Bonoua. [199]

[198] See Zolberg (1964).
[199] See Crook (1997); See also, Akindes (2003).

Philippe Yace served as the secretary-general of the PDCI from 1965 to 1980. He had been the director of the Syndicat National des Ecoles en Côte d'Ivoire (SNECI) from 1949 to 1954 and later led the Union de la Jeunesse de la Côte d'Ivoire (UJCI). Mathieu Ekra, who has been Minister in practically every government since independence, was the founder of the Syndicats des Cheminots Africaines (SCA) in 1944.[200] His union supported Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI early on. Mme Gervais had played an important role in the historic march by Ivoirian women on the prison of Grand Bassam to force the colonial government to release PDCI supporters. She later became the director of the Association des Femmes Ivoiriennes (AFI), a member of the party's political bureau as well as Minister of Women's Affairs. [201]Alphonse M. Djedje helped create the Mouvements des Elèves et Etudiants de Côte d'Ivoire (MEECI), with the support of the party, while he was a student at the University of Abidjan. Later he became the first secretary-general of the Syndicat des Médecins, Pharmaciens et Vétérinaires, as well as a member of the political bureau.

The persistence of voluntary associations after independence may be attributed to two distinct factors: first, the increased level of competition for limited economic resources and, second, the utilization of ethnic associations by elites to consolidate their own economic and political position in the post-colonial state. Bates (1983) goes so far as to argue that "... ethnic groups represent, in essence, coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization-benefits which are desired but scarce" (1983: 152). Many bureaucrats and party officials viewed the formation of local and regional associations as a means of

[200] Ibid.
[201] Ibid.

building up for themselves a clientele base. Their motivation was to link their rise in the post-colonial state apparatus with their own ethnic group.

Conclusion

When analyzed in terms of religious tolerance, my research at first glance shows that religion is in fact a key explanatory factor in the politicization and non-politicization of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa. The comparative analysis indicates that Senegal, a country with a higher ratio of Muslims to Christians than Côte d'Ivoire, has a higher degree of religious tolerance than Côte d'Ivoire. Closer examination and analysis of the role of Islam in Senegal reveals, however, that the key to understanding non-politicization in Senegal not religion *per se,* but rather the Sufi Brotherhoods. Islam was able to mitigate ethnic politicization in Senegal, not because of the religious doctrine or theological foundations, but because of the extent to which the religious structures encouraged the facilitation of social institutions such as the institutions of social integration that: (a) attenuate ethnic differences; and (b) serve as an effective counterweight to the state, in terms of goods provisions. As informal institutional configurations that help to transcend historic ethnic and religious communities, Sufi Brotherhoods provide an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the idea of national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that block the use of political appeal to cultural differences as a mobilization tool.

Conversely, examination of voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire indicates that while, like Sufi Brotherhoods in Senegal, these informal institutions provided

governmental resources, and they did so primarily on the basis of ethnic and ethno-regional differences. What this shows is that unlike Senegal, the informal institutional configurations of voluntary associations did nothing to help transcend historic ethnic and religious communities. If anything, they made the use of political appeals a potentially profitable or attractive strategy choice for political elites. By making ethnic identity a prerequisite for access to state resources, the redistributive system of voluntary associations became a mechanism of electoral mobilization. This in turn created accentuated ethnic identity politically and created incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity a potential primary mobilizational tool. Furthermore, with ethnicity and religion so closely related in Côte d'Ivoire, the incentive structure would allow an Ivoirian political elite seeking to part ways with an extant party to emphasize particular ethnic grievances as a means of attracting political support.

The real source of ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire then is not Christianity *per se*, but rather a pervasive political system based on ethnic preferences and institutions that accentuate these cultural differences.

Part III

Introduction to Part III

Accounting for Ethnic Politicization in Sub-Saharan Africa: a case of Informal Institutional Changes?

As established in the previous chapters, a key explanation for why the axes of political competition in post-independence Senegal have not been based on ethnic affiliation concerns the informal social institutions established by the Sufi-Orders in the late colonial and post-colonial periods. And, in contrast, the system of local resource distribution in Côte d'Ivoire is characterized by a recursive relationship between ethnic identity, resource distribution and politics. Over time, each system of local resource distribution became the chief mechanism for electoral mobilization. In fact, as the case explorations above show, while Ivoirian political elites gain access to state resources via political support from particular ethnic groups, which in turn are rewarded with distributed material resources, political elites in Senegal are dependent on ethnically transcendent religious Sufi Orders for political support.

These observations contribute to the study of ethnic politics by articulating and providing theoretical support for a set of clear, generalizable propositions about the specific conditions under which political elites are likely to make political appeals on the basis of ethnic identity. Thus, while scholars such as Bates (1983), Posner (2005) and others have highlighted the impact of resource based distribution system on ethnic politics in various countries, different countries are covered in this project. What is more, while the nature of these distributive systems goes a long way towards explaining

how ethnic identity became salient in Ivoirian society, there remains the question of why ethnicity never became politicized between 1960 and 1993? Why, despite a political system in which ethnic preferences and institutions that accentuated cultural differences were pervasive, did Côte d'Ivoire remain politically stable and without ethnic strife, at least until 1993?

Based on the more recent works on ethnic politics and democratization,[202] one of my initial inclinations was to point to the obvious shift in electoral systems, particularly the transition from single party to multiparty rule, to explain ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire. However, several objections come to mind. First, the Ivoirian democratic transition from single to multiparty rule did not begin in 1993, but rather, early 1990.[203] If the transition to multiparty rule were to adequately explain the ethnic politicization, why was ethnicity not politicized prior to 1993?

Second, and even more important, Senegal, the Cameroon and Tanzania, have all made the transition from single to multiparty electoral rule without the axes of political competition becoming ethnicized. Third, not only has Senegal had a history of single party rule, like Côte d'Ivoire, it adopted the French presidential system, instituted the first past the post electoral system, and experienced a similarly strong

[202] Scholars such as Herbst (2002), Posner (2005) andTouranga (2005) highlight the effects of democratization and changes in the electoral system as strongly related to political outcomes such as ethnic conflict. Lamarchand (2001) argues for example that democratization in Burundi brought the first ethnic majority (Hutu) regime to power in that country in 1992, only to be followed by a brutal coup led by the minority ethnic elite (Tutusi), which intensified ethnic paranoia in neighboring Rwanda: fear and vilification of Tutsis, set against the pressure of democratized Rwanda, helped to incubate the genocide schemes that would be unleashed in the spring of 1994. According to Herbst (2001), democratizing countries where the electoral competition lack strong institutionalization and enculturation of strong political parties and civil society organizations has translated into varying degrees of ethnicization of political conflict and party competition. In the case of Yugoslavia, as established by scholars such as Silber and Little, (1997), dormant ethno-religious hatreds provided mobilizable appeal for new political elites who were suddenly forced to compete in popular elections.

[203] The official date for the transition is April 24, 1990. This is the date that Houphouët-Boigny declared it lawful for multiple political parties to compete in the national presidential elections held later that year (October1995).

presidential leadership in Senghor, much like Houphouët-Boigny. If neither differences in regime type nor changes to the electoral party systems (formal institutional rules) adequately account for the differences in ethnic politicization in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, what factors or mechanisms (particularly those that go beyond shifting formal institutions) affect ethnic cleavages politically?

The discussions in the previous chapters provide an essential clue—informal institutional rules governing resource distribution, political representation and land tenure and citizenship rights. I posit that where the actual rules followed are not those that have been formally structured but rather those established by informal institutions, formal institutional changes may occur without necessarily affecting the political salience of ethnic identity. In such cases, there are no real changes to the incentive structure or altered expectations and therefore, the likelihood that ethnic identity will become the axes of political competition remains low.

The case explorations above suggest that we can identify the persistence of specific informal institutional configurations in Senegal that block the political appeal to ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool despite formal institutional changes. It is also true for Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny's leadership in the 1990s. These institutions are conspicuously lacking in post-1993 Côte d' Ivoire. Other, more divisive informal mechanisms have taken their place.

The implication of my argument is that so long as these informal institutional configurations persist, despite formal institutional changes, so too will the incentives/disincentives for political elites to view ethnic appeals as profitable or unprofitable strategy. Thus, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire where ethnicity has been

continuously salient, if informal institutional configurations of the redistribution system remain intact after multiparty rule has been introduced, ethnicity should remain latent. Conversely, changes to these informal institutions may result in a change in the salience of ethnic identity from dormant to actualized; the sudden collapse or failure to deliver material goods may mean that the needs of a group are no longer being met satisfactorily. Consequently, ethnic groups may become more likely to respond to ethnic appeals and political elites more likely to view ethnicity as a mobilizational tool. Such mobilization may in turn encourage counter-mobilization and ethnic outbidding. Changes that disrupt and challenge the established rules of the game may: (a) cause changes in the balance of power among various ethnic groups, give rise to fear and confusion as well as amplify grievances, (all of which drive mobilization), to the extent that it becomes actualized as these issues dominate political debate and become the axes of political competition; (b) provide the political opportunity for political elites to galvanize support along ethnic lines or make it difficult for political elites/parties to attract cross-ethnic electoral support.

To develop my account however, I first have to establish that while the institutional arrangements governing power-sharing, representation and access to goods endured during the late-colonial and post-independence periods as well as the early transition periods, they were significantly altered in Côte d'Ivoire during, or after, 1993. To do so, I conduct a comparative analysis of the role of redistributive networks during Houphouët-Boigny's tenure with that of Bédié and other successors. More specifically, I examine whether, and to what extent, the informal redistributive institutional rules in Côte d'Ivoire changed after 1993. I also assess how, if at all, these changes affected

mobilization from above (elite level) and below at the ground level. Evidence of significantly altered institutional arrangements could help to explain how and under what conditions political elites are likely to make ethnic appeals to garner electoral support.

Focus on the informal nature of these redistributive networks is particularly important here. First, it raises some essential questions regarding our understanding of the effects of institutional changes on political outcomes. While much of the comparative politics literature focuses on the effects of formal institutions such as shifts in the electoral systems, constitutional design and other formal institutional arrangements, political stability, ethnic conflict or civil war, this chapter reveals that the key to understanding and explaining such political outcomes, may in fact lie with the informal rules that operate beneath the surface. If the changes in informal institutions have led to a shift in the salience of ethnic identity, then this suggests the possibility of a general proposition about the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized. This is so especially if, despite changes in the formal institution, there are no shifts in the salience of ethnic identity and no changes in the informal institutions.

Second, focus on how informal institutions shape politics presents a much different picture of political change and outcome in sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars such as Young (2002), Gellar (2002) and Touranga (2001), point to the extent to which uncodified rules shape the behavior and expectations of people throughout sub-Saharan Africa. As in most African countries, the actual rules that political elites and the public adhere to in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are not necessarily formally established. Rather, as documented in previous chapters, institutional rules, such as balanced ethnic

representation and the concept of the land belongs to whoever cultivates it, are generally informally established. Neither the redistributive networks established by the Sufi Orders in Senegal, nor the resource reciprocity system of the voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire, have formally established rules concerning ethnic representation. In both cases, the rules regarding pan-ethnic and balanced ethnic access to government and government resources are uncodified. Yet, as established in the previous chapters, these are the actual rules that have shaped the behavior and expectations of the people in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire since the late-colonial, and throughout the post-independence periods.

The section develops as follows: Chapter Six shows that while political support has largely been based on ethnic identity in Côte d'Ivoire, ethnic affiliation became the axes of political competition not because of democratization or the introduction of multiparty rule, but rather, because of changes to long established and institutionalized rules governing political representation, power-sharing and resource distribution. These changes significantly altered widespread expectations of relatively balanced ethnic representation and access to distributive resources at the elite and ground levels.

I argue that although ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict in Côte d'Ivoire coincide with, and seem to be directly related to shifts in the electoral system, from single party to multiparty rule, the relationship is spurious. While the shift to increased political competition may have prompted Bédié to choose a particular strategy to off-set the competition, Houphouet-Boigny's choices suggest that it was not the transition *per se* that brought about ethnic politicization. Rather, it was changes to the long established informal rules governing Ivoirian politics instituted by Bédié that shifted the

salience of ethnic identity from latent to dominating the political discourse. The chapter shows how, by affecting property rights, citizenship rights and political rights, the seemingly minor changes to access to and distribution of state resources brought the issue of ethnic identity to the forefront of Ivoirian national politics and made it the axes of political competition since 1993. The changes altered incentives for political elites to agitate the latent potential of ethnic identity.

Chapter Seven depicts how changes in the informal rules of balanced ethnic representation and those governing land tenure and citizenship rights aroused fear and confusion among the Ivoirian population and helped to create a political condition in which local grievances became amplified at the national level. This in turn provided the political opportunity for political elites to galvanize support along ethnic lines, even where there were few direct appeals to ethnic identity.

Chapter Eight then presents a series of analyses that test the implications of my argument. The chapter considers the cases of other sub-Saharan African territories with varying experiences of politicized ethnicity. These include Casamance and Cameroon.

CHAPTER SIX

Rules that Matter: Informal Institutions and Ethnic Politicization in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

Introduction

A dominant assertion in the comparative politics literature is that democratization, particularly the transition from single-party to multiparty rule, exacerbates ethnic differences, unleashes ethnic tensions and gives rise to ethnic-based rebellion, and ethnic conflict (Touranga,2001; Herbst 2002; Posner 2005). Scholars argue that in the cases of Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi, the move to multi-party politics dramatically exacerbated latent ethnic tensions and the democratization collapsed amidst murderous ethnic conflict.[204] Lamarchand (2001) for instance attributes ethnic politics and genocide in Rwanda to the democratization efforts in Rwanda and neighboring countries.

The general assumption here is that these political outcomes result from change in formal institutional rules. An important implication of this assumption is that ethnic politicization results from, and therefore, may be explained by change in formal institutional rules, particularly shifts in the electoral system (single to multiparty rule). For, as Posner (2005) and others argue, change in the formal institutional rules tend to lead to shifts in the salience of ethnic cleavages.

This is not what this study finds. In the case of Senegal, formal institutional changes of exactly the kind that Posner and others have pointed to, have not led to any

[204] On Congo, see Clark (2001); on Burundi, see Lamarchand, (1996)

noticeable changes in the salience of ethnic identity in Senegalese politics. I also find what appears to be a strong association between increased salience of ethnic identity in Ivoirian politics and shifts from single to multiparty rule is spurious. Senegal, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny's leadership provide empirical examples that changes to formal institutional rules do not necessarily result in ethnic politicization, ethnic conflict, civil wars or genocide. As in the case of Senegal, Tanzania and the Cameroon have not experienced ethnic conflict or politicization despite transitioning to multiparty rule.

If, in fact, formal institutional changes hold strong explanatory power for ethnic politicization and conflict across sub-Saharan Africa, how then do we explain the many instances of the lack of ethnic politicization in countries that have undergone these changes? If, as the recent literature on democratization in Africa suggests, the introduction of multiparty electoral politics invite or foster ethnic politicization, how might we explain the cases of Senegal, Cameroon and Tanzania?[205] What is more, how do we explain the lack of politicization in Côte d'Ivoire in the period immediately following the shift to multiparty rule in 1990? Beyond shifting party systems, what factors or mechanisms affect ethnic cleavages politically?

While embracing the argument that institutions matter, the chapter demonstrates that what drives ethnic politicization has less to do with changes to the electoral systems, and more with changes to deeply embedded, informal institutional rules,

[205] . In general, these countries have taken to multi-partyism without much fanfare. Senegal transitioned from single to multiparty rule in 1981. Although the first multiparty elections were not held until 1995, democratic transition started in Tanzania in 1992 (ending 34 years of one-party rule). By the end of 1992, more than 20 political parties were registered. Transition in Cameroon began in 1990. For a discussion on political transition in Cameroon see Mbaku & Takougang 2004.

governing access to and distribution of government resources.

Institutions of social integration such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal and voluntary associations in Côte d'Ivoire, however informal, have established the rules of the game by which society operates and consequently, the relative salience of ethnic identity in national politics. These are the rules that give "cues to individuals on how to act to maintain or advance their status" (Migdal 1988:29). They drive political behavior, shape expectations and determine the overall incentive for the use of ethnic appeals.

The timing and character of ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire came largely in response to changes to the underlying principles of ethnic inclusion and balance representation established by the voluntary associations over the course of the late - colonial and much of the post-independence period. The rough ethnic balance, representation of, and access to state resources by all the major ethnic groups that were attained and encouraged in Côte d'Ivoire between 1960 and 1993, and that helped to promote political incorporation, power sharing and a relatively balanced access to resources among the various ethnic groups, were significantly weakened during Bédié's tenure. These changes stoked fears of ethnic discrimination and differential treatment, [206] amplified grievances and resentments among the electorate and political elites, all of which in turn escalated ethnic issues in the national political debate. More importantly, they significantly altered incentives for ethnicity to be employed as a mobilizational tool.

The chapter shows that one of the central reasons that Bédié instituted these changes concerns the issue of legitimacy. Unlike Houphouët-Boigny and his

[206] Charges of "Baoulization," and the political exclusion of "northerners" has dominated the national discourse since 1993.

Senegalese counterpart, Abdou Diouf, Bédié faced serious challenges to his political legitimacy on the basis of his overall competence and ability to govern effectively. I argue that it is this challenge to his political legitimacy in the wake of the death of Houphouët-Boigny that led to the introduction of Ivoirité into Ivoirian politics and which subsequently weakened and destroyed extant rules governing representation, access to public goods and citizenship. It is the changes to these informal rules — not the shift from single to multiparty rule — that altered incentives for ethnicity to be employed as a mobilizational tool and therefore explain why ethnicity became politicized in post-1993 Côte d'Ivoire.

Democratic transitions and ethnic politicization: a comparative analysis of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire.

There is a theoretical reason to presume that differences in outcome in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are due to institutional changes, particularly change in electoral system types from single party to multiparty systems. While there are in fact debates about the mechanisms, there is a general consensus that institutional change is key to explaining ethnic conflict. The argument is that since incentives are generally created by political institutions, a change in the institutional rules may significantly alter actors' incentives as expected outcomes themselves change. Change in expected outcomes generated by the shift in institutional rules may directly affect costs and benefits analysis, which may in turn affect the strategies political elites will employ.

In his epic work, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa,* Posner (2005) traces and attributes the variation in the salience of particular ethnic identities in Zambia to

changes in institutional rules. Posner found that, in Zambia, shifts in the electoral system, particularly from single-party to multi-party rule, coincided with shifts in the salience of a particular ethnic cleavage. According to Posner, since political institutions provide common knowledge about the incentives faced by everyone in society, they have the power not just to " shape how individuals identify themselves but also to coordinate these identity choices so as to affect which ethnic cleavage becomes politically salient in society more generally." [207] Taken to its logical end point, Posner's assertion is that, as the rules governing political competition change, so too will the boundaries of the political arena and with it, the incentives for using ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool. To the extent that the boundaries of the political arena are defined by institutional rules, those rules and the changes thereof will be central to any explanations of ethnic conflict and/or cooperation.

Indeed, one of the most dominant accounts of ethnic conflicts within the comparative politics literature is the assertion that democratization, particularly the transition from single-party to multi-party rule, exacerbates ethnic divisions, unleashes ethnic tensions and triggers violent ethnic conflict (Ottaway, 1999; Posner, 2005; Hyden, 2005;) . Ottaway, for example , asserts that ethnicity is "more central than ever to the political process of many African countries, as political openings and multi-party elections have led to the formation of innumerable overtly and covertly ethnic parties" (1999:300). Along the same lines, Donald Rothchild (1999:321) asserts that the lack of institutionalized rules that often accompany transition may create a political environment that fosters pursuit of ethnic self-interests over community-wide interests.

[207] Posner (2005:6).

The state with its scare resources may in turn be unable to respond to legitimate public demands and conflict may result.

For some scholars, the key to explaining the ethnic conflicts is the winner-take-all rules of the political institutions adopted. According to this perspective, countries that adopt winner-take-all rules, particularly presidential systems, are more likely to experience ethnic conflict as incumbents and opposition become so polarized along ethnic lines that there is little possibility for peace or cooperation. Instead, transitions unfold along a path of escalating confrontations that generally result in outright conflict or war.[208]

According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1994), one of the first casualties of democratic transition tends to be the sustainability of extant integrative formulas that cemented national unity and ensured political stability (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994:483). Democratice transistions harden ethnic suspicions, deepens mutual ethnic antagonisms and, as a result of the simple majoritarian and especially, the winner-takes-all and first-past-the-post electoral systems, reduces electoral politics to a zero-sum game. This has ruled out power-sharing options for many ethnic groups assured of electoral victory, on the basis of their numerical superiority over other ethnic groups. Rather, the adoption of winner-takes-all by many African countries has "tended to turn competitive electoral politics into a virtual warfare in which the objective is to annihilate one's political enemies" (Jinadu, 2007:21). According to Duchacek:

> The problem for most ethnic minorities is that they are permanent minorities and the ruling groups a permanent majority. In interethnic relations therefore,

[208] For a debate on the topic see Linz (1990, 1994); Ljiphart (1992); and Valenzuela (1994).

> The convenient democratic game of numbers does not work since the unalterable power symmetry between permanent majority and permanent minorities impedes the formation of a consensual community"[209]

Indeed, a large portion of the democratization literature concerns mitigating ethnic conflict via institutional solutions to exiting electoral systems. Lijphart (1968, 1991, 1996) proposes adopting more consociational forms of electoral systems, whereby governments focus on power-sharing arrangements[210] based on accomodation and bargaining among political elites of various ethnic, religious or sociocultural groups. These include grand coaltions in parliament, proprtional rules for the allocation of ministries at all levels of government, group autonomy and minority veto. Concerned that consociationalism would reinforce rather than minimize the salience of ethnic or religious cleavages, Horowitz (1986, 1991, 1993) has advocated the use of the alternative vote by which voters rank-order their preferences for candidates. If no candidate receives a majority of first preference votes, the candidate with the fewest first preferences is eliminated and for those ballots where this candidate was first choice, votes are reallocated to the next candidate on the voter's list. This process is continued until a candidate receives a majority of first-place preference. According to Horowitz, this approach is the best electoral rule to bridge or transcend ethnic differences and foster voting patterns that will cross ethnic lines and parties with multi-ethnic base.

One of the better known cases of instituting and reinforcing power-sharing arrangements on the basis of ethnicity is Nigeria. While the federal nature of the Nigerian political system dates back to the period of British colonial administrative

[209] Duchacek (1977: 23) quoted in Thomas-Wooley and Keller (1994: 413).
[210] These consist of "practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society" (Sisk1996:vii).

rule,[211] the system was recently re-engineering to reflect true federalism. Under this arrangement, ethnic groups are given home-rule in their heartlands, under a polycentric sustem of government,which shares sovereignty between two levels of government, the central/national/federal government, and the unit-state governments, through specified legislative lists (namely, a federal exclusive list, a joint federal/state concurrent list, with the residual left to the states), which enable each level of government to directly impact the citizens. The federal character clause of Section 14(3) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution dealing with the executive and legislative functions of the unit/state government, stipulates that:

> The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or a few ethnic or other section groups in that government or any of its agencies.[212]

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[211] Nigeria was gradually divided into two administrative units, the northern and Southern Protectorates, between 1900 and 1914, by the British colonial administration.

[212] The proportionality quota principle, inherent in the federal character clauses, was extended to appointments and promotions in the public services, to the appointments of chairperson and membership of boards of directors of parastatals, to promotions in the armed forces, to the allocation of public revenue and distribution of public projects, to the composition of a number of federal executive bodies and to admission to federal secondary schools and federal unversities under Section 157(5), Section 197(2) and Section 197. Section 153 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution established the Federal Character Commission, as a federal executive body, empowered in Section 8(1) of the Third Schedule of the constitution to oversee and monitor the implementation of the federal clauses, as follows:

> (a)Work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National Assembly for the distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the Federation and of the States, the armed forces of the government-owned companies and parastatals of the States;
> (b) Promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principle of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of government;
> (c) Take such legal measures, including prosecution of the head or staff of any Ministry or government body or agency which fails to comply with any federal character principle or formula prescribed by the Commission;
> (d) and, as provided for in Section 8(3) of the Schedule: the Commission shall ensure that every public company or corporation reflects the federal character in the appointment of its directors, and senior management staff.

For some scholars the central problem with democratic transitions concerns the increased electoral competition that accompanies multi-party electoral politics. According to this perspective, the increased competition significantly alters expected outcomes, political calculations and ultimately, the incentives and political opportunities for elites to draw on otherwise latent ethnic divisions to mobilize political support (Silber & Little 1997; Herbst 2002; Lamarchand 2001; Posner 2005: Touranga 2005). For scholars such as Silber & Little (1997), this is exactly what happened in Yugoslavia in the earl y 1990s. Increased competition among new political elites exacerbated ethnic tensions and triggered one of the worst cases of ethnic conflicts in recent history.

According to these scholars, while the creation of cultural ethno-religious divisions may be traced back to the early periods of Soviet control, pre-transitional elites lacked the incentive and capacity to politicize; democratic transition altered the incentive structure, and hence the scope for political elites, particularly the new political elites suddenly forced to compete in the popular elections, to use ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool. [213]

Similar approaches have been used to account for a number of cases of ethnic conflict in Africa. Lamarchand (2001), for instance, asserts that the ethnic conflict and genocide in Rwanda are due to democratization efforts; particularly the transition to multiparty rule. He wrote:

> Democratization in Burundi brought the first ethnic majority (Hutu) regime to power in 1992, only to be followed by a brutal coup led by the minority ethnic elite (Tutsi), which intensified ethnic paranoia in neighboring Rwanda. Fear and vilification of the Tutsis, set against the pressure of democratization in Rwanda

[213] See Silber & Little (1997).

> helped to incubate the genocide schemes that would be unleashed in the spring of 1994.[214]

Ake (2001) argues that the increased competition accompanying democratic transitions in Africa has pushed the premium on political power higher and higher and with it the intensity for political elites to capture political power for themselves and/or their ethnic groups. As political elites grow more fearful of what seem to be the grave consequences of losing to their rivals in the competition for control of state power, they resort to playing the "ethnic card" (Ake, 2001: 5).

Given that one of the most notable features of democratic transition in Côte d'Ivoire has been the return to competitive elections; it is plausible that this factor could account for why the otherwise latent ethnic identity became actualized. Several issues make the case a difficult one to claim, however. First, multi-party elections were held in Côte d'Ivoire in 1993 without ethnic identity dominating national politics. Also, if true, how do we account for cases such as Senegal that stand as clear examples of a functioning multiparty regime that made the transition without ethnicity becoming the axis of political competition? Are these other cases mere anomalies, or is there more to the problem than generally assumed? What might we learn from Senegal's and Côte d'Ivoire's experience with the re-introduction of multi-party rule?

The case explorations below strongly suggest that while the demise of Côte d'Ivoire as a stable regime in the 1990s coincided with its efforts to democratize, what appears to be a direct relationship between democratization and ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict is spurious. In the case of Senegal, informal institutional rules such as ethnic transcendence that have served as a constraint on the use of ethnic identity as a

[214] See Lamarchand (2001:15).

possible mobilizational tool over time have remained relatively intact despite formal institutional changes. In other words, although there are many cases of ethnic conflict whose origins can be traced to formal institutional change, not all countries that have transitioned from single to multiparty rule have experienced ethnic conflict. [215]

The empirical results of this chapter suggest that informal institutions are important in explaining cross-country differences in ethnic politicization in Africa; in some specifications, more than formal institutions. It is relatively well established in the political science literature that as in Latin America, informal institutional rules are as important as (if not more than) formal institutions in shaping expectations and political behavior in African societies. In many instances, informal rules subvert and even supersede formal institutions; the actual rules followed are largely unwritten and are to be found codified nowhere in an official legislative or regulatory document.

In Côte d'Ivoire, notwithstanding constitutional stipulations explicitly denouncing ethnic consideration for economic and political appointments, Ivoirian governments since the late-colonial period, have instituted informal power-sharing arrangements centered on ethnic balancing and coalitions (Zolberg 1975; Crook 1997). In Senegal political parties have no "real" social base to speak of and political elites are largely dependent on religious Sufi Orders for electoral support. In Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania and parts of South Africa, despite the official state Land Rights Act, land tenure and property rights issues are often regulated by indigenous or customary rules.[216] Also, it is more common than not for local

[215] Senegal, Tanzania, Cameroon have all made the transition from single to multiparty rule without the axes of political competition becoming politicized.

[216] For a detailed discussion see Sally Falk Moore (2000). Moore's study of the Chagga, a people who live on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, show that with the introduction of coffee as a cash

communities in Africa to solve conflicts through indigenous law and other informal justice systems instead of via state judicial institutions (Claassens and Cousins 2008).

Informal Institutions

By definition, informal institutions are "socially shared rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels."[217] Whereas formal institutions are generally publicly debated and formally recorded, informal institutions are rarely written and actors who create and enforce them may deny doing so. Though often murky and disputed as Helmke and Levitsky (2006) point out, scholars such as Guillermo O'Donnell (1996)and Douglas North (1990) argue that informal institutions are often as important as formal institutions in establishing and structuring the rules of the game.

Scholars such as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Young (2002) and Gellar (2002), among others have found that in Africa, notwithstanding formal institutional rules as laid out in constitutions, electoral laws or legislative statutes , the actual rules[218] adhered to many cases are informal. Examples include widespread power-sharing arrangements such as ethnic balancing, ethnic coalitions and indigenous conflict resolution practices and customary laws across Africa.

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crop and a steady decrease in the amount of land available for agriculture, rights of access to land had to be reformulated. This was achieved under the banner of traditional customary law.

[217]This definition borrows from Helmke and Levitsky (2006) and is consistent with North (1990), O'Donnell (1996b) and Carey (2000).

[218] By which I mean rules that are societally embedded,adhered to and that shape and constrain political behavior, even though they are unwritten.

In her epic work *Muslim Brotherhood and Politics in Senegal,* Lucy Behrman (1970) highlighted the intricate and complex relationships between the Muslim Sufi Orders and political parties and leaders in the late -colonial and post-independence Senegal. Berhman (1970) found that while franchise was extended to all, the Sufi Orders, and in particular Marabouts, shaped voting behavior. Marabouts often instructed their disciples of which party or candidate to support. In Cameroon, members of the legislative branch are generally handpicked by the sitting president, despite electoral laws stipulating that members of the legislative branch should be elected via an election process open to the public (Mabaku and Takougang, 2004). Also, as mentioned above, while the constitutions of most African countries denounce ethnic quota systems, informal power-sharing arrangements such as ethnic balancing and ethnic coalitions are widely practiced. Such arrangements serve as an important lever of ethno-political accommodation that helps to mute ethnic conflict. While this was never officially acknowledged, ethnic balancing and coalitions have been an integral part of late-colonial and post-independence Ivoirian politics.

A number of studies have found that notwithstanding formal institutional changes such as transition from single to multi-party rule, many of the informal institutional arrangements identified above persist, and continue to drive African politics. Indeed, one of the reasons that Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and others have concluded that democratization in Africa has mainly served to "erect a façade of institutional respectability"[219] is because of the role of informal institutions.[220] The

[219] Alence (2004:3).
[220] See also Chabal (2002); Joseph (1997, 1998) and van de Walle (2000).

scholarship on Senegal often point to the clientilism and deep rooted traditional norms to explain the quasi-democratic nature of the Senegalese regime.

In his analysis of the democracy in Senegal, Gellar (2005) argues that one of the chief impediments to democratic consolidation is the dominance that clientilism continues to have on Senegalese Politics. The title of Linda Beck's (1997) article: "Senegal's Patrimonial Democrats: Incremental Reform and the Obstacles to the Consolidation of Democracy," speaks for itself. Similarly, Leonardo Villalón (2006) has found that the informal redistributive institutions of the Sufi Orders remain as pertinent and strong in the post-independence multiparty era as they were in the single party era. Institutional rules established by the Sufi Orders during the late-colonial period that govern political representation, access to public goods, citizenship and property rights are as much in effect today as they were more than thirty years ago when Behrman (1970) first conducted research on the subject. The implication here is that because there are no significant changes in these informal institutions in spite of shifts in formal institutional rules, expectations and political behavior are unlikely to change. Consequently, in cases such as Senegal where the informal institutional rules of the Sufi Orders have served as a bulwark against the use of ethnic identity as a possible mobilizational tool, political elites will continue to have little opportunity or incentives to use the ethnic card.

Clearly, informal institutions may continue to shape expectations and behavior and consequently, incentives for ethnic mobilization. One would expect to find that where such institutions undergo change, the incentive structure may also become altered- to the extent that ethnic identity becomes an attractive mobilization for political

elites. Notwithstanding this possibility, much of the discussions on the effects of institutional change on ethnic conflict and ethnic politicization focuses (almost exclusively), on formal institutional change.

Gretchen Helmke and Stephen Levitsky (2003, 2006) have made recent calls for more research focusing on informal institutions in order to uncover the "real incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior." [221] Still, while the literature on clientilism and neo-patrimonial institutions has expanded somewhat, there have been few attempts to examine the impact of changes in informal institutional rules on ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict. Even studies that have highlighted the role of informal institutions tend to frame the issue in terms of the relative strength of the state *vis-à-vis* civil society. In fact, besides formal institutional change, a dominant theme in the existing scholarship is that the African state is weak. Herbst (2001), for instance, posits that one of the reasons for the various degrees of ethnic conflict and political stability throughout Africa is that democratization is introduced without the requisite strong institutionalized political parties and civil society organizations.

Much of the existing literature on Africa attributes such political outcomes as regime break down, ethnic conflict and other political outcomes to weak, ineffective, or insufficient formal institutions. Some scholars assert that vibrant informal networks grow and expand as a result of a weakened or weakening state.[222] Theorizing the causal story in reverse, others assert that the existence of strong informal networks may weaken the state from below, particularly in redistributive role. [223] However, as Helmke and Levitsky (2006) aptly point out, formal institutional weakness does not necessarily

[221] See Helmke and Levitskey (2003:1).
[222] See Herbts 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999;Bayart et al.(1999)
[223] See Chazan 1983; Dei 1992; Cheru 1997; Karen Hansen (2004).

imply the presence of informal institutions. Citing O'Donnell (1994), the scholars point out that in much of Latin America, the formal rules of representative democracy are weakly institutionalized. The absence of institutionalized checks on executive power allowed for the considerable widening of the scope of permissible presidential behavior and the substantial abuse of executive authority. [224]

Focus on informal institutional changes (or the lack thereof) may help explain cross-country differences in ethnic politicization in Africa. The persistence of informal power-sharing arrangements such as ethnic balancing despite democratic transitions and the changes in electoral rules- single to multi-party competition- may help explain why, contrary to the predictions of the democratization literature; political elites in countries such as the Cameroon have not turned to cultural differences as a mobilization tool. Informal institutional change may help explain why countries such as Côte d'Ivoire have recently experienced ethnic politicization.

Single Party, Multiparty Politics and ethnic politicization in Senegal &Côte d'Ivoire

During the 1990s many countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced significant political liberalization. While the real reason for change is still a matter of dispute, given the large number of countries that introduced (reintroduced) multi-party government, Huntington's (1991) reference of the third wave of democratization seems apt. Between 1989 and 1991, over 21 countries instituted constitutional changes and electoral laws to allow for greater political participation. During the 1990s, 42 of 50

[224] See Helmke and Levitsky 2006:6.

countries held elections.[225].By the end of 1998, thirty nine percent of forty eight sub-Saharan African countries enjoyed political stability, twenty three percent faced political crisis, while thirty eight percent were engaged in ethnic conflicts.[226]

Unlike Côte d'Ivoire, conflict among the five major ethnic communities in Senegal is virtually unknown. With the notable exception of the Casamance region, there have been no significant changes in the number of ethnic/ethno-religious grievances (measured in terms of reported/officially documented instances of crimes believed to be ethnically related) since1981. Of the few dozen reported cases in 2007, almost all can be explained by factors unrelated to ethnic affiliation or religious beliefs.[227]

Democratic transition: the cases of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

Both Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny established virtual single-party states upon their countries' independence from France in 1960. While Senghor permitted limited opposition party participation in national Presidential elections during the early post-independence period, it was not until 1981 that Senegal officially made the transition from a de facto single-party regime to a real multiparty system.

Senegal became a one-party participatory democracy in 1966 after the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS),[228] headed by President Leopold Senghor, became

[225] Notably, not all of these elections were deemed free and fair. For example, only 10 of these elections resulted in a change of government. These include Zambia, Togo and Senegal. Others, such as Kenya, Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire, held elections in which the incumbents have won and retained control of the presidency.

[226] Including countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

[228] The party was later changed to Parti Socialist (PS) in 1976.

the country's only political party. This came after at least three years[229] of highly competitive electoral politics. For example, in 1960 Cheikh Anta Diop created a political party called the Bloc de Mass Senegalaise (BMS). The African Party for Independence of Mamadou Diop was created in 1957. These, and other political parties[230] created by Chiekh Anta Diop were declared illegal and banned. Although the increasing concentration of power into the hands of the president became a concern for some, the introduction of one-party rule did not increase the salience of ethnic identities, exacerbate ethnic tensions, or result in ethnic politicization. The introduction of one-party rule did not alter the institutional rules stipulating ethnic transcendence.

Rather, the period between 1966 and 1976 was characterized by relatively low levels of ethnic or religious conflicts, cross-ethnic support for the governing party and a large capacity to integrate otherwise potentially fragmentary ethnic communities. In fact, responses to the dissolution of existing parties and the lockdown of Senghor's most fervent competitors, bought out no claims whatsoever of ethnic discrimination. Senghor was accused of being anti-federalist, neo-colonialist, and often was often described as a lackey for French foreign forces. [231] However, no accusations were made against his actions on the basis of ethnicity.

In the new one-party institutional setting, Sufi Orders and their institutional rules stipulating ethnic transcendence created during the late-colonial periods continued to shape voting behavior. In fact, the institutional configurations of the Sufi Orders continued to play a crucial role in blocking ethnic politicization. Although the one-

[229] Much longer if we were to consider pre-independence electoral politics. Even during the colonial period, there were several parties that in general, were affiliated with those based in France and that later Senegalese.
[230] In 1963 Chiekh Anta Diop created another party called the Senegalese National Front (FNS).
[231] See Le Vine (2004).

party system increased the intra-party competition, political elites, having never established any "real" social base, continued to be dependent on the Islamic Brotherhoods for electoral support. With the rules on ethnic transcendence firmly in effect, political elites had few incentives to use appeals to ethnic identities as a mobilizational tool. Indeed, where the Islamic Brotherhoods were well established (which, for the most part is Senegal North of the Gambia), institutional rules inhibited the politicization of ethnic identities. And, Where they were not well established (e.g. Senegal, south of the Gambia), ethnicity was more likely to become politicized.

Also, the Sufi Orders did not lose their capacity to perform their redistributive roles during the period of one-party rule. Rather, as Galvan (2001) points out, the institutional redistributive networks were encouraged by the government. Senghor needed the continued support of the religious Orders in order to remain in power. In exchange for such support, Sufi leaders receive payouts, which were then re-distributed to their followers. This created incentives for religious followers to vote per their Maraboutic instructions.

Transition from single to multiparty rule and ethnicity in Senegal

In 1974 Senegal instituted limited party competition. While this has meant that Senegal has had minority party representation in its national assembly from since 1974, democratic transition-from single-party rule to multiparty rule- did not officially begin until 1981 when Abdou Diouf declared the Senegalese society open to multiparty elections. Since then, more than 113 political parties have been created and no party has

since been banned from competing in elections. More importantly, there have been few reports of political parties and/or political elites mobilizing on the basis of ethnic differences. This is also true of locally established parties in minority regions such as Senegal south of the Gambia. In fact, as mentioned above, one of the striking observations of the electoral campaigns in Senegal is the lack of political appeals to ethnic identity or religion.

For the most part, campaigns have focused on the issue of the economy, especially falling standards of living brought on by loss of revenue from decline in the world market prices of primary goods in the 1970s. In fact, while Abdou Diouf was regularly elected by wide margins[232] in 1983, 1988 and 1993, questions of the state of the economy dominated the campaigns and were posed most sharply by the opposition.[233] Campaigns also focused on the broad issue of continuity and change; the PS campaigned on a variety of slogans portraying Abdou Diouf as an effective administrator while the opposition campaigning was dominated by the cry for sopi (or change).[234]

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[232] In 1983 Diouf won 83.5 percent of the votes with voter turnout out at 57percent. Diouf's closest opposition candidate won just under 15 percent of the total votes. In 1988 Diouf won just over 73percent (voter turnout almost 59 percent). Wade place second with an improved 25.8 percent. In 1993, the margins narrowed even more, as Diouf secured just over 58 percent of the vote, to Wade's 32 percent (voter turnout 51 percent). In 2000 Wade finally came out ahead with a little over 58 percent of the votes to Diouf's 41.5 percent. (Notably, this was in the second round as Diouf won the first round, by 41 percent to 31 percent. However, failure to secure a clear majority, Wade won in the end .Turn-out was 60 percent and 62 percent respectively).

[233] Especially after 1983 demands for increased stipends and educational scholarships for college and university students were prominent issues during these elections. Many believe that Abdoulaye Wade won the 2000 presidential elections because of the support of young students demanding better educational support.

[234] For example, in the 1993 electoral campaign t Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS issued posters and graffiti depicting the slogan sopi or "sopi jot na" (the time for change) has arrived, throughout the country. Diouf and the PS' most prevalent campaign poster showed the president juxtaposed against a millet field under the slogan "Suuf, sunuk om-kom" (the land is our economy). Other campaign issues included t he distribution of voting cards and the voter identification question, and the issue of the secret ballot. See *Jeune Afrique* : Elections 88: Les Principales revendications de l'opposition", ("the main demands of the opposition"). No. 1419, March 16, 1988: 68.

TABLE VI
Presidential elections of 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2000 compared: Vote distribution percentage

	1983	1988	1993	2000
Abdou Diouf	83.5	73.2	58.4	41.5[235]
Abdoulaye Wade	14.7	25.8	32.0	58.5
Others	1.8	1.1	9.6	

Table VII
: Presidential elections of 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2000 compared: participation percentage

	Registered voters	percent voting
1983	1,888,444	58.2
1988	1,932,265	58.7
1993	2,549,699	51.5
2000	1,667,775	60.8

Source: Institute of National Statistics- Senegal.

And, while many Senegalese political elites faced imprisonment during the single-party era (1960-1981), arrests have been much less frequent during the multiparty period. None of the Senegalese political elites or journalists interviewed for this project that claimed to have been, at one point, a political prisoner in their own country, cited ethnic or religious affiliations as a substantive factor in the imprisonment.[236] The opposite is true of Côte d'Ivoire. While fewer political elites faced imprisonment during the single-party era than after the transition, particularly after 1993, most attribute their detention to ethnicity. [237]

In terms of representation in the legislature, the President's cabinet or other major governmental appointments, the data indicates that, in Senegal, representation has

[235] These are figures from the second round votes, hence no votes for "others."
[236] Field research interview, Dakar, Senegal July- Dec. 2007.
[237] Field research, interview, Abidjan, Jan-June 2008.

remained as ethnically diverse during multiparty rule as it was under single party regime. The number of women representatives have been noticeably higher during the multi-party years, however, Christians are slightly overrepresented (relative to their overall percentage of the population) in the legislature as well as the President's cabinet under both systems.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the Baoulé were generally slightly over-represented among the political elites and in these political institutions. All of the other ethnic groups were also fairly well represented. In fact, it was not until after 1993 that any one ethnic group dominated the legislature and other important political institutions in Côte d'Ivoire.

Transition from single-party to multi-party rule and ethnicity in Cote d'Ivoire

Like Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire adopted single party system rule immediately after independence in 1960. Also like President Senghor in Senegal, Houphouët-Boigny declared the PDCI a de facto single party. Houphouët-Boigny banned all opposition parties and those who remained operational (mainly the FPI) were forced into clandestine operations. It was not until 1990 that Côte d'Ivoire adopted a "real" multiparty system.

In sharp contrast to Senegal, ethnicity has been politically salient in Côte d'Ivoire since the late-colonial period. This is reflected by the many interview respondents who indicated that given the choice they would identify with their ethnic group before and above their nationality. When asked which they would put first when it comes to politics, nationality or a member of their ethnic group, more than seventy

percent of those interviewed placed their ethnic identity before their nationality.[238] This is in stark contrast to Senegal, where more than 87 percent[239] of the respondents stated that being Senegalese took priority to being a Serer, a Puel, or Wolof. Futhermore, statements such as: "I am Bété [Baoulé, Tagounda, Krou] before I am Ivoirian," and other statements to that effect by political leaders, are generally rare in African countries; even for those countries where ethnicity clearly undergirds the social, political and economic life.[240]

Chapters four and five document how early dependence on ethnic alliances and ethnically based voluntary associations, particularly their incorporation into the political party structure, reinforced the importance of ethnicity in Ivoirian society in the late-colonial and post-independence periods. A major part of the political campaign process[241] was that political candidates (deputies) returned to their ethnic hometowns to galvanize support.[242] This included those who have no specific ties to the rural regions of the country, having migrated to more urban regions decades earlier. Of the ten administrative sub-sections or districts of Abidjan, all of the mayors, with relatively few exceptions, reflect the dominant ethnic group among the population.[243]

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[238] Of the 45 individuals interviewed 31 placed ethnicity before nationality. Admittedly since the field research was conducted after the civil war, this could be a factor in the heightened importance of one's ethnicity. Still, the responses provide an insight into the importance of ethnicity in Ivoirian society. Field research, Abidjan, Jan-June 2008.

[239] Of the 47 individuals interviewed during the field research about 42 said that they would put their nationality above their individual ethnic group. Those who responded in the opposite were generally from the Casamance regions and expressed sentiments of not be treated as "Senegalese" as many of the other ethnic groups from the regions North of the Gambia. Several respondents were irritated by this question and some went as far as to state: "I am Senegalese, that's all! Ethnic identity is of no importance… chez-nous, we are all Senegalese."

[241] More specifically legislative elections since a real multiparty Presidential election did not occur until 1990.

[242] Field Research interview, Abidjan, 2008.

[243] Field Research, interview, Fraternité Matin.

Access to state resources, employment, official appointments, promotions, and education have all been influenced by ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire. Yet, with all the pertinence of ethnic identity in Ivoirian society, ethnic politicization did not occur until after 1990. Crook (1989) notes for instance that: "Although the Akan are dominant in the sense that they form around forty two percent of the population (1978) and are slightly over-represented in the political elite, ethnic identity has never been highly mobilized." [244] This begs the obvious question: Why did the return to multiparty elections in Côte d'Ivoire not yield ethnic conflict or ethnic politicization as evident by the successfully non-violent and largely non-ethnic political campaign and election in 1990?

Non-Politicization in Côte d'Ivoire 1960-1993: Towards an explanation

Some scholars point to the strong leadership of President Houphouët-Boigny to explain why Côte d'Ivoire was not tribalized. [245] The case explorations above suggest however, that we can indentify informal institutional rules in Côte d'Ivoire that , while encouraging the salience of ethnicity, also prevented ethnic identity from being highly mobilized. These rules have been entrenched in Ivoirian politics since the late-colonial period, persisted throughout the post-independence period, and endured even after regime transition in 1990. I posit that while democratization brought about a shift from

[244] Crook (1989:15).
[245] Azam (2001:431), for instance, calls Côte d'Ivoire's former President Houphouët-Boigny a "maestro in the art of buying the loyalty of the most active representatives of the different ethnic groups", and the policy of visible public investment in the various regions "provided the cement of the emerging Ivoirian nation."

single to multiparty rule, between 1990 and 1993, the actual rules governing access to, and distribution of goods, experienced no significant change(s). The implication here is that ethnic politicization resulted from changes in the informal institutional rules along with the introduction of Ivoirité after 1993. These institutions, however informal, generally ensured relative access to, and distribution of, government and governmental resources, land and citizenship rights.

To assess this claim I examined the proportional representation of the various ethnic groups in government appointments from 1959- 1989, 1990-1993- and 1993-2007. Scholars have identified key markers or indicators to determine disparities among various ethnic/ethno-regional, or class cleavages in a society. Bakary (1984) and Langer (2004), suggest focusing on the social composition of the cabinet -measured in terms of the distribution of cabinet posts along ethnic and ethno-regional lines. A second, more refined indicator in this respect can be social composition of the inner circle of political power (Langer 2004: 23), measured by the ethnic and ethno-regional distribution of key political positions.[246]

A third indicator is the social composition of parliament, measured in terms of the ethnic and/or regional distribution of parliamentary seats. Since those ethnic groups that have access to the legislature would be expected to be influential it makes sense to count the number of ethnic groups represented in the legislature after 1993 and compare this figure to the pre-1993 years. However it is important that any measure used must weigh the relative importance of each ethnic group within the country.

A final indicator is the ethnic composition of the party elites, measured by the ethnic and ethno-regional distribution of top posts within parties. A comparative

[246] For example, President, prime minister, president, parliament, key ministers.

analysis of Houphouët-Boigny and Bédié's leadership using these key indicators highlights changes in ethnic balancing and new ethnic distinctions regarding membership in the political community that occurred after 1993. The analysis offers some insight into how and why ethnicity became politicized in Côte d'Ivoire when it did.

The immediate question is why this change came about. The case explorations below reveal that one of the key differences in the factors that Houphouët-Boigny and Bédié faced, which significantly affected their political choices and the consequent political outcomes concerns political legitimacy. Like Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny enjoyed enormous political support and confidence in his leadership. Unlike his predecessor and Senegalese counterpart, Abdou Diouf, however Bédié faced significant questions and challenges about his ability to govern effectively and hence, his legitimacy as President of Côte d'Ivoire, from political elites and voters alike. This significantly shaped the strategies that Bédié employed. Focus on fomenting political support and legitimizing his claim to the Presidency resulted in changes to long standing institutions governing access to state resources and political representation and citizenship issues. These changes in turn altered the salience of ethnic identity and consequently the incentives for political actors to use ethnic identity as a mobilizing vehicle.

Single Party Politics, Multiparty Politics and ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire

We established in the previous chapters that Houphouët-Boigny was able to garner the support of all of the major ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire by incorporating

ethnically based redistributive networks under the umbrella of the PDCI. One of Houhouët-Boigny's main opponents in the early post-colonial period, a noted politician from northern Upper Volta region, Coulibaly, withdrew from the electoral competition and pledged his[247] support for Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI on the promise that the northerners would have relatively good political representation and access to state goods and resources.[248] A retired political elite explained the importance of what he called the "genius of Houphouët-Boigny getting all of the major ethnic groups living together peacefully over such a long period of time." According to this interview respondent, rather than exploit the ethnic divisions within the society, Houphouët-Boigny found an almost organic way of taking the distinctiveness of each part of the society and making them part of a larger societal framework…"kind of like a quilt; each piece is different and unique, yet fit perfectly together to make a perfect piece of fabric."[249] In an interview with Ivoirian scholar Aristide Zolberg, one of the founders of the Triechville branch of the PDCI explained the logic of the incorporation of the informal ethnic associations/networks under the umbrella of the PDCI this way:

> During the elections [of 1945and 1946] we had found that the ethnic associations that existed in the city functioned efficiently for electoral purposes as well. In preparation for the battle we would be waging, we thought that it was necessary to create highly solidarity units, equivalent to the communist cells in France. Ethnic organizations were the most natural and the most practical for this purpose. Regardless of where they lived and worked in the city, people of the same tribe came together for social purposes. So we transformed the ethnic associations into party-subcommitttes. Where they did not exist, we help the tribes to organize original ones. Only in this way could we communicate with the members, collect dues, and pass down party directives in the various local languages.[250]

[247] And by extension that of the people of the North,
[248] See Zolberg, 1964, Bakary 1984, Crook, 1989, Langer 2004.
[249] Field Research interview Abidjan March 2008
[250] Interview with M.Mathieu Ekra, (1959), cited in Zolberg (1975:116).

What was achieved was the development of a multi-ethnic party coalition (PDCI), with different ethnic, ethno-regional groups making up an ethnic whole— "an amalgam of heterogeneous components… constructing an indirect party in which individuals were not members of the party but of social groups that belonged to the party" (Zolberg, 1964: 76).

Since membership to the party meant access to state resources, these redistributive networks and the PDCI became mechanisms for political elites to represent and negotiate on behalf of their ethnic groups. With this framework in place, a sort of federation of ethnic groups through something akin to, though not quite, an ethnic calculus was established in Côte d'Ivoire. While no ethnic calculus was ever formally institutionalized[251] and in fact, Côte d'Ivoire has never had a formally institutionalized ethnic quota system for government appointees or elected representatives, there has always been[252] a relatively rough representative balance between ethnic groups in Ivoirian politics or political institutions. As Le Vine (2004) notes, under Houphouët-Boigny, the country "had an almost institutionalized system of ethnic candidature to the National Assembly."[253] This was largely because access to state resources rested on the informal ethnic associations or redistributive networks that form the base of the PDCI.

To ensure relative equality among the various groups, Houphouët-Boigny relied heavily upon the informal rule of ethnic balancing to regulate the level of ethnic representation. The broader, and more equitable the access to, and by, ethnic groups, the

[251] The Ivoirian Constitution does mention the inclusion of all ethnic groups, but says nothing specific about actual quotas that need to be met.
[252] That is, at least until 1993.
[253] See Le Vine 2004:209.

less likely it would be that ethnic identity would become viewed as a politically advantageous mobilizational tool. The construction of a wide elite consensus around these informal networks meant that political elites had little incentive to politicize ethnic identity, even though it was a potentially potent mobilization tool. A federation of ethnic groups also made dissent from ethnic groups relatively rare, and where dissent appeared, it was easy to marginalize and/or suppress.[254]

Some of Houphouët-Boingy's chief political advisers during his lengthy tenure as the President de la Côte d'Ivoire were from Koroghgo in the North, Jacqueville in the South- West and Bounouko in the East. Although he was known for switching around his cabinet members quite a bit,[255] there was always a measure of balanced representation of the various ethnic groups. In terms of party composition, all of the major ethnic groups were represented in the PDCI. Indeed, a significant characteristic of the PDCI was the geographic basis of representation.

Much like Kenya, electoral districts in Côte d'Ivoire tended to be identified as the home of particular ethnic groups- "ethnic homelands."[256] The practice of political

[254] For example, when the King of the Agni ethnic group of Sanwi claimed that their kingdom had become part of Côte d'Ivoire without their consent and called for the kingdom to secede in 1969, they were quickly marginalized and cut off from access to state resources until the "revolt" had subsided. Also, when a Bété leader, Gnagbé Niabé (also known as Gnabé Opadjelé) proclaimed himself grand chancellor of Côte d'Ivoire in 1970, Houphouët-Boigny not only refused to accept Gnabé's candidacy for president or grant his request for a cabinet post, but also, when Gnabé gathered a large group of supporters and marched on Gagnoa, government troops were unleashed to capture the "rebel leader" and ended the small rebellion.

[255] In 1977 and throughout the 1980s Houphouët-Boigny constantly reshuffled his cabinet members. *Fraternit*é Matin.

[256] As in Kenya, communities in Côte d'Ivoire are organized basically along ethnic lines. The cities are broken down into sub-sects as well. In Senegal on the other hand, large cities (Dakar) or rural areas, Kaolack, tend to be very diverse. Almost all ethnic groups have representation in these cities and there is very little division by street or sub-sect on the basis of ethnic affiliation. It is not uncommon for top-ranking political elites to be a member of the minority in their area or town of origin. For instance, Mackie Sall, a Serer, is from Puel majority region (56 percent). Despite his ethnicity, Sall has been nominated and won the political support of the people of his region. Houphouët-Boigny had a slightly different system whereby representatives from the various regions/ethnic communities were elected by individuals from their ethnic group, to serve in the government. This allowed for a system of equal

candidates returning to the "ethnic homeland" to rally political support, while never formally institutionalized, was nonetheless widespread (Zolberg, 1964; Bakary, 1984; Crook, 1997). It was, for all intents and purposes, an integral part of the informal rule regulating ethnic representation and access to the government and its resources. One interview respondent stated that while as a junior candidate, he served as counselor for regions where the ethnic majority did not reflect his own ethnic affiliation, as he moved up, and took on more serious political roles, and eventually became a political candidate for the Assemblée Nationale, he was required to, and found it essential to, work more closely with those areas of large Bété concentrations.[257] This respondent further stated: "ici, chez-nous, c'est comment on a gagné les élections législatives, jusque 1993 et certainement, âpres. Si on fait pas ça, on n'a rein accompli" (here in Côte d'Ivoire, this is how we won the legislative elections up to 1993 and after. If we did not do this, we accomplish nothing.) [258]

Tables VIII and IX depict the level of representation of the various ethnic groups that characterized Côte d'Ivoire from 1959-1993. Table VIII covers the years 1959-1980, while Table IX covers those years from 1980-1993. The tables indicate a slight over-representation of the Akans among the political elites. They also show however, that the other ethnic groups were relatively well represented in the national politics. One might even point out that the Kru were relatively over-represented in several instances.

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representation, however, the vote at the base remained largely ethnic and precarious-subject to shifts in balance brought about by electoral changes or political disputes.

[257] Field Research interview, Abidjan, March 2008.

[258] Field Research interview, Abidjan, March 2008.

TABLE VIII
Elite Representation in Political Institution from 1959-1980

Ethnic Group	Total Political Elite		Minister		Deputy		Economic and Social Councillors		PDIC Politiburo		Total Population in 1975
	No.	percent	No.	percent	No.	percent	No.	percent	No.	percent	percent
Akan	163	50.9	39	53.4	100	50.0	50	56.1	43	55.1	41.4
Kru	33	19.6	15	20.5	41	20.5	13	14.6	10	12.8	16.7
N.Mandé	33	10.3	7	9.5	19	9.0	10	11.2	8	10.25	14.8
S.Mandé	17	9.06	2	2.7	13	6.5	4	4.4	4	5.1	10.2
Voltaic	29	9.06	6	8.2	9	4.5	4	4.4	7	8.9	15.7
Others	13	4.06	4	5.4	6	3.0	7	7.8	5	6.4	1.2
Unknown	1	0.3	-		1	0.5	-	-		-	-

Source: Bakary, T. (1984: 36)

What is interesting, as depicted in Table IX, is that ethnic representation under Houphouët-Boigny did not vary much from the early periods of single-party rule, to the outset and immediately following the transition from single party- multiparty rule. From the table it is clear that throughout the post-colonial period, there was a system, however loose and informal, of ethnic quotas for representation in the political institutions from 1959- 1980. As previously noted, there has definitely been a higher level of representation of the Akans. Akans in fact, made up a bit more than 50 percent of the country's political leaders. This is significant as Akans constitute roughly $2/5^{th}$ of the total population (1977). Kru and Malinké representations were just about equal relative to their population percentage. The representation of the Voltaic on the other hand, was about half of their relative population size.

TABLE IX

Ethnic Representation in Political Institutions under Houphouët-Boigny, 1980-1992

Ethnic Groups	Government [a]								National Assembly						Economic and Social Council			
	Nov.80		Jun.86		Oct.89	Nov.91			Nov.80		Nov.85		Nov.90		Feb.86		Feb92	
	%	RRb	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	percent	RR
Akan	0.49	1.16	0.41	0.99	0.47	1.12	0.61	1.46	0.46	1.09	0.45	1.07	0.47	1.12	0.55	1.32	0.58	1.38
Baoulé	0.22	1.29	0.24	1.46	0.20	1.20	0.17	1.04	0.19	1.14	0.21	1.23	0.21	1.27	0.28	1.70	0.33	1.95
Kru	0.19	1.30	0.20	1.34	0.20	1.37	0.17	1.19	0.20	1.40	0.19	1.33	0.17	1.17	0.19	1.31	0.23	1.54
S.Mandé	0.05	0.51	0.10	0.91	0.13	1.25	0.04	0.41	0.11	1.02	0.10	0.91	0.10	0.91	0.03	0.31	0.03	0.31
N.Mandé	0.08	0.51	0.17	1.07	0.13	0.84	0.09	0.55	0.10	0.60	0.14	0.90	0.16	1.01	0.14	0.89	0.12	0.73
Voltaic	0.14	0.83	0.10	0.60	0.03	0.20	0.09	0.53	0.14	0.63	0.12	0.74	0.10	0.63	0.04	0.26	0.02	0.10
No.	N=37		N=41		N=30		N=23		N= 147		N=.175		N=175		N=120		N=120	
PIMc	0.36		0.27		0.46		0.47		0.30		0.22		0.21		0.52		0.63	

Source; Armin Langer (2005:.23)[259]

The depiction in the table fits very well with the statements made by interview respondents about the "ethnic division of labor" that existed in Côte d'Ivoire for much of the late-colonial through to the early transition years. According to these accounts, one of the ways to ensure that all of the ethnic groups and the citizens in the country were made to feel that they had a stake in the welfare of the country was to have them control of economic and government sector such as transportation, the security forces and the civil service. Consequently, "Dioulas[260]" were made to be in charge of all things transportation. Much of Côte d'Ivoire's transportation system is owned and operated by individuals of northern descent.[261] In terms of the military, the northerners

[259] a) Government positions taken into account included: President, Ministers of State and Regular Ministers. Deputies were not included in the calculations; b) *Relative Representation* (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group's relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population; c) *Political inequality Measure (PIM)* equals the standard deviation of the relative representation of the different ethnic groups.

[260] Again not a real ethnic affiliation, but more so a crude reference used to categorize those ethnic groups from the northern regions of the country and other parts of Africa, north of Côte d'Ivoire.

[261] Field Research, Abidjan, Jan.-June, 2008. This became quickly apparent to me as I used the local transportation in and around Abidjan. Initially I resided in Marcory, about 40 minutes via taxi from the University of Abidjan which was in the Cartier of Abidjan called Cocody. I was also able to observe this on my travels outside of Abidjan to regions such as Aboisso and Bouaké as I generally travelled on large buses or via mini-vans. A night out on the town in Yopougon is perhaps the best place to observe this

controlled higher positions in the army[262]; the Baoulé dominated the National Security Police (Sûreté Nationale),[263], while the Bété and Krus were a plurality in the National Gendarmerie[264] and the police.[265]

When asked to account for the low levels of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict in Côte d'Ivoire prior to 1993, most respondents interviewed for this study, regardless of ethnic or religious background, socio-economic, occupational background pointed out that prior to Bédié's presidency, there were no real distinctions between true Ivoirians and quasi- Ivoirians. They point out that for as long as they can remember, most ethnic groups have always had some say in the government … "a seat of the table, if you will." [266] According to one interview respondent:

"Of course there is nothing in writing about this…c'est la loi invisible. There is no magic number that we go by officially to appoint representative. It is just been understood that this is how things are done, ici chez-nous; c'est la vérité." [267]

Another respondent stated that:

"Before [1993], we had nothing to fear , together, we were all Ivoirian, regardless of ethnic affiliation, we all felt a part of our country, we all benefitted from the economic resources and we all had some in government that could bring our concern to the President. We are all proud to be who we are as far as our ethnic

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practice. The air is filled with the distinct sounds of the Dioula language as taxi drivers try to attract clients.

[262] For example, from the mid-1970s the Sénoufo in the north were overrepresented in the army.

[263] Houphouët-Boigny invariably appointed as his minister of defense a member of the Baoulé.

[264] A branch of the armed forces responsible for general law enforcement, maintenance of public order, and internal security, including the suppression of violent crimes. Houphouët-Boigny invariably appointed a Bété chief of staff of the army.

[265] This was a common response among interview respondents. The issue of ethnic preference is frequently discussed openly and joked about in daily conversation, particularly where different ethnic groups are represented. The joking generally sound like the following conversations that I witnessed: You, my friend, go fetch us a taxi, those who drive and own the taxi are all of your people, you should do well to get us a decent price. Or, if we get pulled over by the police, you be sure to do all of the talking. As soon as they recognize that they are dealing with a fellow Bété we will not have to pay and won't have to sit all night haggling with them over nothing. On one of these occasions we were pulled over by the police on the way back from a concert at the Palais de la Culture in Treichville, Abidjan, and, as one would have it, the person who was Bété spoke to the police and we were soon on our way.

[266] Field Research , Abidjan Feb.2008.

[267] Field Research interview, May 2008.

identities, moi-même, je suis Mossi[268] but I never felt like an outsider in the country of my birth, until after Houphouët-Boigny died. When Bédié took power everything changed; on est devenu les Ivoiriennes faux."[269]

I found extremely high levels of support for Houphouët-Boingy as a venerated moral authority and trusted political leader, regardless of religion or ethnicity. This holds true even for those of Bété descent, who otherwise carry a long held grudge after the 1969 massacre brought on by calls for secession. There were numerous written "hommage au père de la nation Ivoirienne" and "ode à Houphouët-Boigny," in the country's newspapers. Although Houphouët-Boigny died on December 7, 1993, there are still numerous editorials, poems and commentary about his achievements in Côte d'Ivoire in the national newspapers. His funeral ceremony on February 8, 1994 was estimated to have been attended by over 100,000 people.[270]

Among the most common reasons cited by respondents for Houphouët-Boigny's popularity, was his ability to make each ethnic group feel important and very much a part of the Ivoirian experience. One respondent stated for instance that what kept the country peaceful all those years was that Houphouët-Boigny was good at merging together all of the different elements of the Ivoirian experience into a single cohesive unit and he did so while making no one feel excluded or inferior. "Houphouët-Boigny would have been a masterful chess player!" [271]

There is little evidence that Houphouët-Boigny's popularity waned at the introduction of multiparty rule. In fact, Houphouët-Boigny received close to 82 percent

[268] An ethnic group originally from Burkina Faso among some of the earlier migrants South to Côte d'Ivoire to work on plantations in exchange for land and a livelihood.
[269] Field research interview, April 2008.
[270] Fraternité Matin Feb.8, 1994. Also see article in *New York Times* Feb.8,1994.
[271] Field research interview, Jan-Jun.2008.

of the popular vote in the first ever multiparty elections in 1990 with an almost 70 percent voter turnout.[272] One of the reasons, which Chapter Seven clearly illustrates, is that while the formal institutional rules regarding electoral competition were altered, there were no fundamental changes made to the "rules that really mattered." While, as the previous table indicated, the Baoulé had a slight over-representation among the political elites and the important political institutions, there was a relative balance in the multiparty years that characterized Côte d'Ivoire throughout much of single party era.

Multiparty rule meant the inclusion of other political parties into the political sphere. However, Houphouët-Boigny still maintained control of the vast majority of the state resources and could dispense of them as he wished. Based on Table VIII, he chose to continue the trend of allowing relatively balanced ethnic representation and access to state resources and services. The regime structure may have been changed on the surface, but beneath the surface the rules regulating the redistribution and access to state resources operated on a business as usual basis.

The republic of Cameroon is a good case in point that formal institutional change does not necessarily alter the actual rules[273] of the game result. Despite the potential for ethnic and ethno-regional conflict, the transition from single to multiparty rule in 1992 did not result in ethnic politicization in the Cameroon. One of the reasons is that like President Ahmadou Ahidjo, his successor Paul Biya has adhered to the commonly established (though never formalized) rule regulating access to, and distribution of, government resources (Rothchild, 1997:14).[274] While, as in Côte

[272] Electoral Results for Côte d'Ivoire. Ivoirian Statistical Institute. See also Fraternité Matin.
[273] By which I mean that rules that are institutionalized or societally embedded even though they are not codified.
[274] See Rothchild, (1997:14)

d'Ivoire, inequity has persisted in the Cameroon, unlike the post-1993 Côte d'Ivoire, all of the major ethnic groups have had a seat at the table and relatively reasonable access to state resources; thereby providing little incentive for political elites to mobilize along ethnic lines. Even after transitions to multi-party rule in 1992, the salience of ethnic identity has remained relatively low in the Cameroon.

In terms of party composition, again, even after 1990, at least until the death of Houphpouët-Boigny in 1993, the PDCI enjoyed large multi-ethnic support and included representatives from all of the major ethnic groups in the country. The PDCI won 163 of the 175 seats in les élections législatives.[275] Given this kind of national support in the face of political competition,[276] there was little incentive for Houphouët- Boigny to change the rules of the game and subsequently, little reason for ethnic identity to be used as a mobilizational tool. The question then becomes: what changed? The answer lies in the fact that unlike Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié faced serious questions and challenges regarding the legitimacy of his claim to the Presidency from political elites and voters. This significantly influenced the political strategies that Bédié employed to legitimize his accession to the Presidency, which in turn gravely affected extant informal rules regulating political representation, access to public goods, citizenship and land tenure. These changes in turn led to a shift in the political salience of ethnic identity and ergo, the incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool.

[275] Election Results of the Nov. 1990 elections.
[276] The main opposition to compete in the presidential election was Gbagbo and the FPI. In the legislative elections the competition was generally the FPI and the PIT.

Towards explaining ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire: a case of changing institutional rules?

It is often noted that when access to resources and power is not monopolized by one dominant group but shared out equitably between competing ethnic groups, as in Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), a country tends to remain politically stable and more socially cohesive. The previous sections outline the political stability and ethnic cohesion that Houphouët-Boigny was able to achieve from 1960-1993 via a form of state-facilitated co-ordination of a number of quasi-autonomous ethnic and or ethnoregional interests.

The Transition Effect: change in the informal institutional rules 1993-2000

As mentioned above, one of the central changes to affect Côte d'Ivoire in 1993 was the death of Houphouët-Boigny. In his study of the levels of socio-economic disparities among ethnic groups and between regions in Côte d'Ivoire, Langer (2005) identified essential distinctions between the ethnic composition of the cabinet under Houphouët-.Boigny and Bédié. My own survey of cabinet appointments between 1960 and 2008 yielded similar results. Table X summarizes the details of this finding. In short, Houphouët-Boigny's cabinets, while undoubtedly favoring Akans, were more inclusive and diverse than Bédié's. Among the most significant changes that Houphouët - Boigny's death brought to Côte d'Ivoire was a leadership crisis.

TABLE X
Ethnic representation under Bédié 1991-1999

Ethnic Groups	Government[a]								Inner Circle of political Power								National Assembly		Econ.&Social Council	
	Nov.91a		Dec.93		Jan.96		Aug.98		Nov.91		Dec.93		Jan.96		Aug.98		Nov. 95		Mar-98	
	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR
Akan	0.61	1.46	0.52	0.24	0.52	1.23	0.59	1.41	0.73	1.74	0.67	1.58	0.67	1.58	0.75	1.78	0.46	1.10	0.58	1.39
Baoule	0.17	1.04	0.24	1.43	0.28	1.64	0.31	1.86	0.36	2.18	0.42	2.48	0.42	2.48	0.42	2.48	0.22	1.29	0.33	1.98
Kru	0.17	1.19	0.24	1.89	0.21	1.63	0.16	1.23	0.09	0.62	0.17	1.31	0.17	1.31	0.08	0.66	0.19	1.52	0.23	1.84
S.Mandé	0.04	0.41	0.04	0.40	0.10	1.03	0.06	0.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.94	0.03	0.25
N.Mandé	0.09	0.55	0.08	0.48	0.07	0.42	0.03	0.19	0.09	0.57	0.08	0.51	0.08	0.51	0.08	0.51	0.12	0.74	0.13	0.76
Voltaic	0.09	0.53	0.12	0.68	0.10	0.59	0.13	0.71	0.09	0.56	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.12	0.70	0.02	0.09
No.	N=23		N=25		N=29		N=32		N= 11		N=12		N=12		N=12		N=171		N=120	
PIM	0.47		0.62		0.49		0.49		0.64		0.65		0.65		0.66		0.33		0.74	

Source: Armin Langer (2005)[277]

Bédié and the crisis of legitimacy

Prior to his death, Houphouët-Boigny enacted a constitutional amendment in 1990 stipulating that, in the event of his death, would assume his office until the next scheduled presidential elections. As the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié was constitutionally slated to be the next president of Côte d'Ivoire following Houphouët-Boignys' death. Thus, like Abdou Diouf in Senegal, Bédié came to the presidency via constitutional maneuvering of his predecessor Houphouët-Boigny. While like Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny sought to settle any potential legitimacy claims by naming a successor via constitutional revision,[278] Bédié's choice proved more

[277] The November 1991 government was formed under Boigny; (b) *Relative representation* (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group's relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population; (c) *Political Inequality Measure* (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the relative representation of the different ethnic groups.

[278] This was stipulated in Article 11 of the Ivoirian Constitution as amended in 1990. According to this amendment, as the leader of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié was declared the automatic successor in the event of Houphouët-Boigny's death in office.

problematic for the Ivoirians than the choice of Adou Diouf was for the people of Senegal.

In particular, Bédié faced questions about his legitimacy as Côte d'Ivoire's next President in a way that Abdou Diouf did not. Diouf had the support of a large majority the people of Senegal,[279] the political elites and the Sufi religious leaders. This may have been largely because he was Senghor's choice. More importantly, however, Diouf's own professional successes seem to have bought him favor with all sections of the Senegalese society. Throughout his career in the civil service, from regional governor (1961-62) to secretary general to the government (1964-65) to minister of planning and industry (1968-70) to prime minister (1970-1981), Abdou Diouf had built a stalwart reputation as a competent leader and deemed by many Senegalese to be an excellent candidate to assume the presidency. Abdou Diouf is known as one of Senegal's chief technocrats; someone who values competence and reliability above all else, particularly ethnic affiliation.[280] Throughout his tenure, Diouf enjoyed high favorability ratings. Many Senegalese had a high level of confidence in Diouf's overall qualification and competence to govern. Notwithstanding his electoral defeat in 2000, many Senegalese believe that Diouf was an excellent president. [281]

In contrast, the issue of Bédié's competence to effectively govern the Côte d'Ivoire at the death of Houphouët-Boigny became increasingly salient during the early 1990s as the gravity of Houphouët-Boigny's illness became glaringly apparent. The

[279] As indicated by his overall percentage in the 1981 elections.
[280] Promotions and appointments under Abdou Diouf were largely based on educational qualifications, competence, skills and abilities and strong work ethic. Based on conversations during field research, these are some of the defining characteristics many Senegalese attribute to Adbou Diouf.
[281] Field Research, Dakar, Senegal: interviews and newspaper coverage.

newly appointed Prime Minister—Allasane Ouattara— [282]was proving to be highly competent at running the country- a task he took on more and more during the 1990s as Houphouët-Boigny sought treatment for his illness overseas. The more competence Ouattara displayed in his role as prime minister and the day-to-day governance of the country in Houphouët-Boigny's absence, the more questions arose about Bédié 's competence and suitability, and eligilibility to become the future President de la Côte d'Ivoire.

Impressed with Ouattrara's qualifications, accomplishments[283] and plans for the country, the question for many Ivoirian (particularly some of the most prominent member of the PDCI), became: Who is the better candidate? Is Bédié the better candidate for this position in his party?[284] The discussion played out publicly as newspaper publications ran daily and weekly surveys posing these very questions. Many Ivoirians believed that Côte d'Ivoire would fare better with Ouattara as the leader than with Bédié "installé a la tete de la Côte d'Ivoire."[285]

While Bédié had a relatively successful run as President of the National Assembly, the focus of many newspaper reports tended to be Bédié's dismissal as the Minister of Economy and Finance on charges of corruption and mismanagement of the public coffers in 1977 and other allegations of professional shortfalls and/or failures. Juxtaposed with Ouattara's apparent successes, the message seemed clear: Ivoirians

[282] In 1990 Houphouët-Boigny decreed the establishment of the post of Prime Minister, and appointed Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO), an American trained economist and then serving governor of the West African Central Bank, and the first Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire.
[283] Under Ouattara's leadership, particularly his austere economic measures, Côte d'Ivoire experienced significant improvement economically.
[284] Qui est le meilleur candidat? Etait-il [Bédié] le meilleur candidat de son parti à ce poste ? Y était-il pour ses qualités intrinsèques ou pour ses origines ethniques ? These questions were posed in newspapers as survey questions. See Le Voie, Sept. 1993- March 1994. See article by Raphael Lakepé : "Pourquoi je ne crois pas en Bédié."
[285] See "Campagnes pour Légitimer Bédié' by Freedom Nenda, Jan. 7, 1994.

held serious reservations about Bédié becoming the next President of Côte d'Ivoire. In fact, despite some initial opposition to the austerity of the structural measures he instituted, overtime Ouattara had won the respect and allegiance of some of the key legislators and top ranking officials within the PDCI—so much so that he was encouraged by these officials to challenge the constitutional amendment that would allow Bédié to automatically assume the office of the presidency upon Houphouët-Boigny's death.

Aware of the growing popularity of Ouattara among members of the PDCI and among the general population, as well as his increasing unpopularity as more information seeped out about his past mismanagement as former minister of economics and finance,[286] Bédié faced an important political dilemma: how to foment political support and legitimize his presidency. The situation reached critical mass when, emboldened by the support of members of the legislature and sensing the political weakness of Bédié as head of the PDCI, Ouattara officially challenged Bédié's political legitimacy by bring a motion against the amendment to the Supreme Court. Ouattara lost this battle as the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional right for Bédié to assume the presidency in 1994. However, the challenge for Bédié was clear: foment political support and legitimize his authority or lose the presidency in upcoming elections. This was particularly significant as the constitutional amendment that made him Houhouët-Boigny's successor also stipulated that Bédié was entitled to hold the office only until the expiration of Houphouët-Boigny's mandate in 1995. In effect, Bédié had less than two years to devise, plan and orchestrate a successful political campaign; one that would ensure his and PDCI's electoral success.

[286] See reports in Fraternité Matin, Le Voie and other Ivoirian newspapers (1995-2000).

Bédié and the run-up to the 1995 presidential election

As the section above suggests, Bédié faced a significant political dilemma that was increasingly undermining his chances of electoral success in the 1995 presidential elections in the lead-up to the 1994 presidential elections. With only two years to the next scheduled election, the political stakes were high. Bédié's strategic choices and apparent rejection of Houphouët-Boigny's legacy should be viewed within this context. Bédié made the particular changes he did in an attempt to maintain control of the political process and establish his own political authority and legitimacy.

Perhaps the most telling indication of the seriousness of the dilemma is Bédié's first act as President de la Côte d'Ivoire. During the official and televised announcement of the death of Houphouët-Boigny by Ouattara,[287] Bédié appeared at the national television station (RTI), under full gendarmerie escort. Reaffirming the death of the "father of the Nation," Bédié declared himself President de la Côte d'Ivoire. [288] Citing the constitutional amendment of 1990 enacted by Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié outlined that as leader of the National Assembly; he was entitled to and would immediately assume the office of the Presidency.[289] Bédié then drove the 1.5 miles from RTI to the official presidential mansion, again with full military escort. That Bédié felt it necessary to order military escort is particularly significant. It underscores the extent of the challenges and opposition Bédié felt towards his ascendance to the presidency, especially from Ouattara.

[287] In his speech Ouattara stated that: "Côte d'Ivoire is an orphan…[t]he man who has shaped [its] people for half a century, the father of the nation…has died."

[289] As far as his eligibility and competence to be an effective leader and president; at least compared to Ouattara, who, had so far displayed, in the eyes of many Ivoirians, an excellent ability to govern and successfully manage the country.

Bédié's Strategic Choices

Given the increasing support among the elites for Ouattara, one of Bédié's primary concerns was how to offset the political challenge posed by Allasane Quattara.[290] As Bédié's chief political rival, undermining Ouattara's legitimacy to the presidency meant almost sure dominance at the polls for Bédié and the PDCI. Undermining and/or de-legitimizing Ouattara as a potential/actual presidential candidate became paramount.

The strategy of choice for Bédié was the introduction of Ivoirité (meaning the purported characteristics of an indigenous Ivoirian). The introduction of Ivoirité would not only serve as an ideological argument against Ouattara's candidacy, but also legitimize Bédié's ascendance to power. Ivoirité required both parents of presidential candidates (le pèrè et la mere) to be native Ivoirians.[291]It also stipulated that candidates must reside in country within five years of bidding for the presidency. Also, candidates who have held a diplomatic passport from another country would be ineligible to run for president. The inability to satisfy these requirements rendered Ouattara unqualified to run as a presidential candidate in Côte d'Ivoire. With only one parent a native[292] of the country and having traveled and taken appointments representing Burkina Faso, and living outside of the country for much of his life, the stipulations dislodged Ouattara's candidacy and delegitimized his bid for the presidency. Ouattara's candidacy was barred on the grounds that he held Burkinabé nationality and was not a native Ivoirian.

[290] This is often referred to as the ADO effect.
[291] Prior to the change, only one needed to be native born Ivoirian.
[292] Ouattara's mother was from a village called Kong, which is located in the northern regions of the country bordering Burkina Faso. His father however is from Burkina Faso.

With the ADO effect sidelined, Bédié made a number of follow-up strategic moves. These included isolating those members of the PDCI (known and suspected) who favored and supported Ouattara. Bédié not only dismissed them from their positions; he also quickly moved his loyalists (most of whom shared his ethnic lineage), into all key positions in government.[293] In fact, once in power, Bédié significantly increased the appointments of fellow Baoulé politicians to his cabinet. Table X shows for instance that under Bédié, relative representation of Baoulé increased from 1.04 under Houphouët-Boigny, to 1.86 by 1998. The big losers in Bédié's government, relative to Houphouët-Boigny's, appeared to be Kru and northern Mandé. In the case of the latter group, their relative representation under Houphouët-Boigny stood at 0.91 in November 1991 compared to 0.19 under Bédié in the August 1998 government.[294]

In a commentary piece in the *Nouvel Horizon*, Jacques Préjean lamented that the number of Baoulé being named to the government outweighed the other ethnic groups by a ratio of 6-1. [295] A look at the actual numbers indicates that this may have been an exaggeration of the facts. However, it highlights the unease/fear that many Ivoirians had started to feel about the changes that Bédié would bring to the country. Based on the many editorials, and commentaries in the various Ivoirian newspapers accusing Bédié

[293] The strategy is not uncommon. To the contrary it is quite commonly used by authoritarian or dictatorial leaders. Indeed, some of the most well known political leaders to employ such a strategy include Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), and Francisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea. The idea is to surround oneself with trusted members of one's own ethnic group, whose allegiance is paid for with direct access to jobs and other governmental resources.For further discussions on African leader that tend to surround themselves with loyalists and in particular, members of their own ethnic groups see: Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Kabwit 1979 on Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Idi Amin of Uganda; and Decalo1989 on Francisco Macias Nguema of Guinea.
[294] Langer (2005).
[295] Le Nouvel Horizon, No. 171. Dec. 24, 1993.

of being tribalist or of tribalising politics,[296] there was a general perception among a large portion of the Ivoirian population that Bédié was advancing an ethnic agenda to promote Baoulé dominance and privileges, at the expense of the other ethnic groups.

In terms of the inner circle of political power, Bédié also increased the relative over-representation of the Baoulé from 2.18 in November 1991 to 2.48 in December 1993. While this increase seems relatively small, when viewed within the context that the increase was done largely at the expense of northern and southern Mandé, that the over-representation was maintained throughout his presidency, along with the dismissal of other ethnic groups from the civil service and their replacement by party loyalists and fellow Baoulé representative (something he also did with members the party and the government media)[297], a pattern of ethnic preference emerges. Furthermore, by 1998, the Baoulé controlled more than forty percent of the key political positions in Côte d'Ivoire.[298]

While in any other context changes to the composition of the cabinet might not have proved as significant, these seemingly minor changes have held important implications for Ivoirian politics. Given that ethnic identity has always been a potential source of political conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, one of the most important effects has been on ethnic politicization. Indeed, in general, although these strategies may have helped

[296] Such charges have been levied against Houphouët-Boigny as well over the decades. Content analysis of some of Côte d'Ivoire's most read newspapers indicate however, that the frequency with which the charges were made increased significantly after March 1993 and within three months, had surpassed totally number of charges made against Houphouët-Boigny since his presidential term started in 1960. While it was difficult to find older volumes of many newspaper articles, I was fortunate to make contact with staff from an outstanding NGO in Cocody Abidjan – Centre de Recherche et D'action Pour la Paix (CERAP). Among its most outstanding collection in the library hosted by the institute, are Ivoirian newspapers dating as far back as 1964 (*Fraternité- Matin*). Many of the charges were published by *Le Patriote, Notre Voie, and Nouvelle Horizon* as they pro-opposition, especially after Bédié fired some of the most highly respected journalists in 1993/1994.

[297] These include Ali Coulibaly (head of Ivoirian TV 1), Koné Moussa (editor of *Ivoir Soir*) and Yacouba Kébé, the managing director of *Fraternité Matin*

[298] Crook (1997:13); Dozon (2000:53).

secure Bédié's success in the 1994 presidential elections. Ethnic tensions rose sharply during Bédié's presidency. The introduction of Ivoirité significantly affected the composition of the PDCI. Appointing a larger number of Akans and Baoulés to the cabinet (especially at the expense of other ethnic groups), and barring Ouattara's candidacy on the basis that he was not a "true Ivoirian," brought an end to the fragile ethnic balance that had been had successfully maintained since the late-colonial period under Houphouët-Boigny. By stipulating that being Ivoirian meant being born to parents who were/are themselves natives de la Côte d'Ivoire, Bédié not only prevented the RDR and Ouattara from running for president in the 1995 and 2000 elections, it also brought significant loss of northern support to the PDCI.

Trying to define who was Ivoirian was and who was not, exacerbated ethnic and ethno-regional divisions, the manifestation of which included the growing attacks on foreign migrant workers from neighboring Muslim countries. Given the historical tendencies to treat migrants from the northern regions of the country as foreigners, many Ivoirians became targets of these local attacks. After decades of being made to feel like an important element of the fabric of Ivoirian society, Muslims began to feel unfairly treated and unwelcomed in their own country. Many northerners felt targeted and disenfranchised in a country to whose economic development they had significantly contributed.

This did three things. First, the traditionally safe support of the northern ethnic groups fell apart as a large majority of the Muslim and northern supporters transferred their support from the PDCI to Ouattara and the RDR. Without the support of the northerners, the PDCI was no longer representative of all Ivoirians. Rather, the party

became increasingly stigmatized, and susceptible to charges of being an ethnic party- "the party of the Baoulé." As one interview respondent stated:

> "If the party [PDCI] was not going to represent us, and put Baoulé interests before everyone else, even more than before, then it made sense for us to go support a party that would be about us… That is why I support the RDR… I loved Houphouët-Boigny, but after he died, I did not care for his replacement or the kind of party that the PDC I had become."

Second, as more and more Notherners and Muslims transferred their support to Ouattara and the RDR in support of a fellow northerner, Ivoirian politics became embroiled into a debate about ethnic identity. Bédié met accusations that he and the PDCI had become an ethnic party with counter accusations. Pointing to the heavy Bété and Muslim/northerner presence among the supporters of the RDR and the FPI respectively, Bédié accused these parties and their leaders of engaging in ethnic politics. Also, as Ivoirians became more open and vocal about the "increasing inequalities," the noise levels on the national stage increased, altering the salience of, and incentives to use, ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool.

Third, ruining the long standing ethnic coalition involving the northerners[299] had more far-reaching political consequences that went beyond shifting allegiance from one party to another. While never formally written and codified, ethnic balancing and coalition were underlying and societally embedded rules that governed political representation and access to governmental goods from the late-colonial period. Barring a political candidate on the basis of ethnic identity, appointing loyalists into all key positions in government while sidelining supporters of the opposition, effectively

[299] One of the political strategies that Houphouët-Boigny employed to ensure a peace was establishing an ethnic coalition- without the inclusion of the northern, it is doubtful that Houphouët-Boigny would have had such a successful tenure-one without ethnic strife and conflict. Although it was never formally recorded, this ethnic coalition became a core defining principle of the rule of the game.

undermined and significantly altered these rules. This in effect, altered incentives for elites and the general population to engage in ethnic politics: elites became more likely to use ethnic appeals to mobilize political support, and the public was likely to respond to such appeals to ensure electoral success and/or defeat.[300] Without the broad coalition, disincentives to use ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool no longer existed, which in effect, made the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool politically appealing and advantageous to political elites.

Bédié's attempt to foment political support by tapping into deep seated resentment of immigrants and ruling that indigenous Ivoirians should reclaim the land from the immigrant population, had a profound effect on other long standing, if informal, societally embedded rules- those governing land tenure and property rights. The rule governing land tenure since the late-colonial period stipulated that "the land belongs to he who cultivates it." Historically, the main benefactors of the informal rule that "the land belongs to he who cultivates it" were immigrants and Ivoirians from the north, center and west of the country. Change from "the land belongs to he who cultivates it" to needing proof not only of one's natural birth, but also, proof that both parents are/were also native born citizens, led to significant increases in political inequality, ethnic and ethno-regional disparities and ethnic based grievances.

With the introduction of Ivoirité came new legislation concerning property rights. The implementation of new legislation presumed identification and registration of customary rights. These new legislations favored the autochthons (indigenous groups). Indigenous groups could lay claim to land along on the basis of ancestral lines

[300] Voters sometimes cast their vote not so much for a particular candidate but more in opposition to another candidate.

at the expense of those who had inhabited and worked the land for generations (some prior to independence),. This further increased ethno-regional disparities and exacerbated ethnic tensions, leading to shifts in the political salience of ethnic identity- from dormant and contained, to dominating the national discourse- and the incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool.

In her study of land related conflicts in Africa, Catherine Boone (2003) found that the number of land-related conflicts in the Western regions of Côte d'Ivoire spiked dramatically in the mid-to late 1990s and after.[301] While Boone asserts that change in the political economy was the key factor at play here, my research findings suggest that these conflicts were due to exacerbated ethnic tensions between autochthons and immigrants, resulting from the introduction of Ivoirité. The autochthon/immigrant struggles have their roots in the colonialism; however, prior to 1993 there was little incentive to benefit, economically or politically, from instigating or politicizing such conflicts. The incentives generated by the introduction of Ivoirité were different. With the termination of the informal rule of "the land belongs to he who cultivates it" autochthons sought to reclaim their ancestral lands. These actions provided further incentives for political elites to make ethnic/ethno-regional grievances part of their political campaign. In November 1994 for instance, more than 10,000 immigrants from Burkina Faso were forced out of their homes in the southwestern town of Tabou after members of the local Kru ethnic group complained that foreigners had taken over their

[301] See Boone (2003).

land.[302] The RDR had few problems mobilizing immigrants, descendants of immigrants, Muslims, northern Ivoirians[303]or any one sympathetic to the plight of these people.

Ivoirité also made the criteria for being an Ivoirian stricter. The process required documentation of the origin of one's parents. By 1994 this was the requirement of the national identification program and the issuance of new identity cards. In fact, such documentation was required to simply establish residential status. As more than 30 percent of the Ivoirian population are foreign born and even a larger percentage born to immigrant parents and grandparents, this was particularly troublesome for many Ivoirians. Those most profoundly affected were northern Ivoirians.

As established in the previous chapters, one of the effects of the colonial migration policy and Houphouët-Boigny's open land policy was that Ivoirians who had migrated to the South were often considered foreigners. This was increasingly the case after 1993. Akindès notes for instance that an outcome of "the process of identifying the 'true Ivoirians' was that Muslims were amalgamated with foreigners… and people from the north of the Ivory Coast [because they are generally Muslims]were amalgamated with foreigners" (Akindès, 2003:14).

Many Ivoirians were made to feel unwelcome in their own country. According to Akindès (2003), in the collective imagination, there developed "a doubt as to the underlying reality of their belonging to the Ivoirian nation" (Akindès, 2003:13). Among the many thousands of people who left Côte d'Ivoire for fear of their lives and/or livelihood, about 10 percent are northern Ivoirians.[304] Ouattara [305]felt that questions

[302] Nouvel Horizon, Nov. 1994. See also Akindes (2003).
[303] Primarily because Ivoirian from the northern regions make up an integral part of the immigrant community and have often been treated as foreigners themselves.
[304] See Crisis International (1999).

about his true nationality arose only because, like the population from the northern regions of the country, he was Muslim.

Again, these measures drove northerners away from the PDCI and toward the RDR [306] particularly since, like them, the leader Ouattara, was told that under the new rules of Ivoirité, he was not Ivoirian enough to run for the presidency. According to the Secretary General of the RDR:

> We certainly are not an ethnic party and we did not set out to become one. We attracted so many northerners because a man without a voice is like a foreigner in his own country and many felt that we speak on their behalf.[307]

With a majority northern Muslim political voter base, the RDR and its leader (himself a northerner and a Muslim) became increasingly susceptible to the charge that the party was an "ethnic party." The RDR became a political target of the PDCI on this basis. Bédié often made reference to the RDR as "a northern regionalist party." Indeed Bédié described the RDR as "a northern regionalist party with a sinister Muslim agenda." (Collett, 2006: 623). While this may have been an attempt to delegitimize the party, it provides a unique glimpse into the political rhetoric at the time and a way to gauge how much ethnic identity had come to dominate the national political discourse. It also turned into a self- fulfilling prophecy where the perception was generated that Bédié was an "anti-Muslim going to punish individual ethnic, religious, and regional groups for their divergent political views" (Crook, 1997: 226).

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[305] Ouattara was born in the northern regions of the country, at the time of his birth, this region was known as the Upper Volta and was somewhat distinct from the rest of Côte d'Ivoire.
[306] The program of national identification and issuing of new identity cards is also often cited as the prime motivation for joining the conflict amongst rebel recruits (Marshall-Fratani, 2006).
[307] Field Research Interview, Abidjan March 2008.

Conclusion

The case explorations above strongly suggest that the changes in the informal institutional rules regulating resource reciprocity systems in Côte d'Ivoire led to increased salience of ethnic identity and made what was conventionally latent, a highly significant mobilizational tool.

The discussion highlights that analyses of formal rules alone are insufficient to explain political outcomes. The findings suggests that since the actual rules that people adhere to are generally not formally established, changes to informal institutional rules may have a more significant impact on ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict, than changes to the formal rules. This is true especially if, as in Senegal and Cameroon, change in the formal institutional rules does not translate to change in deeply embedded informal institutional rules. Indeed, while one could make the case that changes to the informal institutions in Côte d'Ivoire resulted from the change in the formal institutional rules—single-party to multiparty system—the chapter indicates that the former does not necessarily follow from the latter. Again, Senegal and Tanzania and Cameroon provide empirical support. It is evident in the case of Côte d'Ivoire as well. The politicization of ethnicity did not immediately accompany the transition to multiparty rule in Côte d'Ivoire. It was not until after the death of Houphouët-Boigny, and in particular change in the informal institutional rules regarding political representation and access to state resources, that ethnic identity became a mobilizational tool. It was not until Bédié changed the rules of the political game that ethnicity began to dominate Ivoirian political discourse and stormed the national public sphere.

My research shows that while the informal institutional rules generated incentives for individuals to invest in, and consolidate their ethnic identities, they also acted as constraints against mobilizing ethnic identities as they promoted and ensured relatively balanced access to government and governmental resources among the major ethnic groups. Where these rules are altered or significantly weakened, as in post-1993 Côte d'Ivoire, the subsequent shift in the incentive structure may be such that political elites find it advantageous to politicize ethnic differences. In other words, the changes to the informal institutional rules altered incentives for ethnicity to be employed as a mobilizational tool.

The next chapter explores how these changes gave rise to fear and confusion among the Ivoirian population, which helps to explain how political elites were able to galvanize support along ethnic lines, even in the absence of explicit appeals to ethnicity by political elites and party leaders.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Exploring the effects of informal institutional rule changes on ethnic politicization: Insights from the cases of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

Introduction

Scholars have long espoused that one of the main contributing factors to ethnic conflicts is the existence of severe disparities and inequalities in societies, especially those that are blatantly along ethnic lines, Gurr (2000) argues that the salience of a specific identity (ethnic or religious), and subsequently, its mobilization potential, is a function of the degree to which that identity is a major determinant of the groups' security, status, material well-being and access to political power. For Gurr, economic disadvantages, such as poverty and economic discrimination, are "consistently correlated with economic and social grievances and with demands for greater political rights" (Gurr 1993:188). Where a group is treated differently in terms of privileges and power, this identity can be strengthened as a unifying force and consequently provide mobilizational appeal for aspiring political elites competing in popular elections. Grievances[308] about differential treatment and the sense of a group identity provide the essential bases for mobilization and shape the kinds of claims political elites make.

Langer (2005) and Østby (2008) assert that horizontal inequalities, particularly at the elite level, represent an aspect of relative deprivation which can facilitate mobilization. According to Østby (2008), group-based inequalities (economic, political,

[308] Grievance or relative deprivation refers to widely shared dissatisfaction among group members about their standing vis-à-vis dominant groups (Gurr & Moore, 1997).

or social) can create a sense of common grievances, increase intra-group solidarity and reinforce a sense of separation between in-group and out-group. The greater the differentials between groups the stronger the mobilizational appeal and the more likely it is that elites will make political appeals to ethnic or ethno-regional differences. Applying this theoretical framework to the Ivoirian Crisis, Langer (2005) argues that there exists in Côte d'Ivoire, the simultaneous presence of severe political and socio-economic horizontal inequalities which not only generated strong incentives for political elites to mobilize supporters along ethnic lines, but also made it highly likely that ethnic constituencies would respond to such appeals.

My research points to the evidence of wide disparities in the Ivoirian society. The case explorations in Chapter Four establish that one of the driving forces of inequality in Côte d'Ivoire is the wide socio-economic and political disparities between the north and the south. With respect to direct investments and infrastructural development, the northern regions of the country have received very little investment relative to the south. Road construction, health and medical facilities, schools, small-scale industries, access to running water and electricity and other key social services, have conventionally been more readily available in the southern regions of the country.

What is also established in that chapter, however, is that the north/south disparities in Côte d'Ivoire existed even prior to independence in 1960- dating back the early colonial period. If the assertion is that socio-economic disparities provide political elites with strong incentives to mobilize their supports among ethnic lines, how then do we explain non-politicization in Côte d'Ivoire between 1960 and 1990?

The general assumption in the ethnic politics literature is that given the choice, political elites will couch their electoral appeals and frame their political discourse in ethnic terms rather than make cross-ethnic appeals, and that groups will willingly following the directions of their leaders. While this assumption is generally borne out in cases where political parties lack significant support from any one ethnic group (s), it often does not apply to cases in which the major political parties already enjoyed majority support among particular ethnic groups.[309] In the case of the latter, one would expect party leaders would seek to attract cross-ethnic political support, especially if none of the ethnic groups was large enough to deliver an electoral victory to a political party. This is indeed what I found in the case of post-1993 Ivoirian national elections. Data from interviews and a survey of the newspaper coverage of the national and presidential electoral campaigns leading up to the 1995 and proceeding elections, indicate that individually, each of the major parties (PDCI, RDR and FPI) promoted broad, cross-ethnic appeals a central part of its electoral campaign. Each party also claimed that one or the other opposition party was covertly an ethnic party.

The chapter argues that changes to informal institutional rules governing political representation and land and labor policies created the incentives for political elites to employ this kind of double-edged political strategy. While the official party platform espoused messages with cross-ethnic appeals, they also accused the other parties of engaging in ethnic politics. Within an already ethnically charged political climate, the claims and counter-claims of engaging in ethnic politics: (a) made ethnic identity not only a dominant issue in national political debate but also a divisive issue

[309] See Chapter Six for a discussion on how changes to informal institutional rules governing political representation and access to public goods and citizenship and land rights created a political environment in which ethnicity dominated the national political discourse.

that ultimately became the underlying basis of political competition; (b) elevated otherwise local grievances to national level politics in an ethnic framework and; (c) increased the likelihood and chances of individuals and ethnic groups voting along ethnic lines.

Côte d'Ivoire Electoral Campaign 1990s -2000

Electoral polls and surveys indicated that Gbagbo had a majority support among individuals and ethnic groups from the south-west headed into the 1995 national elections. Given this, one would expect that like the Diola political elites in Senegal, Gbagbo would have sought to extend his party's political appeal beyond members of his own ethnic group or the groups from his own region. Even with the total eighteen percent of the Bété vote, Gbagbo could not win a national election by appearing to represent a particular ethnic and/or ethno-regional grouping or being exclusive of other ethnic groups. The challenge for Gbagbo and the FPI during the 1995 election, therefore, was how to highlight the specific grievances of his political support base (the Bété)[310] while espousing a national cause or advancing an inclusive national agenda and image. In other words, the political puzzle for Gbagbo and the FPI was how to maximize cross-ethnic support while minimizing loss of political support among the party support base.

That Gbabgo was the one to initiate the political strategy accusing the PDCI and Bédié of systematically favoring the interests of the Baoulé during the 1995 political campaign (Langer, 2007: 21) is consequential. His actions fulfilled the criteria of

[310] This is to ensure continued large scale support from among this group.

broadening his appeal while simultaneously expressing the sense of grievance of the Bété. Given the centrality of ethnic identity in the national debate Gbagbo's strategy[311] provided a way to use the issue to undermine the ruling party, all the while presenting himself and the FPI as the most qualified alternative. [312] Gbagbo's political strategy was not lost on the other major political parties however. Ouattara and the RDR employed a similar strategic approach early on in the campaign.[313]

While fairly secure in its support by the people of the north,[314] the RDR was also aware that to win large scale political support, it was necessary to attract support from other ethnic groups and regions of the country. One of the RDR's immediate concerns was how to galvanize national support, develop a national image and prevent becoming stigmatized as the party of the Muslim northerners. Like Gbagbo and the FPI, RDR party leaders chose to cast the opposition parties (mainly the PDCI) as ethnic parties. In fact, one of the points that the RDR leadership uses to justify its emergence is the claim that existing political parties championed the cause of particular ethnic groups at the expense of others. The RDR leaders pledged to representative of the interests of all Ivoirians.

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[311] Gbagbo won more than 18 percent of the total votes in the 1995 presidential election. The party won 9 seats (of 163) in the legislative elections later that year. Akyé and Akan ethnic group members were avid supporters of the FPI.

[312] A frequent charge of the FPI throughout the electoral campaign was that the PDCI favored the interests of the Baoulé at the expense of the other ethnic groups, particularly the Bété.

[313] Although, some would argue that in the case of the RDR and Ouattara, his strategy was more of a defensive strategy against claims by the PDCI that the RDR was the party of northerners and Muslims with sinister plans for the rest of the ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire.

[314] Especially as Bédié's introduction of the concept of *Ivorité* ensured that the RDR had just such a voter base. The introduction of Ivorité, which sought to distinguish between true and quasi-Ivoirians and changes to informal rules of relatively balanced ethnic representation and the land belongs to whomever cultivates it affected northerners disproportionately. Northerners were also drawn to the RDR because they viewed the disqualification of the party leader- Ouattara – as an attempt to disenfranchise all northerners, particularly those who were also Muslims.

Not unlike Gbagbo and Ouattara, Bédié's campaign strategy was also to point to the opposition parties-FPI and RDR as ethnic parties. Indeed, throughout the 1995 political campaign, Bédié accused both parties of being the party of the Bété and the party of the "sinister Muslim northerners" respectively. Bédié and the top ranking PDCI elites believed that characterizing the other major opposition parties as engaging in ethnic politics would rally political support among Bédié's own ethnic group while undermining the appeal of the FPI and RDR to the other ethnic groups.

While each political party and party leaders seemed to have employed a political strategy that would absolve them from accusations of engaging in ethnic politics, each had a significant role to play in the ultimate politicization of ethnic identity in post-1993 Côte d'Ivoire. By casting accusations against each other, the major political players in the campaign leading up to the 1995 elections directly contributed to a political climate in which ethnic identity became a politically polarizing issue in the country. The political strategy had the effect of encouraging ethnic outbidding- as each party tried to label the other party the fear that another ethnic group would gain control of the institutional machinery of the state and use it to subordinate other groups and impose systems of ethnic stratifications drove ethnic groups to collective action.

Party Agenda: national, issue-specific or regional

A survey of the party campaign literature, political speeches associated with the 1995 election, and interviews,[315] indicate that as in Senegal, Ivoirian political party

[315] A core aspect of this research was data collection on political parties: agenda, speeches, publications interviews with party leaders or high-level party officials and other relevant materials. The aim was to

leaders did not set out to become the party of a specific ethnic or religious group. Each of the political parties[316] endorsed broad cross-ethnic support. Party leaders in both countries[317]worked hard to combat the portrayal by the opposition and perception among the public that their parties were ethnic parties. Party leaders often cite diversity among the top-level party officials and support among various ethnic groups in the country as evidence of their cross-ethnic reach. The Secretary General of the RDR, for instance stated that one has only to look at the founders of the party to see that "it is not, nor has it ever been, an ethnic party:"[318] Djény Kobina was from the south-east near the border with Ghana, and identified with the Nzimba people … three of the other eight founding deputies were from the southern and central towns of San Pedro, Sassandra and Bouake. And, Ouattara did not become the leader of the party until after it was established. Herself among the Christian representatives from the Southern parts of Côte d'Ivoire, the General Secretary states that she views the RDR an open political party.[319]

According to the RDR Secretary General party leaders did not set out to mobilize the nordists nor the Muslims: "[o]ur aim was to revert to the principles of Houphouëtism and to offer representation to all Ivoirians-to let everyone know that we are standing up against the establishment on everyone's behalf." [320] Pointing to the

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glean information about the political strategies that political parties and their leaders used to attract voters during the 1995 and subsequent elections in Côte d'Ivoire. This section offers an analysis of the findings from these sources.

[316] More specifically, the party manifestos and agendas and other party literature.

[317] In the case of Senegal, the political parties and political elites in Casamance in particular.

[318] Interview with RDR party officials, at party headquarters, 2 Plataeu, Abidjan, March 2008.

[319] Interview with RDR party officials, at party headquarters, 2 Plataeu, Abidjan, March 2008.

[320] Interview, Abidjan, II Plateau, March 2008.

heightened salience of ethnic identity in the post-1993 era[321], other RDR top officials argue that one of the early difficulties faced by the RDR and its leadership was being able to break-through the identity politics. One top level official stated that the political climate leading up to the 1995 elections cost the party votes in several regions of the country. This as: "many [people] believed the claims and rumors [that the RDR was an ethnic party] and decided that it was better to vote for their own ethnic groups… [i]n such a political environment, it is hard to dissuade people otherwise." [322]

RDR party manifesto and party documents generally support the Secretary General's claims that the RDR attempted to make cross-ethnic appeals. While there has been some reference to the Charter of the North[323], there are no explicit references to ethnic or religious or even regional concerns directed specifically at attracting northerners/Muslim voters. The official party documents focus on economic issues and call for a revival of the old political principles of Houphouët-Boigny, which they claim was becoming corrupt under Bédié's leadership.[324] Also, when interviewed, most Ivoirians reported not ever having heard RDR leader(s) use ethnic rhetoric during public address at political rallies or in official statements to the press. As one RDR party official explains:

> Given the vast number of northerners and Muslims that fled the PDCI for our party because of Bédié's policies, which were no longer honoring our rules of ethnic balancing in the government and that discriminated against northerners

[321] Brought on by the changes the informal institutional rules governing ethnic balancing and land policies such as the land belongs to whomever cultivates it and to the introduction of Ivorité,
[322] Interview, Abidjan, II Plateau, March 2008.
[323] A document developed by northern interests with calls for a fuller recognition of the Muslim religion, greater political recognition of the north's political loyalty" and an end to "Baoulé nepotism" in recruitment to public jobs."
[324] A survey of public speeches and newspaper coverage of the RDR activities during its formative years (1994- 1995), indicates that the rhetoric remained loosely based on accusations of corruption by the PDCI and suggestions of alternatives means of governance that the RDR would employ if elected into power.

> with the introduction of Ivoirité, it was not necessary for us to direct our campaign messages towards them. [325]

Indeed, many Ivoirian northerners indicate that the viewed the changes to long-standing rules governing representation and land and citizenship rights by Bédié as systematic discrimination against Ouattara and by extension, all northerners/Muslims. Consequently, Ouattara and the RDR became, for many, a very powerful symbol for the grievances of the disenfranchised northern political, economic, ethnic and regional grouping. The more Bédié tried to delegitimize the RDR as a political party by describing it as a northern regional party with a sinister Muslim agenda, the more solidified the RDR's electoral base became. Many felt, for instance, that by declaring that both parents ("le père et la mère") of the candidates "doit ètre Ivoiriens" was a referendum against all northerners and Muslims and not just Ouattara as an individual and support among northerners grew exponentially.

As beneficiaries of instant political and economic support from northerners however they also became easy targets for the ruling party and the FPI to paint the RDR as an ethnic party. Rather than attracting cross-ethnic support via campaign messages promoting the principles of *Houphouëtism* and the promise of more economically rational policies, the RDR failed to expand its support base as it became embroiled in claims and counter claims of ethnic politicking.[326] The problem as RDR leaders saw it was a difficulty in breaking through the identity politics and mis-perceptions to capture cross-ethnic support. An RDR party official stated:

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[325] Interview, Abidjan, March 2008.

[326] the RDR pointed out in campaign speeches and interview statements that it was actually Bédié that has been purging the PDCI and other important institutions, of northerners and Muslims, especially those in high-level positions

> Although the central emphasis of our campaign was more on the problems facing the nation and the northerners all relate to these problems, they readily supported the RDR because the leader is himself a northerner. Sadly, this made it difficult to attract others as well. People felt that because so many northerners supported us, we were the kind of party that Bédié claimed us to be… Ivoirité made people here afraid. We were all afraid... We never thought to see this type of problem ici en Côte d'Ivoire.[327]

While the RDR Secretary General and other party officials were very careful to highlight the evidence of their cross-ethnic public and national campaign platform, as Chandra (1994) points out however, the political use of ethnicity is not always overt. Like Gbagbo (FPI) and Bédié (PDCI), the RDR and Ouattara adopted a strategy of accusing the opposition parties of engaging in ethnic politics, while advancing a political campaign encouraging cross-ethnic support. [328] The incentive to appeal to a particular ethnic group may not have been strong but the heightened salience of ethnicity presented an opportunity for the parties to seek to undermine the opponent via accusations of engagement in ethnic politics. The result is the prolonging and even deepening of ethnic politicization.[329]

[327] Field Research, Interview II Plateau, March 2008.

[328] Although it is only fair to point out that the RDR did not initiate this political strategy, but got drawn into the political back and forth from having to defend against claims by Bédié and the PDCI officials that the party had a "sinister Muslim plot." Nonetheless, before long, all three major political parties and leaders became embroiled in what can only be described as ethnic politicking, which served not only to heighten ethnic tensions and make ethnicity the dominant issue of the national discourse. It also divided the population along ethnic lines. Individuals became more likely to align with one party over the other on the bases of ethnic affiliation.

[329] As people become more likely to align with a political party on the basis of ethnicity and become entrenched.

Political Parties and Ethnic politics in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

As established in previous chapters, unlike the political parties in post-1993 Côte d'Ivoire, the political parties in Senegal, have not had as much difficulty garnering cross-ethnic votes. Indeed, while political parties such as And-Jëf Parti pour la Democratie et le Socialisme and the Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) and their respective party leaders, Landing Savane and Robert Sagna, have had to battle claims of being ethnic parties,[330] the issue of ethnicity has never dominated Senegal's[331] national political discourse.

One of the primary reasons for this concerns the trans-ethnic nature and redistributive roles of the religious Orders. Political parties' dependence upon the Sufi Orders for political support and their role as redistributive intermediaries makes broad, cross-ethnic political support absolutely crucial to political success in Senegal. Fear of marginalization subsequently makes it very difficult for party leaders to use ethnicity as a primary mobilization strategy. Thus, while there were many snide remarks and dismissals of Robert Sagna's political party by various party officials, such claims are rarely explicitly advanced as a means of rallying political support or used as part of general electoral campaigns.[332]

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[330] Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Takku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) is often referred to as the party of the Diola (largely due to the massive following among the Diola in the Casamance region of Senegal) despite diversity among party officials and cross-ethnic political support among the various ethnic groups across the country. These include Muslims, Wolofs, Serers and Peuls. Diolas are predominantly Christians. For some, a fairly large political following among the Diola in the southern regions of Casamance and the fact that the party leader himself is Diola seem to be adequate grounds for the claims.

[331] Again, the emphasis here is on Senegal north of the Gambia. The issue of Casamnace is dealt with in more details in the following chapter.

[332] Robert Sagna was one of the most frequently discussed party leaders whenever the issue of ethnic voting and ethnic parties were raised. While not one of the most influential Senegalese politicians Sagna's is viewed as a strong political rival and he is often credited for his rise to prominence in national level politics via the PS. The issue of his ethnicity and the regional support he enjoys is brought up as a swipe at his growing popularity. As indicated earlier however, party leaders for the most part are not

For his part, Sagna often emphasizes his years of experience in politics, his close proximity to former President Senghor and downplays his role as mayor of Ziguinchor, which is 61 percent Diola. When Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal's (RSD/TDS) party leaders directly address the issue a variant of the following response is often offered:

> Zigunichor is a region that is more than sixty percent Diola and having served as the mayor for years, of course it makes sense that the people of Zinguinchor are going to vote predominantly for the Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) in the national elections. This is because they see the work and know that all the positives that having strong representation from the can bring to the region and to Senegal as a whole. The Senegalese people know us, and they know we are not driven by ethnic interests but by what is best for Senegal. [333]

Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) party leaders also point out that Robert Sagna did become the mayor of Ziguinchor because he is Diola but rather, because he is the best person to get the job that needs to be done, accomplished. Also, while party officials of the Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) are mindful of bring national level attention to the problems of the region,[334] they are also mindful of the fact that the limited chance of success without cross-ethnic political support across the Senegalese population.

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willing to make the issue a part of any legitimate and or official political discourse. For the most part, each parties' dependence on the Sufi Orders assures this.

[333] Field research interview, Dakar, Senegal. Dec. 2007. Notably, besides serving as mayor of Ziguinchor from 1984-2009, Robert Sagna was a minister twenty two years; serving the presidencies of both Senghor and Abdou Diouf (1978-2000). An agricultural engineer, Sagna has served as: secretary of state for human promotion (1978 to 1980); secretary of state for maritime fishing (1980 to 1983); minister of equipment (1983 to 1988); minister of tourism (1987 to 1988); minister of information for the Sénégambia Confederation (1988 to 1989); minister of communication (1988 to 1990); minister of equipment, transport and the sea (1991 to 1993); and, minister of state for agriculture (1993 to 2000).

[334] The Cassamance region in Senegal receives very little in terms of governmental resources. Compared to the regions North of the Gambia, public investments in these regions are poor. Resources such as health care services, public infrastructure, access to running water and schools are much less readily available in Ziguinchor than in St. Louis for example (this from personal observation having spent a week in each location and being taking around by the locals to observe just these elements).

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, a survey of the FPI's campaign literature, party agenda, speeches and interview statements, suggests that Gbagbo made some attempt to promote a national image. For example, the campaign literature dispersed to the public highlighted economic issues and made general charges of corruption and governmental inadequacies against the ruling party. Interviews with top ranking FPI party officials also suggest however that having large Bété support[335]the party made the political party vulnerable to accusations that Gbago and the FPI were "hardliner Bété harboring ill-feelings against the PDCI ever since the government troops quelled their rebellion and calls for secession in 1969."[336]

Some argue that it was this political vulnerability that informed Gbagbo's decision to initiate as a political strategy, accusing the PDCI of engaging in ethnic politics. The effects of the changes to the rules governing ethnic representation and the introduction of the concept of Ivoirité on the political climate, particularly the salience of ethnic identity, provided a key opening and opportunity to score political points by pointing to all of the ways in which the PDCI seemed to be moving in favor of the Baoulé rather than as the national party it proclaimed to be. By preemptively shifting the focus of the "ethnic issue" onto the ruling party, the FPI felt that: (a) it could not be accused of making appeals to ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool; and (b) it could nullify the ethnic issue as a legitimate political issue, by pointing out that national party itself showed preference for one particular ethnic group.

The FPI's party leaders did not seem to anticipate the effect that counter-charges would have on the issue of ethnicity. Rather than absolving the political party of

[335] Particularly in south-western, the south- eastern regions as well as Abidjan.
[336] Field Research interview, Feb.2008.

charges of engaging in ethnic politics, the strategy would embroil Côte d'Ivoire in vicious battle of charges and counter-charges, at the center of which was the issue of ethnic identity. The political strategy made the issue of ethnicity more politically salient. Indeed, by asserting that the PDCI was a partial regime that systematically favored the interests of the Baoulé, the FPI did much more to advance the salience of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool than it did to widen the party's political appeal to other ethnic groups.

For many Ivoirians, the strategy seemed to confirm the perceptions that the FPI was more concerned about ethnically related issues than the more pressing issues facing the political nation. For instance, many Ivoirians felt that by making the land issues (grievances associated with the ethnic groups of the south-western regions, particularly the Bété) front and center of his political campaign at the national level, Gbagbo was advancing the interests of his own ethnic group (Bété), at the expense of other groups such as the Baoulé and the northerners. Gbgabo's continued agitation over particular local southwestern grievances gave many the impression that the FPI was less concerned with specifying the benefits that the party would bring to the different segments of the society and more concerned with advancing the cause of the Bété.[337] Many northerners felt personally affronted by what they perceived by Gbagbo's "campaign against the nordists."[338] For one respondent: "the barely veiled anti-Islam

[337] Field Research Interview, Abidjan, Jan.-June 2008.
[338] Field Research Interview, Abidjan, March 2008

religious undertones of Gbagbo rhetoric, not to mention his wife's campaign statements, make supporting the FPI impossible." [339]

Of the major political parties involved in the Ivoirian 1995 electoral campaign, the PIT was perhaps the party with the least ethnic specific supporters and consequently, the broadest campaign appeal and national image since 1990. The leadership of the PIT in Francis Wodié have explicitly refused to campaign on the basis of ethno-regional or area-specific issues. Rather, as a political campaign strategy, Francis Wodié, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Abidjan, Cocody, presents an agenda highlighting "principled leftist or social democratic alternatives to those currently being advanced."[340] According to a party official Wodié, "prefers to stay clear of the ethnic bating … [he] simply wants to devise and introduce constructive ideas of how to improve the socio-political and economic problems facing Côte d'Ivoire."[341] Yet, despite the effectively organized electoral campaign and national agenda, which many believed were effectively presented to the public at political rallies or via the media, Wodié failed in his presidential endeavors –receiving a mere 3percent of the electoral vote in the 1995 election.

The PIT's lack of success is consequential for a number of reasons. First, as the only political party that refused to invoke the issue of ethnicity as a part of his campaign, one would expect that the PIT leader would have received overwhelming cross-ethnic support. That the PIT was unsuccessful in its electoral bid therefore, speaks the degree to which ethnicity had become politically salient and a divisive issue in post-

[339] Field Research Interview, Abidjan, March, 2008. Gbagbo and especially is wife are known for their harsh statements against Muslims in Côte d'Ivoire. As Christians from the South, the statements against Muslims and Immigrants are taken as slights by many.
[340] Field Research Interview, Abidjan, May. 2008. Also see Crook, 1997.
[341] Field Research Interview, Abidjan, May 2008.

1993 Ivoirian national politics. Crook (1997) asserts for instance that the PIT lack of success was directed related to the refusal or inability of the party leader to capture a local or ethno-regional power base. With party support clearly delineated along ethnic lines, there was little left to mobilize by 1995.

It bears pointing out here that it is not uncommon for voters/potential voters to delineate along sharp lines over emotive issues. Public opinion polls have shown that in general, emotive issues draw strong responses from individuals and, as such, one is less likely to sit on the fence or shy-away from taking one side over the other. In terms of the RDR, there is a definite correlation between the changes to the institutional rules governing political representation, land rights and citizenship rights and the introduction of Ivoirité, and a large concentration of Muslim/ northerner support.

While there are no official numbers for membership to the RDR, it is estimated by party officials that more than 85percent of their supporters are northerners and Muslims. This is apparent from the 1995 legislative election results. The RDR either won all of the fourteen seats located in the far northern prefectures of Katinola, Dabakala, Odiénné, Seguela, Korhogo, Boundiali and Ferkessedougou.[342] The RDR also won in Abobo and Abidjan, which, while relatively diverse, have a large population of northerners. Youpugon in particular, has a very large population of Muslims, northerners, and immigrants. Many of the house workers and traders from this cartier have ties to the north, ethnically and/or religiously.[343] Conversely, the RDR had little success garnering political support and ultimately, expanding its support base,

[342] Official Election Results 1995, Assembly Nationale . Also published in Fraternité Matin.
[343] While data on the actual population of Muslims/northerners are limited, this statement is corroborated by multiple interview sources and based on my own observations of the cartier. On my many visits to Yopougun I notice that the preferred attire is the grand Bobo (the garb that Muslims in general wear). The use of the Dioula language is also more widely used here than in Treichville for instance.

in the Southwestern or Southeastern regions. The party also had very little success in regions of Abidjan, such as Treichville, with relatively low northern/Muslim populations.

When asked how to explain why they voted for a particular party/candidate and not others, a majority of non-Muslim Ivoirians, regardless of class or educational background, stated that they did not vote for the RDR because it was an ethnic party. This is significant because when asked to cite examples of the RDR leader's use ethnic rhetoric during his public addresses at political rallies or statements to the press, no one seemed able to do so. Some quickly noted their party leader insist that the RDR is an ethnic party, thus it must be so.

Furthermore, they point out, whether the party leaders are explicitly ethnic is not very important: "everyone knows and it is clear by looking at the party's supporters that they are either all Muslim or northerners."[344] When asked which of the party leaders was the most qualified, and experienced to lead the country, the majority of Ivoirians chose Ouattara above both Bédié and Gbagbo. Ouattara had a stronger command of the economy and showed better proclivity towards good governance than Bédié. Some respondents felt however that whether he had the educational qualifications is hardly important. According to one respondent:

> Regardless of his qualification, he is not Ivoirian and therefore not fit to hold the office of the Presidency. He was Prime Minister yes, but nothing in the Constitution says that he cannot be Prime Minister, so let him be Prime Minister. But, by the constitution de la Côte d'Ivoire, he cannot be President, c'est tout.[345]

[344] Interview, field research. Abidjan, February, 2008.
[345] Field Research, Abidjan, Jan. 2008

Some interview respondents suggest that while they liked Ouattara and believed in his ability to run the country, they felt the need to vote for their brothers in order to ensure representation in the government. One respondent explained the reasoning:

> If you have first Bédié representing the Baoulé, giving them jobs and promoting them to higher positions in the government and other sectors. Then you have Gbagbo representing the Bété and their causes. Then you have Ouattara, who has this large Muslim/northern majority and himself a northerner, how else was I going to vote? If I voted for either Gbagbo or Ouattara, I would have voted against my own people and besides my own interests. Do you think that if Gbagbo or Ouattara were to win they would be fair to the Baoulé? They would take care of their own. In fact, look at us since Gbagbo has been in power; he has given all of the decent jobs to the Bété. Even the diplomat to France is now Bété. I have no doubt that Ouattara would do the same if he ever gets into power.[346]

Grievances, identity construction and mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire: case of the northern "Dioulas"

As established in previous sections of this dissertation, the construction of a northern identity in Côte d'Ivoire dates back to the colonial period. Both the colonial and post-colonial economic policies have disproportionately benefitted the south. Incidents of poverty for instance, have been consistently higher in the northern regions relative to the rest of the country. In 1999, between seventy percent and ninety percent of the population residing in the northern regions were classified as poor compared to fifty percent in the southern regions (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Also, the vast majority of economic activities and production occurs in the Southern regions of the country.

[346] Field Research, Abidjan, Jan. 2008.

Also, historically, laborers in Côte d'Ivoire have come from the northern regions of Côte d'Ivoire, and neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso. As explored in previous chapters, the practice started during the early period of colonial rule in response to the problem of insufficient labor force among southern Ivoirians to work on European plantations. The French resolved the problem by introducing a system of indentured labor whereby a large numbers of workers were recruited from neighboring countries. [347] Houphouët-Boigny continued to encourage the migration after independence, through an informally established rule of "the land belongs to he who cultivates it" (Dozon, 1985: 72). This policy encouraged not just seasonal labor migration, but rather a full scale "open door policy." Entire families were brought to settle in southern Côte d'Ivoire and set up their own farms (Zolberg, 1964). By the late 1940s, many of the local cities had a majority of immigrants from foreign countries or other regions of Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, in some rural districts, there are more foreigners than natives. The 1955 census indicates that foreign Africans made up nearly half of the total population of Abidjan. The original inhabitants, the Ebrié, constituted less than seven percent of the city's total population as early as 1948. Houphouët-Boigny's policy notably increased that figure. By 1980, about twenty-five percent of the city's total population was foreign nationals.[348]

One impact of this policy is that it amplified strained relationships between original inhabitants and foreigners. As more and more forest land had to be cleared for the increasing number of farms and migration started spreading from the west to the east, the migrant population was coming into constant conflict with the more recent

[347] See Chapter Four for a full discussion of the French migrant policy in Côte d'Ivoire.
[348] Raulin (1957)

settlers. Disputes over ownership of the land were often brought by the Bété against those who inhabited the Western regions. According to Raulin, "…since the Bété knows that the population of Gagnoa is made up mostly of non-Bété foreigners, he fears, rightly or wrongly, the rule of the non-Bété and he rebels against the Dioula."[349]These disputes were often settled by government officials in favor of the Baoulé and the Voltaic and Burkinabé migrant farmers, whose cocoa production contributed significantly to the government revenue. One older Ivoirian explained that the Bété resented seeing the Baoulé and "Dioula" take over their land.[350]

Similarly in the Agboville region, the Abbey natives feared being eliminated from their own region's development by the foreign townsmen. During the 1920s and 1930s, the native Dida and Divo were contemptuous of the Baoulé and Dioula migrant workers who engaged in work reserved for women in their own society. Except for exacting compensation payment for the use of their lands, the Dida had little to do with foreigners. As land became more and more scarce, the various ethnic groups involved in cocoa production began to view each other as competitors rather than partners. northerners as well as foreigners found themselves increasingly distinguished from those who considered themselves to have a greater indigenous right to land within the cocoa producing areas

Another implication of the colonial migrant policy and Houphouët-Boigny's open arm policy is that being northerner became synonymous with being a foreigner. There are many empirical accounts of the tendencies of Southerners to treat northerners more or less as foreigners from Burkina Faso, Mali or Guinea. Because of shared

[349] Ibid.
[350] Interview, Abidjan, March , 2008.

geographic, regional and cultural traits between some internal migrant workers and foreign migrants workers, being northerner also became synonymous with being a Muslim. Islam and northerner, the two broad groups became conflated in political discourse. The growth of a specifically northern identity this developed not only through Mandé and Voltaic perceptions of themselves in relation to the power of the hierarchy in Côte d'Ivoire, but was also consolidated by the southern, particularly Baoulé, and Bété perceptions of people of northern origin as Muslims and immigrant farm laborers (Collette, 2006: 620).

Over time, and despite the wide array of ethnic groups, the term "Dioula" came to be the mode of identification for the entire ethnic group (Maouka, Senoufo and Malinké) geographically located in the northern regions of the country. Many people from the north came to identify with being Dioula, because of a sense of shared family names and religion with the fellow northerners. This however, is also a primary reason that many northerners are perceived by other ethnic groups from other regions of the country, particularly those from the South, as foreigners (non-Ivoirian). Historically, northerners are genetically more closely related to citizens of neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea) than they are to other ethnic group. Out -of -country-migrants also tend to be Muslims. In fact, Muslims account for 86percent of the immigrants in Côte d'Ivoire.

While grievances among northerners persisted throughout Houphouët-Boigny's leadership, and always held some mobilizational appeal, it was not until after 1990 that the northern identity became an axis of political competition. In general Houphouët-Boigny enjoyed levels of support as a venerated moral authority and trusted political

leader. Regardless of religion or ethnicity, Ivoirians generally thought well of Le Vieux. This holds true even for those of Bété descent, who otherwise carry a long held grudge for the massacre in 1957.[351] The ability to seek out, gain political the support of and bring all of the major ethnic groups (at both the regional level and local levels) earned him the title of "master of chess." Everyone was aware of Houphouët-Boigny's interests, yet no one was really threatened by them, as he sought to get to his end goal via inclusion rather than exclusion. [352]

As indicated in previous chapters, early on in his administration, Houphouët-Boigny employed a web of informal rules that historically helped to manage inter-cultural relations in such a way that it became woven into the fabric of the state as it consolidated itself between 1960 and 1990. Thus, while there were no formal laws directing an exact quota of ethnic group representation, the cooption of the informal voluntary associations provided a certain ethno-regional balance in the political sphere that assured northerners of reasonable representation. In the June 1946 elections, the leading candidate from the northern Upper Volta region withdrew from the race in exchange for Houphouët-Boigny's pledge of support for northern demands for separate status. [353]

Additionally, while the southern population continued to have better access to education and public facilities, Houphouët-Boigny attempted to bridge the apparent inequality gap during the 1970s by increasing investments into the region. Between 1974 and 1977 Houphouët-Boigny allocated a significant amount in public investments

[351] Houphouët-Boigny ordered government forces to crush the rebellion among the Bété leader demanding session from de la Côte d'Ivoire.
[352] Field Research Interview, Jan. 2008.
[353] Zolberg, p.76

towards the promotion of economic development. In fact, with the notable exception of the Southwest and Abidjan regions, public investments in the North greatly exceeded those allocated to other regions of the country and the amount in 1977 almost doubled that of 1974. Houphouët-Boigny also established six sugar-processing plants in the region.

While the general sentiment among Muslims and northerners in Côte d'Ivoire is Houphouët-Boigny favored the Southern regions and was not all the way successful in bridging the developmental gap between the north and the south, many credit him for at least attempting to do so. According to one interview respondent:

> Le Vieux, he did not give us everything, but at least he tried. He didn't hate us the way this other president does. It was not until that other [president] started firing all of the northerners in the Legislature, dismissed Coulibaly [head of Ivoirian TV] Moussa [Editor of Le Soir], and Yacouba Kebe [managing director of Fraternité Matin], plus introduced ivoirité and prevented Ouattara from running for president, that we came together as a political group. We felt that we were under attack from our own government. We had to support the RDR when it was established."[354]

A key factor to understanding the mobilization force that fused the northern and foreign ethnic and political identities into a single political voice concerns the effects of the introduction of *Ivoirité* on northerners.[355]

Given that internal migrants were often categorized and treated as foreigners /non-citizens, Ivoirité also posed a significant problem for issues surrounding Ivoirian citizenship. Having a name that signaled being of northern descent or Muslim became an albatross around the necks of many given the doubt raised as to the underlying reality of their belonging to the Ivoirian nation (Akindès 2003:15). As one interview respondent expressed to me:

[354] Field research interview, Abidjan, 2008.
[355] See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion

> I have lived all my life in Côte d'Ivoire. I have never lived anywhere else my entire life. My parents grew up here in Abidjan, and this is where I grew up. I raised my own children here, in this country; all of them grown. I have no ties to the rural countryside. I know of no family members in any rural parts of this country…I have served my country well, yet now, when someone asks my name, I get to see them weigh whether or not I am Ivoirian. What else could I be?[356]

The effects of the political use of *Ivoirité* on the massive shift of northern support from the PDCI towards the RDR, *is* also discernable from one of the popular music forms of the 1990s- *Zouglou*.[357] In the song '*Tu sais qui je suis*' ('You know who I am'), Les Poussins Chocs, effectively highlights a fundamental dilemma in the discourses to national identity. The statements that "due to Ivoirité, [an Ivoirian] doesn't know if he'll always be Ivoirian, aptly describes and echoes the sentiments, that many Ivoirian, particularly northerners, felt about their sense of belonging. Akindès (2003) notes for example that where as prior to 1993 having a name that signaled being of northern descent or Muslim would have brought little reaction, after 1993, this not only brought stigmatization of an individual as foreigner and not a true Ivoirian, it also

[356] Interview, field research Abidjan, 2008.

[357] In Côte d'Ivoire, popular music genres such as reggae and Zouglou have served as a domain for the articulation of ideas about politicians, corruption, citizenship, national history and identity. A divisive debate over a particular Zouglous song as to whether it was politically instigative or merely reflective of what was happening in society prompted my including an analysis of the Zouglou and reggae forms of music in Côte d'Ivoire since the 1990s into the project. As a music form, Zouglou emerged in the 1990s and was developed by University students who carved out for themselves a media via which to make their socio-economic and political frustrations and aspirations public. As the political situation became more tense and unstable, the commentaries on socio-political issues grew stronger, more descriptive and more direct. The messages are not meant just to voice the concerns of the people, but also direct messages to the political elites of the actual/possible effects of their policies and actions on the country and its people. The music in general serves as a kind of platform for criticism of the prevailing political and social conditions. It provides commentary on and information about politicians, corruption, citizenship, national history and identity. In this regard, the songs offer keen insights into general public opinion as, well as particularly - university students and graduates- a key study population of this project. For the purposes of this project I will focus on those songs offering commentary on socio-political issues that highlight the undercurrent of the massive shift of supporters from the PDCI to the RDR.

brought “a doubt as to the underlying reality of their belonging to the Ivoirian nation” (Akindès 2003:15). The implicit message is that if one is not assured basic citizenship rights, particularly in a country in which more than thirty percent are immigrants, those directly as well as those indirectly affected, may mobilize to affect change or; an action that may lead (as it did) to social and political instability.

Tu sais qui je suis !
Si l’ivoirien te dit ‘tu sais qui je suis,’
Il veut dire qu’il est ivoirien que toi.
Tu sais qui je suis !
Nouveau millénaire arrive
Où chaque pays prépare son bilan.
C’est là l’ivoirien a la peur au ventre.
Affaire de l’ivoirité,
Parce qu’il ne sait pas s’il sera toujours ivoirien.
Tu sais qui je suis !
Je connaissais un monsieur, il était ivoirien,
Vers la fin il est devenu ghanéen.
Il y a un autre aussi,
Il était ivoirien et puis après il est devenu mossi.
Même le chef du village, le gens ont commencé de dire
Qu’il ne pas ivoirien aussi.

You know who I am!
If an Ivoirian tells you ‘you know who I am’,
He wants to tell you that he is more Ivoirian than you.
You know who I am!
It’s the new millennium
Where every country prepares its assessment.

There, the Ivoirian feels sick with fear of this *Ivoirité* business ,
Because he doesn’t know if he’ll always be Ivoirian
You know who I am!
I knew a man, he was Ivoirian,
And in the end he became Ghanaian.
There was another one,
He was Ivoirian, and afterwards he became Mossi.
Even the village chief, people have started saying
That he isn’t Ivoirian either.

This uncertainty of national identity and the use of nationality to disqualify political opponents are also mentioned by Tiken Jah in the song ‘Plus jamais ça’ (“Never again this”). The song reflect the problems faced by individuals such as Ouattara and RDR founder, Djény Kobina, who, after decades of having held high positions in previous governments and, in the case of the latter, having served as PDCI national secretary for external relations under Houphouët-Boigny, were denied the right

to run for the presidency on the grounds that they could not prove that his parents were Ivoirians. The political nature of these accusations of foreign nationality at founding members of the RDR rallied more individuals who were having similar experiences and sentiments to the party.

Quand ca commence et tu changes de camp Tu deviens automatiquement libérien Ou bien ghanéen, sinon on t'appelle le burkinabé Tout simplement parce que tu change de camp.	When it starts and you change camps You automatically become Liberian Or Ghanaian, or otherwise they call you Burkinabé Simply because you have changed camp.

Perhaps the most dramatically descriptive of the Ivoirian experience (particularly those from the North) is the Zouglou song "Quel Est Mon Pays" by Petit Yodé and Siro. The song raises several scenarios that effectively portray the citizenship dilemma that many Ivoirians faced after 1993. The song questions the validity of considering individuals born in a particular country, even if it is to immigrant parents and non-citizens.

Like 'Tu Sais Qui Je Suis," this song portrays the peculiar dilemma of many Ivoirians, particularly northerners, who had not only lost access to their homes and livelihood, were prevented from passing their land on to their children, but also, their sense of belonging. The song reflects not just the situation at the societal level, but also at the elite levels and as such, provides some insights into why such a large number of northerners were mobilizable as a group in support of Ouattara and the RDR.

De père ou de mère tu es Ivoirien
Trop de frustrations à son égard

Erico est né à Abidjan
Sa mère est Ivoirienne
C'est l'enfant de Kaboré
Kaboré qui est Burkinabé

A trios ans, il a connu le Burkina
A cause de la tradition
Erico Kaboré
Il a été Balafré

Orphelin de père
8 ans grandit avec sa mère
Erico yako
Ivoirienne de mère donc tu es Ivoirien
Pourquoi le refuse a reconnu

Ma mère est guinéenne
Mon père est malien
D'où moi je viens?

Mon père est tchadien
Ma mère béninoise
D'où u moi je viens?
De part et d'autre je suis reconnu
Mais pas en tant que tel
Quel est mon pays?
Le pays du métis

Quand je suis au Gabon
On on m'appelle Ghanéen
Quand je suis au Ghana
On on m'appelle Gabonais?
Au Burkina on dit viola Ivoirien!
En Côte d'Ivoire viola Burkinabé

De part et d'autre je suis reconnu Mais pas en tant que tel
Quel est mon pays?
Le pays de métis?

Regard pas mon visage
Pour m'attribuer une nationalité
Mon accoutrement pour donner le nom de mon pays!
Quel est mon pays?
Le pays de métis
Quel est mon pays?
Le pays de la mère **et** le père.

[If by your] father or mother you are Ivoirian [you will have]
A lot of frustrations in this regard

Erico was born in Abidjan
His mother is Ivoirian
The child of Kaboré
Kaboré who is from Burkina Faso

At three years [old] he came to know to Burkina Faso
Because of tradition
He was scared [marked]
Father died at 8 years
He grew up with his mother
Sorry Erico
Your mother is Ivoirian therefore you are Ivoirian
Why do they refuse to recognize
My mother is Guinean
My Father is Malian
Where am I from?
My father is from Chad
My Mother is from Benin
Where am I from?
I am recognized by both sides
But neither in and of themselves
What is my country?
The country of mixed [people]

When I am in Gabon
They call me Ghanaian
When I am in Ghana
They call be Gabonese
In Burkina [Faso] they say there is an Ivoirian
In Côte d'Ivoire there is a Burkinabe

I am recognized by both sides
But what is my country?
The country of mixed [people]

Do not look at my face
To assign a nationality
My dress to determine my country
What is my county?
The country of the mother **and** father.

Conclusion

While the Ivoirian party leaders did not make direct appeals to a particular ethnic group for political support, changes to informal institutional rules governing political representation and the introduction of Ivoirité created incentives for party leaders to choose as a primary political strategy, the undermining of political opponents via accusations of engaging in ethnic politics. Indeed, since the period leading up to the 1995 elections, charges and counter-charges of ethnic politics have dominated Ivoirian national politics.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Informal Institutional change and ethnic politicization: beyond the cases of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire

Introduction

The measure of the portability of the argument advanced in this dissertation is how well it applies to other cases. We have already identified a few cases in which formal institutional changes (single-party to multi-party rule) have not resulted in significant changes in the salience of ethnicity or ethnic politicization. The question addressed in this chapter, therefore, is whether there are cases besides Côte d'Ivoire, in which changes to informal institutional rules, particularly those governing political representation and labor and land policies that have resulted in ethnic politicization. To address this question the chapter examines the cases of Casamance and Cameroon.

The choice of the Casamance is two-fold. First, while the discussion has so far been centered on Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal north of the Gambia, as any serious student of African politics knows the salience of ethnicity and instances of ethnic politicization are significantly different in the regions south of the Gambia. In fact, since the early 1980s, Casamance has had spells of ethnic related violence and experienced outright ethnic conflict. There is a need therefore to account for the case of Casamance.

Second, the Casamance provides a good test for the applicability of the argument advanced in this dissertation. Both regions— Senegal north and south of the

Gambia—transitioned from single-party to multi-party at the same time, yet while ethnicity became politicized in Casamance, the same was not true for the rest of Senegal. Treating the Casamance as a single case allows us to isolate the distinguishing factors that may speak to the precise question addressed in this dissertation: under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized?

The findings are consequential for the argument advanced in this dissertation. Drawing on the research of scholars such as Linda Beck (1996) and Catherine Boone (2003), the chapter finds that changes to informal institutional rules governing land rights during the 1980s played a significant role in the increased salience of ethnic identity and ultimately, the politicization of ethnicity. In her analysis of institutional variations across sub-Saharan countries and regions within the same country, Catherine Boone (2003) observes that while the formal rules regulating land rights were enforced and adhered to in Senegal north of the Gambia, this was not the case in the Casamance. In the case of the latter (at least until 1980), despite the formal rules stipulating that the transfer of land must be administered by an official of the state in 1964, the Senegalese government had never intervened in rural land-tenure relations in the region. Land had always been transferred on the principles of customary law-from generation to generation or (in the case of a stranger) at the word/promise by the individual that they had the right to farm, though not own, the land, and were generally confirmed by elders and lineage heads.

Accounting for the case of the Cassamance

Applied to the Casamance, the argument advanced in this dissertation would lead us to expect that changes in informal institutional rules, particularly those that govern representation and access to government resources and land and citizenship rights, preceded the heightened salience of ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts in the region. Abundant evidence suggests that it did (Beck 1996; Boone 2003). Catherine Boone's (2003) analysis indicates this is precisely what happened in 1980. Writing about the land riots of the 1980s, Linda Beck (1996) also observed that lands that had previously been communally owned were being expropriated to individuals outside of the region.

These land expropriations ran counter to rules (however informal) that had regulated land rights and tenure for generations (Hessling 1994:251).The changes significantly altered the Diola land tenure rules of communal land tenure rights significantly violated Diola traditions and customs. As a result of the informal rule change, the Diola were no longer able to distribute their land in the way they had done traditionally. What is more, the expropriated lands were being sold at great profits to individuals and corporations outside the region. For example, in areas such as Ziguinchor and Cap Skirring expropriated land was sold to religious marabouts and Wolof and Toukeleur migrants from Senegal north of the Gambia. French firms also acquired land for groundnut production, orchards, and tourism. Beck notes for instance that by 1982 there were over two-thousand cases of land parcels expropriated and attributed non-autochthones[358] in Ziguinchor alone (Beck 1996a:260).

[358] Autochthon is a French term meaning natives. Non-autochthon here refers to those who are not natives of Ziguinchor.

Many locals saw their land expropriated and used in a way that benefit people outside of the region. Many felt that the altered communal land rights resulted in their marginalization. The Democratic League/Labor Party Movement (LD/MPT) Memorandum on the Casamance crisis noted for instance that:

> During 1980-81, about 2,000 parcels of land were expropriated or allocated exclusively to non-indigenes in the Boucotte, Lyndiane, Peyrissac and Tilene districts of Ziguinchor. Driven to the outskirts of the urban areas, that is, to the underdeveloped areas where there are no electricity, running water, health units and trade…, the Administration has thus deprived them of their right to a city while they argued that, at the same time, the populations of the north enjoy that right.[359]

Local objections to farmers with insufficient holdings no longer being able to expand their plots by borrowing land from their mother's brother or by clearing new land; borrowed land no longer being able to be inherited and the influx of individuals (strangers)[360] from the Senegal north of the Gambia were widespread. While the political elites from the northern regions of the country tried to undermine the legitimacy of the objections to the changes in the informal rules regulating land rights and tenure, by painting the land conflicts as a Diola uprising, the changes had also provided large incentives for local Casamaçais politicians to galvanize political support among the Diola by (re)framing the issue as the need for the Diola to stand against the "dominance of northerners and marabouts."[361] Some politicians went as far as to revive old abandoned calls for secession from Senegal.[362]

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[359] Cited in Dykman (2000:8).

[360] It should be noted that the culturally individuals and ethnic groups believe that they have more in common with neighboring Guinea than to their fellow Senegalese nationals. In fact, there have been demands by political leaders of the region to secede.

[361] Boone (2003:133).

[362] This was indeed the cause of the Movement of Democratic Casamance Forces (MDCF). The movement first called for independence from the Senegalese government in the early years after independence and once again at the outbreak of the land riots in 1980.

Accounting for the salience of ethnic identity in Casamance

While French activities in Senegal date back to the early seventeenth century, the region south of the Gambia, known as the Casamance, did not come under France control until the Berlin Conference in 1886. Unlike the region north of the Gambia, the influence of Islam spread never quite took root in the Casamance. Indeed, as Catherine Boone (2003) has noted, the region has remained predominantly Christian and animist. In their discussion of Islam in the Casamance scholars such as Girard (1963) and Villalón (2006) note that, even in those areas of Casamance where Islam became adopted, it was less organized than in the north. This means that the influence of the religious Marabouts have not been as extensive in the region as they have been in Senegal north of the Gambia (Girard 1963; Boone 2003; Villalôn 2005). Consequently, the informal institutional configurations of the Sufi brotherhoods that notably helped to transcend historic ethnic and religious communities and blocked the use of political appeals to cultural differences as a mobilization tool in Senegal north of the Gambia also did not emerge in Casamance. Without the patronage ties of the respective brotherhoods to help de-emphasize ethnic identity, there were fewer constraints on political elites in the Casamance to use ethnic identity as a political tool.

Scholars such as Boone (2004), Darbon (1988) and Beck (1996a) have highlighted significant differences in the state-society linkages and political administration of the Casamance from that of Senegal north of the Gambia. Like Côte d'Ivoire, ethnicity in Casamance has remained a central element of the fabric of the society. Of the Senegalese students interviewed for this dissertation project for example, the majority of those who felt that ethnicity played a key role in Senegalese society

were from Casamance. One student stated that compared to the other ethnic groups, Diolas have to be more careful not to call attention to their ethnic identity lest it cost them a job or promotion.[363]

While unlike Villalón, I observed no instances in which an individual introduced him/herself as belonging to one ethnic group only to find out later that their ethnic background is not as they initially declared, there is a general feeling among the people of the Casamance region of being discriminated against (or viewed less favorably) by the rest of the country. Many from the region readily point to the lack of economic development of the region, the inferior state infrastructure, lack of adequate schools or access to running water as evidence that "no one cares about Casamance and its people."[364] For some, the discrepancy is directly related to political under-representation and, as such, a lack of Diola voices at the national political table. One Diola respondent stated that: "without a strong Diola presence there is no one to look out for the interest of the Diola… [this is] why our region is as it is, and will remain so, unless something changes."[365]

These statements suggest that individuals from Casamance are more likely to vote on the basis of ethnic identity than on the basis of his or her qualifications than other groups in Senegal. Many from the region believe that qualifications and ethnic affiliation are one and the same. One respondent claimed that one simply cannot be qualified to represent the interest of the Diola if one is not a member of the ethnic

[363] Field Research Interview, Dakar, Dec. 2007. During my stay in Senegal, I was able to make a week-long visit to Ziguinchor. My discussions with those living in the Casamance suggest that this view is more strongly held by those in the region than those living in Dakar. Many in Dakar felt that they were able to get their job because of the fact that they are Diola –whom many believe to be the most hardworking and dedicated individuals.
[364] Interview, field research. Dakar.November 2007.
[365] Field Research, Interview, Dakar, Senegal Dec. 2007.

group.[366] This issue became a dominant issue during 1980s. Campaigning on the slogan of getting rid of the problem of "nonrepresentativeness" of elected politicians, about 100 percent of the candidates for the Socialist Party's regional list in 1980 and 1983 were born in Casamance (Darbon, 1988:133-4). Scholars of the region note for instance that Assane Seck was purposefully sidelined in 1983 due to the many objections to his not being a native of the region. Darbon (1988) notes for instance that while Seck was from the region, his roots were shallow. Not only was Seck's father Wolof, Seck himself had spent most of his adult life in Senegal north of the Gambia and France.

Demographics

In terms of demographics, the Casamance has some interesting similarities with Côte d'Ivoire. Like Kenya, certain regions in both Casamance and Côte d'Ivoire are ethnically concentrated. As established in Chapter Three, the Casamance region is the only region (besides Dakar) with a significant ethnic concentration that can be considered in ethno-regional terms. Whereas the other administrative regions are relatively well represented, more than 60 percent of the population in Casamance is Diola.[367] Unlike the case of Mackie Sall being voted into power despite being a minority, politicians from the region are generally from the major ethnic group. A good example of this is Robert Sagna.

[366] Field Research, Interview, Dakar, Senegal Dec. 2007. This stands in contrast to the interview results from those students and individuals north of the Gambia, many of whom stated that their choice of a political candidate is based on the candidate's qualifications and not his or her ethnic background or religion.

[367] Other ethnic groups are the lower numbers of 5percent, twelve percent and fifteen percent respectively.

Given its late integration in the French colony of Senegal [368]the region has a historic distinctiveness that may, to some extent, be likened to the northern Côte d'Ivoire (Beck: 1999:5). Like the northerners in Côte d'Ivoire that feel more akin to their Muslim neighbors to the north than to their fellow citizens from the South (who tend to be predominantly Christians.) the Diola are closer to ethnic groups in neighboring Guinea Bissau than to their fellow Senegalese citizens.

Physically, the Casamance is certainly closer to Guinea than it is to the rest of Senegal. The geographic distinction is perhaps best depicted by the fact that to get to Casamance (Zinguinchor) from Dakar one has to cross two international borders by car, drive around the country of Gambia, or endure an eighteen hour overnight ferry ride on the high seas. Outside of these options, the only other means of travel between the two regions is via airplane. Casamance is also very lush, green and fertile compared to the Sahelian nature of the rest of Senegal. As in Côte d'Ivoire, the geographic differences have contributed to differences in developmental policy initiatives and attitudes towards people from these regions by the rest of the country.

Over time, these disparities and grievances have taken a particularly ethnic resonance. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the Dioulas feel that they are treated less favorably by the Ivoirian government because of their origins in the north and because they are predominantly Muslims. In the Casamance, the Diolas feel that they are treated less favorably by the rest of Senegal because they are physically cut off from the rest of the country and tend to be culturally different.[369] In conclusion, northern Côte d'Ivoire

[368] Casamance was not officially a part of Senegal until the French turned over control in 1960. Until then, much like Senegal, the Casamance was treated as an entity of France.
[369] While Senegal is about 94 percent Muslim, more than 90 percent of the Diolas in Casamance are Christians.

and Casamance have more in common with each than they do with Senegal north of the Gambia. In both cases, changes to these informal institutional rules governing land tenure have resulted in the politicization of ethnic identities.

The Cameroon: Democratic transition: Instability, changes in the salience of ethnicity and ethnic politicization?

Based on the formal institution model, one would expect that the political transition to multiparty elections in Cameroon in 1992 would increase the salience of ethnic identity politically and increase the odds of Cameroon experiencing ethnic politicization and/or conflict. While the period leading up to and during the multiparty elections in 1992 was violent, particularly in the Anglophone areas and in the northern regions, the main central appeals during the electoral contest did not concern ethnic identity. As in Senegal (north of the Gambia), the political salience of ethnic identity and the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool have remained relatively low in the Cameroon since democratic transition in 1992.

This raises the question of why, in their bid to create and establish new political parties, have Cameroonian political elite not appealed to ethnic differences? As one of the most of the most ethnically diverse African countries[370], why have these differences not been exploited by political elites seeking electoral success?

[370] Cameroon is made-up of approximately 250 different ethnic groups and is one of most ethnically diverse countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Region, religion, ethnicity, language and colonial heritage provide several potential political cleavages in Cameroon. Many of these cleavages coincide with disparities in income and have given rise to grievances. Perhaps the two most politically salient social cleavages are language and colonial heritage (Anglophone vs. Francophone) and region (North vs. South). Like Côte d'Ivoire, northern Cameroon is poorer than the South. Also, the Ivoirian Muslims/ north and Christian/south divide are mirrored in the Cameroon. It is generally accepted that the north is less ethnically diverse than the south. As Kofele-Kale, (1986) point out however; northern Cameroon is

TABLE XI
Ethnic Diversity in Cameroon

Ethnic Group	Location	Size
Western Highlanders/Grassfielders (Bamileke, Bamoun)	Northwest	38%
Coastal Tropical Forest Peoples (Bassa, Douala, etc.)	Southwest	12%
Southern Tropical Forest Peoples [Ewondo, Beti (Bulu and Fang subgroups) Maka and Pygmies/Bakas]	South	18%
Fulani (Islamic northerners)	Sahel/N.Desert	14%
Kirdi (non-Islamic northerners).	N.Desert/C.Highlands	18%

Applied to the Cameroon, the argument articulated in this dissertation would lead us to expect that the answer lies with there being little or no changes to the informal institutional rule governing representation and access to public goods despite shifts from single-party to multi-party rule. This is indeed what the evidence indicates. While the constitution of Cameroon officially prohibits the formation of political parties on the basis of ethnicity[371], Cameroonian citizens and political elites have adhered to the informal institutional rule of "regional balance." The rule ensures that the ethnic groups in all regions of the country enjoy reasonable representation and access to state resources and apparatus.

Indeed, ethnic balancing was a prominent feature of the Ahidjo's[372] regime. For about twenty-three years Ahidjo made significant efforts to maintain regional balances in his cabinets. For instance, he ensured that assignments to the more important ministries were rotated among southern ethnic groups (including Anglophones) and

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also divided along ethnic and ethno-religious lines. The Fulani (of Fulbe) are the dominant group in the north despite being a minority (25 percent) in the region (Kofele-Kale, 1986: 55). A majority of the others in the region are the non-Muslim Kirdi. Southerners are divided by language and colonial heritage. The two Anglophone provinces (North West and South West) make up about twenty one percent of the population and about nine percent of the land Cameroon (Kofele-Kale 1986: 62).

[371] A ban was placed on all ethnic associations in 1967.

[372] President Ahmadou Ahidja rose to power in 1958. Throughout his tenure (1958 to 1982 when he relinquished the presidency) Ahidja has continuously advanced ethnic balancing.

those from the north. Ahidjo also made sure that the more important ethnic constituencies were always included in governmental distributive loops.

While there was a change in the office of the presidency in 1982 when Ahidjo handed the government over to his Prime Minister Paul Biya Ahidjo, the informal rule of ethnic balancing has persisted. An increase in the number of southern ethnic groups relative to northerners holding offices in the Biya government has led some to lay complaints that Biya's own ethnic group has benefitted more from his presidential reign than the other ethnic groups. Scholars such as LeVine (1996) and Krieger and Takougang (1998) argue however, that for the most part Biya has been careful to retain a regional balance.

Conclusion

The chapter shows that where the rules of the games governing representation and access to governmental resources are established more by informal institutional rules than formal institutions, shifts in informal institutional rules may affect ethnic politicization in the way that the argument would predict. In the case of Casamance, changes to rules governing land tenure altered incentives for local political leaders to use ethnic identity- Diola- as a mobilizational tool. In the case of Cameroon, the chapter shows that because Biya has continued the trend of ethnic accommodation and ethnic balance, the changes brought about by shifts from single-party to multiparty rule have not significantly affected the political game- at least not enough to bring the issue of ethnic identity to the forefront of Cameroonian politics.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusions

Under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized in multi-ethnic societies? When and why do political elites take advantage of their country's ethnic multi-dimensionality? Under what circumstances does ethnic politicization become an attractive political option for elites? What factors check the use of ethnicity as a political tool? These are some of the questions addressed in this dissertation. This project does not attempt a comprehensive explanation of all the possible factors that may affect ethnic politicization. Rather, its objective is to show the effects of societal-level institutions on the political salience of ethnicity and highlight some of the incentive structures that systematically influence the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool. Conceived narrowly, this dissertation is about the role of informal institutions and institutional rules in attenuating or accentuating ethnic differences in sub-Saharan Africa. While the empirical focus is on African cases, its implications extend well beyond the African continent.

The specific argument the dissertation advances concerns how changes to informal institutional rules can significantly affect the salience and politicization of ethnicity in heterogeneous societies. The logic of the argument offers an alternative analytical framework for considering when and why political elites make appeals to ethnic identity in heterogeneous societies. Following the example of several outstanding scholars, the dissertation explored the colonial and historical legacies of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire in Chapter Four. The Chapter examined when, why and

which ethnic identities become prominent. Building on the assumption that institutional setting helps to define the incentives for and constraints on political behavior, the chapter also explored the institutional incentives and constraints on the use of ethnicity as a mobilizing vehicle by political elites. Rather than focus on formal institutions of the colonial state however, the chapter focuses on societal-level informal institutions.

My argument in this chapter is that societal-level institutions such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal and Voluntary Associations in Côte d'Ivoire that emerged as a result of colonialism may significantly affect whether and to what extent ethnicity becomes politically salient. In some cases, these informal institutions have as much, if not more, impact on ethnic politicization as formal institutions. As intermediaries between the state and society in the provision of public goods Sufi Orders and Voluntary Associations may become the primary mechanisms through which members of ethnic groups derive their ideas about politics and the relevance/non-relevance of ethnicity to them. Where the redistributive system is based on ethnic identity, as in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, ethnicity is likely to be more politically salient than in countries such as Senegal, Cameroon and Tanzania, where resource distribution is not based on ethnic identity.

Chapter Four goes only as far as to account for the variation in the salience of ethnicity between Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire and does not directly explain why ethnicity became politicized in one of the countries but not the other. However, it explains the origins of much of the contemporary ethnic landscape and points out that societal-level informal institutions and institutional rules may be consequential for the politicization of ethnicity.

Chapter Five details how informal institutions such as the Sufi Orders and voluntary associations have operated as redistributive intermediaries between the state and society, and in effect, have helped to attenuate or accentuate ethnic identity. Set within the framework of the prominent debate on religion and ethnic politics, this chapter shows that ethnic political behavior and ethnic politicization are not necessarily determined by religious differences. A better indicator of ethnic politicization is whether the functions and nature of the informal institutions help to accentuate or attenuate ethnic differences.

The chapter demonstrates that while religion is indeed important in shaping behavior, it does not determine political actions. Islam is able to mitigate ethnic politicization in Senegal not because of the religious doctrine or theological foundations, but because of the extent to which the religious structures encourage the facilitation of informal institutions like the institutions of social integration: (a) attenuate ethnic differences, and (b) serve as an effective counterweight to the state, in terms of goods provisions.

Chapter Six assesses the hypothesis that ethnic politicization results from formal institutional changes. By comparing the effects of shifts in the electoral rules (from single-party to multi-party rule) and instances of ethnic politicization in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, this chapter demonstrates that formal institutional changes do not necessarily cause ethnic politicization. Conversely, a comparative analysis of the persistence and changes in informal institutional rules indicate that informal institutions may account for instances of ethnic politicization in a way that formal institutions cannot.

Chapters seven and eight examine data from a number of cases, including Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and the Casamance to test the applicability of the findings in Chapter Six. Exploring cases beyond those named as primary for this study shows that informal institutional rule change can result in shifts in the level of political salience and the politicization of ethnicity. And, while the findings in Chapter Seven that political parties had few incentives to directly appeal to ethnic identity initially seemed contrary to the argument articulated in the dissertation, closer examination of the political strategies employed by party leaders in the elections leading up to the 1995 election indicates that changes to informal institutional rules such as ethnic balancing and the land belonging to whoever cultivates, altered the incentives for party leaders to use ethnicity as a political tool; only, rather than direct appeals, the party leaders accused each other of engaging in ethnic politics as a means of garnering political support.

Overall, the dissertation provides an analytical framework that addresses questions regarding, when, how and what kinds of institutions matter and our understanding and explanation of political outcomes in societies in which informal institutions play key roles. The findings suggest that current theories of formal institutional change offer an incomplete story, particularly with respect to the transition from single-party to multi-party rule and add to the growing evidence of the importance of informal institutions for political outcomes in Africa and beyond. The implications of the analysis and the applications of the argument and framework are potentially far reaching.

Informal Institutions

One of this dissertation's central premise is that level of salience and ethnic politicization will depend on the nature and role of informal institutions, particularly as they relate to how access to public goods and representation are determined (for example on the basis of ethnic affiliation or ethnic transcendence.) A key corollary here is that changes in the informal institutional rules, more so than changes in formal institutional rules, may generate changes in the political salience of ethnicity and influence whether or not ethnicity becomes politicized. In Chapters six, seven and eight, I provided some illustrations of how changing the informal institutional rules governing representation and access to public goods have led to changes in the political salience of ethnicity and incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity as a mobilizing vehicle.

While arguments of the role of informal institutions in African politics are not new, this dissertation marks the first attempt to examine the implications of informal institutional rule changes on ethnic politicization.

Empirical Implications for sub-Saharan Africa

The theoretical proposition developed in this dissertation is that contrary to conventional wisdom, formal institutional rules do not adequately account for variations in ethnic politicization in heterogeneous societies. Once the argument that the use of ethnic identity as a mobilization tool is due to formal institutional changes was examined, this dissertation identified new and interesting testable hypotheses about

ethnic politicization and informal institutions. Chapters six, seven and eight tested the formal and informal institutions' hypotheses and their implications.

The strength of the findings of the influence of informal institutions on ethnic politicization leads me to propose that where informal institutions that attenuate ethnicity persist, particularly in their redistributive roles and continue to establish the rules of the game to a greater degree than formal institutions, the use of ethnicity as a political tool will remain relatively low, despite significant changes to formal institutions.

Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence that depoliticizing ethnicity via formal institutional rules such as elite bargaining over consociational mechanisms (Lijphart,1999) or suppression of the issue through the use of plurality rules and gerrymandering for ethnic equality (Horowitz,1985), promotes political stability. What does seem to promote political stability is maintaining (where they have successfully existed) informal institutional rules governing representation and access to public goods. The claim here is not that this will entirely and successfully depoliticize ethnicity, but rather that, if maintained, they will continue to attenuate rather than accentuate ethnicity and thereby help to constrain the use of ethnic identity as a political tool. After all, if the informal rules governing political representation and access to public goods have provided constraints on the political use of ethnicity, the incentive to use ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool will remain relatively low if they are allowed to persist.

The dissertation findings call for more detailed institutional analysis. For example: What institutions other than electoral institutions influence ethnic

politicization in heterogeneous societies? When are individuals more likely to be susceptible to ethnic appeals and voting along ethnic lines, or joining an ethnic party? What institutions create incentives to, or deter the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool? How can formal institutional rules be crafted to reinforce rather than undermine existing informal institutional rules that have successfully attenuated or contained the salience of ethnicity over time?

This direction of research also calls for greater incorporation of nuances in institutional analyses. The examples in this dissertation show that identical formal institutions often produce dissimilar outcomes because the underlying informal institutional rules are very different. Also, we need to account for why and how institutions rules change. It is often theoretically unclear how an individual can change the very institution within which she is embedded and that defines the boundaries within which she operates. It is quite possible that questions of legitimacy may initiate institutional change. In such cases, threats to political power can induce a political leader to institute change in the political rules of the game and consequently the rules governing representation and access to state goods.

Empirically, it is possible that shifts in the relative access to goods and representation may result in individuals more likely to support elites and political parties that seek to champion her grievances via ethnic appeals and for political elites to use ethnic appeals as a means of tapping into the grievances of a particular ethnic group(s). While Fearon and Laitin (2003) have found that grievances such as income inequality and cultural suppression inadequately predict ethnic conflict, scholar such as Stewart (2000) and Langer (2005) have found that where grievances fall along ethnic or

ethno-regional lines, individuals are likely to vote along ethnic lines, where political elites or political parties have sought to emphasize them. Also, sensing political vulnerability to appeals to ethnic related grievances, political elites are likely to try to garner votes by tapping into and emphasizing these grievance, whether explicitly as ethnic appeals, or more covertly as mere grievances.

Additional Implications and Theoretical Extensions

The implications of the arguments developed in this dissertation go beyond sub-Saharan Africa. They are applicable to studies on other regions of the world, especially heterogeneous societies. For example, there is the general question of the political function of ethnicity and the role of political institutions in providing incentives or constraints on ethnic mobilization. Are ethnic groups simply mobilizing vehicles for political elites and political parties? If so, to what extent is this dependent on the political institutions in place? According to the argument developed in this dissertation, the political institutions that govern access to public goods play a significant role in influencing whether ethnicity is politically salient and likely to be used as a mobilizational tool. Often times, these institutions are not the state-level formal institutions that are generally the focus of much of the academic literature but rather societal-level informal institutions such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal and Voluntary Associations in Côte d'Ivoire.

The informal institutions argument can also help address questions regarding the types of political parties we can expect to emerge in a particular country (for example, ethnic parties). Considering societal-level informal institutions and their role in

establishing the political rules of the game, particularly as it relates to the use of ethnic identity politically can help in this regard.

Lastly, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of considering informal institutions as independent variables in their own rights rather than mere as residual variables that are considered only after formal institutions are no longer able to account for the variation in outcomes. The central argument is capable of generating many more testable implications and can even be extended in interesting ways to explain instances of ethnicity politicization, or the lack thereof, in heterogeneous societies beyond sub-Saharan Africa. The implications of the analysis and the application of the argument and framework are potentially far reaching well beyond the African continent.

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APPENDIX A

Research Instruments

Participant Code:_____

Interview Questionnaire
Questions for Political Elites

Date of Interview: Language of Interview:

Country: Location:

Male_____ Female_____
In what year were you born_____?
Where were you born_____?
Where else have you lived_____? For how long_____?

1. Besides being a _____(insert nationality), which specific group do you identify with first and foremost?

2. How do you self-identify?
   - By nationality then ethnicity
   - By ethnicity then nationality

3. How do you or your party seek to attract voters? Why?

4. In what ways does your party differ from other political parties in _____(insert country)

5. What are some of the factors you believe voters in _____ (insert country) consider when choosing which political candidates to vote for?

6. Using a scale of 1 -5 (where 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest) to what extent do you think that voters in _____(insert country) choose political candidates on the basis of:

(a) Their abilities 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Their ethnic affiliations 1 2 3 4 5
(c) Political ideology/platform 1 2 3 4 5

(d) Their religious affiliations 1 2 3 4 5
(e) Are there other reasons? How would you rank these?

7. What types of political appeals do you think voters in _____ (insert country) respond to the most? On a scale of one to five (1 being the lowest and 5 the highest)

a. ethnic appeals 1 2 3 4 5
b. class and social status 1 2 3 4 5
c. national issues and concerns 1 2 3 4 5
d. abilities 1 2 3 4 5
e. political ideology 1 2 3 4 5
f. religious affiliations 1 2 3 4 5
g. Are there other appeals? Using the same scale, how would you these?

8. How would you rank the order of importance of the following factors voters consider when choosing a political party or candidate? Use a scale of 1-5 (1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest).

(a) Party or candidate that emphasizes socio-economic issues 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Party or candidate that advocates women's rights 1 2 3 4 5
(c) Shared ethnic affiliation 1 2 3 4 5
(d) Party or candidate that advocates Health issues 1 2 3 4 5
(e) Party or candidate that advocates human rights issues 1 2 3 4 5
(f) Are there other factors? Using the same scale, how would you rank these?

10. To what extent do you think that voters in _____ (insert country) would respond to the following appeals during periods of economic growth? Use a scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).

(a) Appeals to the free-market and privatization 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Appeals to the women's issues 1 2 3 4 5
(c) Appeals to religion 1 2 3 4 5
(d) Appeals to a particular ethnic group 1 2 3 4 5

11. If faced with economic decline describe the types of strategies you would use to attract votes?

12. During periods of economic decline what types of political strategies are most likely?
to win you political support? Why?

13. How do you think that the change from single-party system has affected the types of strategies that you or your party employ to attract votes? If no affect, can you tell me why there is none?

14. Do you think that enough/adequate measures are in place to stop/prevent appeals on ethnic basis? Do you know of any such measures? If so, can you tell me more about them?

15. What do you think about your judicial system?

16. How would you rate its overall effectiveness/performance?
    (1) excellent
    (2) fair
    (3) weak
    (4) poor

17. On a scale of 1-5 (1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest) how would you rank your confidence in your judicial system?
    (1) Extremely low
    (2) Low
    (3) Neutral
    (4) Medium
    (5) High
    (6) Extremely high

Ethnic affiliation of mother _____ Ethnic affiliation of Father _____

Religion_____ Brotherhood_____

Thanks for your participation. If there are any further questions or concerns, I may be contacted at shanjani@ou.edu. You may also get contact my advisor via email at mps@ou.edu.

APPENDIX A

Research Instruments

Participant Code:_____

Interview Questionnaire
Questions for Professionals/Experts and Students

Date of Interview: Language of Interview:

Country: Location:

Male_____ Female_____

In what year were you born_____?
Where were you born_____?
Where else have you lived_____? For how long_____?

1. Besides being a _____ (insert nationality), which specific group do you identify with first and foremost?

2. How do you self-identify?
   - By nationality then ethnicity
   - By ethnicity then nationality

3. Have your ethic affiliations led to any benefits or problems?
_____Yes No_____

4. In your opinion, do people from your ethnic group get their fair share of government services? Why/why not?

_____Yes _____No Not sure_____

5. Do you think that your ethnic group gets a fair chance at government appointment? Why or why not?

6. Do you think that the government favors other ethnic groups more than yours?
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Don't know
   4. Disagree
   5. Strongly Disagree

7. Some people think that if people do not support members of their own group then they will be dominated by people from other areas who do. What is your opinion?

8. Do you think that this is truer of the past? At what times in the past has this been truer? Why has this changed?

9. Do you support a political party? Which party? Why or on what bases do you support this particular party?

10. In what ways is the party that you support different from the other parties?

11. What are some of the factors that you consider when choosing which political candidates to vote for?

(a) Their abilities 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Their ethnic affiliations 1 2 3 4 5
(c) Political ideology/platform 1 2 3 4 5
(d) Their religious affiliations 1 2 3 4 5
(e) Are there other reasons? How would you rank these on the same scale?1 2 3

12. Some people these days are saying that citizens in countries with multiple ethnic groups are motivated mainly by ethnic appeals. Do you think this is true of _____ (insert country)? Why/why not?

13. How would you rank the order of importance of the following factors when choosing a political party or candidate? Use a scale of 1-5 (1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest).

(a) Party or candidate that emphasizes socio-economic issues 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Party or candidate that advocates women's rights 1 2 3 4 5
(c) Shared ethnic affiliation 1 2 3 4 5
(d) Party or candidate that advocates Health issues 1 2 3 4 5
(e) Party or candidate that advocates human rights issues 1 2 3 4 5
(f) Other? If yes, what are they and how would you rank these?

14. To what extent do you think voters in _____ (insert country) respond to the following types of political appeals? Use a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest),

(a) Ethnic appeals 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Class and social status 1 2 3 4 5
(c) National issues and concerns 1 2 3 4 5

15. Do you think that enough/adequate measures are in place to stop/prevent mobilization on the basis of ethnicity? If so, can you tell me about them?
_____Yes No _____

16. What do you think about your judicial system?

17. How would you rate its overall effectiveness/performance?
(a) Excellent
(b) Fair
(c) Weak
(d) Poor

18. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest and 5, the highest) how would you rank your confidence in your judicial system
(1) Extremely low
(2) Low
(3) Neutral
(4) Medium
(5) High

19. If faced with economic hardships (eg. unemployment) would this affect your choice of political candidate or party? If yes, in what way (s)?

20. If faced with economic hardships (eg. unemployment) which candidate would you most likely support? Use a scale of 1 -5 (1 being the lowest and 5 the highest).
(a) One who advocates continued privatization 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Socialist based party member 1 2 3 4 5
(c) One who is from a particular ethnic group 1 2 3 4 5
(d) One who is highly educated but from a different ethnic group than your own 12345

21. How do you think the introduction of the multi-party system has affected the strategies that political elite take to attract votes?

Ethnicity of mother _____ Ethnicity of Father _____

Religion_____ Brotherhood_____

Thanks for your participation. If there are any further questions or concerns, you may contact me at shanjani@ou.edu. You may also contact my advisor via email at mps@ou.edu.

APPENDIX B

Maps: Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon

Map I: Senegal located on Map of West Africa



APPENDIX B

Map II: Côte d'Ivoire located on Map of West Africa

APPENDIX B

Map III: Cameroon located on Map of West Africa